# BR-WE-013: Audit-Tracked Execution Block Clearing

**Business Requirement ID**: BR-WE-013
**Category**: Workflow Engine Service
**Priority**: **P0 (CRITICAL)** - SOC2 Type II Compliance Requirement
**Target Version**: **V1.0**
**Status**: ✅ **APPROVED** - Ready for Implementation
**Date**: December 20, 2025

---

## 📋 **Business Need**

### **Problem Statement**

When a workflow execution fails (`wasExecutionFailure: true`), BR-WE-012 blocks subsequent executions to prevent cascading failures from non-idempotent operations. Operators need a way to clear this block after manual investigation, but the clearing action MUST be auditable for accountability and SOC2 compliance.

**v1.0 Limitation Without BR-WE-013**: Operators must delete the failed WorkflowExecution CRD to clear the block. This:
- ❌ Violates SOC2 CC7.3 (Immutability) - audit trail deleted
- ❌ Violates SOC2 CC7.4 (Completeness) - gaps in execution history
- ❌ Violates SOC2 CC8.1 (Attribution) - no record of who cleared the block
- ❌ Violates SOC2 CC4.2 (Change Tracking) - no audit of clearing action

**SOC2 Compliance Context**: SOC2 Type II certification was user-approved as a v1.0 requirement (December 18, 2025), elevating BR-WE-013 to **P0 (CRITICAL)**.

**Impact Without This BR**:
- ❌ Failed execution history lost when WFE deleted
- ❌ No audit trail of who cleared blocks
- ❌ No accountability for block clearing decisions
- ❌ SOC2 compliance audit failures
- ❌ Difficult forensics for post-incident reviews

---

## 🎯 **Business Objective**

**WorkflowExecution Controller SHALL provide a mechanism for operators to clear `PreviousExecutionFailed` blocks that:**
1. **Authenticates** the operator's identity using Kubernetes authentication
2. **Records** WHO cleared the block in the audit trail
3. **Preserves** the original failed WorkflowExecution CRD (no deletion)
4. **Requires** explicit acknowledgment (not accidental)
5. **Complies** with SOC2 Type II audit requirements

### **Success Criteria**

1. ✅ Operator can clear `PreviousExecutionFailed` block without deleting WFE
2. ✅ Clearing action includes **authenticated** operator identity (from K8s auth context)
3. ✅ Clearing action recorded in audit trail with reason
4. ✅ Failed WFE preserved in cluster for audit (SOC2 CC7.3)
5. ✅ Clear action requires explicit acknowledgment (not accidental)
6. ✅ SOC2 CC8.1 (Attribution) requirement met
7. ✅ SOC2 CC7.4 (Completeness) requirement met
8. ✅ Full audit trail from block creation → clearance → execution resumption

---

## 📊 **Use Cases**

### **Use Case 1: Operator Clears Block After Manual Fix**

**Scenario**: Workflow execution failed due to incorrect cluster permissions. Operator fixed permissions and wants to retry.

```
1. Workflow Execution "wfe-deploy-app" fails with "insufficient permissions"
2. Status: wasExecutionFailure=true → blocks future executions
3. Operator fixes RBAC permissions manually
4. Operator clears block:
   $ kubectl patch workflowexecution wfe-deploy-app \
     --type=merge --subresource=status \
     -p '{"status":{"blockClearanceRequest":{"clearReason":"Fixed RBAC permissions in target namespace","requestedAt":"2025-12-20T10:00:00Z"}}}'

5. ✅ Shared webhook intercepts request
6. ✅ Webhook extracts authenticated user: "operator@example.com"
7. ✅ Webhook populates status.blockClearance:
   {
     "clearedBy": "operator@example.com (UID: abc-123)",
     "clearedAt": "2025-12-20T10:00:05Z",
     "clearReason": "Fixed RBAC permissions in target namespace",
     "clearMethod": "KubernetesAdmissionWebhook"
   }
8. ✅ Audit event: workflowexecution.block.cleared
9. ✅ WorkflowExecution reconciler detects blockClearance
10. ✅ Resets wasExecutionFailure → false
11. ✅ Future executions allowed
12. ✅ Original failed WFE preserved for audit
```

### **Use Case 2: Auditor Reviews Block Clearing History**

**Scenario**: SOC2 auditor wants to verify who cleared execution blocks during an incident.

```
1. Auditor queries audit trail for block clearances:
   $ kubectl get auditevents -l event_type=workflowexecution.block.cleared

2. ✅ Results show:
   - WHO cleared blocks: "operator@example.com (UID: abc-123)"
   - WHEN: "2025-12-20T10:00:05Z"
   - WHY: "Fixed RBAC permissions in target namespace"
   - HOW: "KubernetesAdmissionWebhook" (authenticated)

3. ✅ Auditor verifies user identity matches K8s authentication records
4. ✅ SOC2 CC8.1 (Attribution) requirement satisfied
5. ✅ Complete audit trail preserved
```

### **Use Case 3: Operator Accidentally Tries to Clear Without Reason**

**Scenario**: Operator tries to clear block without providing a reason.

```
1. Operator attempts clear without reason:
   $ kubectl patch workflowexecution wfe-deploy-app \
     --type=merge --subresource=status \
     -p '{"status":{"blockClearanceRequest":{"requestedAt":"2025-12-20T10:00:00Z"}}}'

2. ❌ Webhook validation fails: "clearReason is required"
3. ❌ No clearance recorded
4. ❌ Block remains in place
5. ✅ Prevents accidental clears
```

---

## 🔧 **Technical Requirements**

### **TR-1: Shared Kubernetes Admission Webhook** ⭐ **AUTHORITATIVE**

**Implementation**: `kubernaut-auth-webhook` (shared service)

**Handler**: `/authenticate/workflowexecution`

```go
// Webhook handler for WorkflowExecution authentication
func (h *WorkflowExecutionHandler) Handle(ctx context.Context, req admission.Request) admission.Response {
    var wfe v1alpha1.WorkflowExecution
    if err := h.decoder.Decode(req, &wfe); err != nil {
        return admission.Errored(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
    }

    // Only process if blockClearanceRequest exists
    if wfe.Status.BlockClearanceRequest == nil {
        return admission.Allowed("no clearance request")
    }

    // Validate request
    if err := h.validateClearanceRequest(wfe.Status.BlockClearanceRequest); err != nil {
        return admission.Denied(err.Error())
    }

    // Extract authenticated user from Kubernetes auth context
    authenticatedUser := fmt.Sprintf("%s (UID: %s)",
        req.UserInfo.Username,
        req.UserInfo.UID,
    )

    // Populate authenticated fields
    wfe.Status.BlockClearance = &v1alpha1.BlockClearanceDetails{
        ClearedBy:    authenticatedUser,
        ClearedAt:    metav1.Now(),
        ClearReason:  wfe.Status.BlockClearanceRequest.ClearReason,
        ClearMethod:  "KubernetesAdmissionWebhook",
    }

    // Clear the request (consumed)
    wfe.Status.BlockClearanceRequest = nil

    // Emit audit event
    h.auditClient.CreateAuditEvent(ctx, &dsgen.AuditEvent{
        EventType:     "workflowexecution.block.cleared",
        EventCategory: "workflow",
        EventAction:   "block.cleared",
        EventOutcome:  "success",
        ActorType:     "user",
        ActorId:       authenticatedUser,
        ResourceType:  "WorkflowExecution",
        ResourceName:  wfe.Name,
        EventData: map[string]interface{}{
            "cleared_by":    authenticatedUser,
            "clear_reason":  wfe.Status.BlockClearance.ClearReason,
            "clear_method":  "KubernetesAdmissionWebhook",
        },
    })

    // Return mutated WFE
    marshaled, err := json.Marshal(&wfe)
    if err != nil {
        return admission.Errored(http.StatusInternalServerError, err)
    }
    return admission.PatchResponseFromRaw(req.Object.Raw, marshaled)
}

func (h *WorkflowExecutionHandler) validateClearanceRequest(req *v1alpha1.BlockClearanceRequest) error {
    if req.ClearReason == "" {
        return fmt.Errorf("clearReason is required")
    }
    if len(req.ClearReason) < 10 {
        return fmt.Errorf("clearReason must be at least 10 characters")
    }
    return nil
}
```

### **TR-2: WorkflowExecution CRD Schema Changes**

```go
// WorkflowExecutionStatus defines the observed state of WorkflowExecution
type WorkflowExecutionStatus struct {
    // ... existing fields ...

    // BlockClearanceRequest: Operator creates this to request block clearing (unauthenticated input)
    // +optional
    BlockClearanceRequest *BlockClearanceRequest `json:"blockClearanceRequest,omitempty"`

    // BlockClearance: Webhook populates this with authenticated user identity (AUTHENTICATED output)
    // +optional
    BlockClearance *BlockClearanceDetails `json:"blockClearance,omitempty"`
}

// BlockClearanceRequest is the operator's request to clear a block (unauthenticated)
type BlockClearanceRequest struct {
    // ClearReason: Operator's explanation for why block should be cleared (required, min 10 chars)
    ClearReason string `json:"clearReason"`

    // RequestedAt: Timestamp when operator requested clearance
    RequestedAt metav1.Time `json:"requestedAt"`
}

// BlockClearanceDetails is the webhook's authenticated clearance record (AUTHENTICATED)
type BlockClearanceDetails struct {
    // ClearedBy: Authenticated user who cleared the block (from K8s auth context)
    ClearedBy string `json:"clearedBy"`

    // ClearedAt: Timestamp when block was cleared (server-side timestamp)
    ClearedAt metav1.Time `json:"clearedAt"`

    // ClearReason: Operator's explanation (copied from request)
    ClearReason string `json:"clearReason"`

    // ClearMethod: How the block was cleared (always "KubernetesAdmissionWebhook")
    ClearMethod string `json:"clearMethod"`
}
```

### **TR-3: WorkflowExecution Reconciler Logic**

```go
func (r *WorkflowExecutionReconciler) Reconcile(ctx context.Context, req ctrl.Request) (ctrl.Result, error) {
    var wfe v1alpha1.WorkflowExecution
    if err := r.Get(ctx, req.NamespacedName, &wfe); err != nil {
        return ctrl.Result{}, err
    }

    // Check if block was cleared by webhook
    if wfe.Status.BlockClearance != nil {
        // Process clearance
        if err := r.processClearance(ctx, &wfe); err != nil {
            return ctrl.Result{}, err
        }
        // Clear the blockClearance field (consumed)
        wfe.Status.BlockClearance = nil
        if err := r.Status().Update(ctx, &wfe); err != nil {
            return ctrl.Result{}, err
        }
        return ctrl.Result{Requeue: true}, nil
    }

    // ... existing reconciliation logic ...
}

func (r *WorkflowExecutionReconciler) processClearance(ctx context.Context, wfe *v1alpha1.WorkflowExecution) error {
    log := ctrl.LoggerFrom(ctx)

    // Reset execution failure flag
    if wfe.Status.FailureDetails != nil {
        wfe.Status.FailureDetails.WasExecutionFailure = false
    }

    // Record clearance in status history
    log.Info("Block cleared by operator",
        "clearedBy", wfe.Status.BlockClearance.ClearedBy,
        "clearReason", wfe.Status.BlockClearance.ClearReason,
    )

    // Emit metric
    r.Metrics.RecordBlockClearance()

    return nil
}
```

### **TR-4: RBAC Requirements**

**Operator Permissions**:

```yaml
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
  name: workflow-operator
  namespace: kubernaut-system
rules:
- apiGroups: ["kubernaut.ai"]
  resources: ["workflowexecutions/status"]
  verbs: ["get", "update", "patch"]
```

**Webhook ServiceAccount**:

```yaml
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
  name: kubernaut-auth-webhook
rules:
# Read WFEs to validate requests
- apiGroups: ["kubernaut.ai"]
  resources: ["workflowexecutions"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]

# Update status with authenticated data
- apiGroups: ["kubernaut.ai"]
  resources: ["workflowexecutions/status"]
  verbs: ["update", "patch"]

# Create audit events
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["events"]
  verbs: ["create"]
```

### **TR-5: Controller ServiceAccount Bypass** ⭐ **CRITICAL**

**Problem**: Webhooks on `/status` subresource intercept **ALL** status updates, including controller reconciliation updates.

**Solution**: Webhook must bypass authentication/validation for controller ServiceAccount.

**Implementation**: See [WEBHOOK_CONTROLLER_BYPASS_PATTERN_DEC_20_2025.md](../handoff/WEBHOOK_CONTROLLER_BYPASS_PATTERN_DEC_20_2025.md) for complete pattern.

**Why Critical**:
- ✅ Controller needs to update `status.phase`, `status.message`, `status.conditions` without webhook interference
- ✅ Only human operators need authentication for `blockClearanceRequest`
- ✅ Prevents reconciliation loop performance degradation (10x faster without auth overhead)

**Code Pattern**:
```go
func (r *WorkflowExecution) Default() {
    // Get admission request from context
    req, err := admission.RequestFromContext(ctx)
    if err != nil {
        return
    }

    // CRITICAL: Allow controller ServiceAccount to bypass webhook
    if isControllerServiceAccount(req.AdmissionRequest.UserInfo) {
        return // Controller updates pass through unchanged
    }

    // Only process operator-initiated clearance requests
    if r.Status.BlockClearanceRequest == nil {
        return
    }

    // ... authentication logic for operators ...
}

func (r *WorkflowExecution) ValidateUpdate(ctx context.Context, old runtime.Object) (admission.Warnings, error) {
    req, err := admission.RequestFromContext(ctx)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }

    // CRITICAL: Skip validation for controller ServiceAccount
    if isControllerServiceAccount(req.AdmissionRequest.UserInfo) {
        return nil, nil // Controller can modify any status field
    }

    // For human operators: ONLY allow blockClearanceRequest modifications
    if !reflect.DeepEqual(oldWFE.Status.Phase, r.Status.Phase) {
        return nil, fmt.Errorf("users cannot modify status.phase (controller-managed)")
    }

    // ... validate blockClearanceRequest if present ...
}

func isControllerServiceAccount(userInfo authenticationv1.UserInfo) bool {
    return strings.HasPrefix(userInfo.Username, "system:serviceaccount:") &&
           strings.Contains(userInfo.Username, "workflowexecution-controller")
}
```

**Testing Requirements**:
- ✅ Test controller SA bypasses authentication in `Default()`
- ✅ Test controller SA bypasses validation in `ValidateUpdate()`
- ✅ Test human operators CANNOT modify `status.phase`, `status.message`, etc.
- ✅ Test human operators CAN modify `blockClearanceRequest`

**Reference**: [ADR-051: Operator-SDK Webhook Scaffolding](../architecture/decisions/ADR-051-operator-sdk-webhook-scaffolding.md)

### **TR-6: Metrics**

```go
var blockClearancesTotal = prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
    Name: "workflowexecution_block_clearances_total",
    Help: "Total number of execution blocks cleared by operators (BR-WE-013)",
})
```

---

## 📈 **Metrics & KPIs**

| Metric | Target | Rationale |
|--------|--------|-----------|
| Block clearance rate | <10% of failures | Most failures shouldn't require manual intervention |
| Clearance validation failures | <1% | Clear validation should rarely fail |
| Audit trail completeness | 100% | Every clearance MUST be audited |
| SOC2 audit pass rate | 100% | Zero non-compliance findings |

---

## 🔗 **Dependencies**

| Dependency | Service | Status | Notes |
|------------|---------|--------|-------|
| Shared Authentication Webhook | kubernaut-auth-webhook | 🟡 In progress | Shared with RO service (ADR-040) |
| Audit Event API | Data Storage | ✅ Exists | Batch endpoint implemented |
| K8s Authentication | Kubernetes | ✅ Exists | OIDC/certs/SA tokens |

---

## 📐 **Design Decision**

**Reference**: [DD-AUTH-001: Shared Authentication Webhook](../architecture/decisions/DD-AUTH-001-shared-authentication-webhook.md) ⭐ **AUTHORITATIVE**

**Related**:
- [SHARED_AUTHENTICATION_WEBHOOK_TRIAGE_DEC_19_2025.md](../handoff/SHARED_AUTHENTICATION_WEBHOOK_TRIAGE_DEC_19_2025.md)
- [SHARED_AUTH_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_TO_RO_TEAM_DEC_19_2025.md](../handoff/SHARED_AUTH_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_TO_RO_TEAM_DEC_19_2025.md)

---

## 🔄 **Related Requirements**

| BR ID | Description | Relationship |
|-------|-------------|--------------|
| BR-WE-012 | Exponential Backoff Cooldown | Creates blocks that BR-WE-013 clears |
| BR-WE-005 | Audit Trail | Audit trail for block clearances |
| BR-ORCH-025 | Remediation Approval (RO) | Shares webhook with RO service |

---

## 🔐 **SOC2 Compliance Mapping**

| SOC2 Control | Requirement | How BR-WE-013 Addresses |
|--------------|-------------|-------------------------|
| **CC8.1** - Attribution | System captures identity of users | ✅ Authenticated user from K8s auth context |
| **CC7.3** - Immutability | Audit records cannot be altered | ✅ Original failed WFE preserved (no deletion) |
| **CC7.4** - Completeness | Audit trail has no gaps | ✅ All block clearances recorded in audit trail |
| **CC4.2** - Change Tracking | Changes are tracked with user identity | ✅ WHO cleared block + reason + timestamp |

---

## 🚫 **Anti-Patterns - FORBIDDEN**

### **❌ DO NOT: Use Annotations for User Authentication**

```yaml
# ❌ WRONG: Annotations are NOT authenticated
metadata:
  annotations:
    kubernaut.ai/cleared-by: "operator@example.com"  # Anyone can write this
```

**Why**: Anyone can write arbitrary annotations. No way to verify the user identity is real. SOC2 non-compliant.

### **❌ DO NOT: Delete WorkflowExecution to Clear Block**

```bash
# ❌ WRONG: Violates SOC2 CC7.3 (Immutability)
kubectl delete workflowexecution wfe-deploy-app
```

**Why**: Deletes audit trail, no record of who cleared block, violates SOC2.

### **❌ DO NOT: Direct Status Update Without Webhook**

```bash
# ❌ WRONG: No authentication layer
kubectl patch workflowexecution wfe-deploy-app \
  --type=merge --subresource=status \
  -p '{"status":{"blockClearance":{"clearedBy":"fake-user"}}}'
```

**Why**: No authentication, anyone can claim to be any user. SOC2 non-compliant.

---

## ✅ **Acceptance Criteria**

```gherkin
Feature: Audit-Tracked Execution Block Clearing

  Background:
    Given WorkflowExecution "wfe-test" has failed execution (wasExecutionFailure=true)
    And subsequent executions are blocked

  Scenario: Operator clears block with webhook authentication
    Given operator "operator@example.com" is authenticated via K8s OIDC
    When operator creates blockClearanceRequest with reason "Fixed permissions"
    Then webhook intercepts request
    And webhook extracts authenticated user: "operator@example.com (UID: abc-123)"
    And webhook populates blockClearance with authenticated identity
    And audit event "workflowexecution.block.cleared" is recorded
    And WorkflowExecution reconciler resets wasExecutionFailure to false
    And future executions are allowed
    And original failed WFE is preserved

  Scenario: Operator tries to clear without reason
    When operator creates blockClearanceRequest without clearReason
    Then webhook validation fails with "clearReason is required"
    And NO clearance is recorded
    And block remains in place

  Scenario: Auditor reviews block clearance history
    Given multiple blocks were cleared during incident
    When auditor queries audit trail for "workflowexecution.block.cleared"
    Then results show WHO cleared blocks (authenticated users)
    And results show WHEN clearances occurred
    And results show WHY blocks were cleared (reasons)
    And SOC2 CC8.1 (Attribution) requirement is satisfied

  Scenario: Unauthorized user tries to clear block
    Given user "attacker@example.com" has NO RBAC permissions
    When user attempts to clear block
    Then K8s API Server rejects request (RBAC denial)
    And NO clearance is recorded
    And block remains in place
```

---

## 📅 **Timeline**

**Total**: 5 days (shared webhook implementation)

| Day | Focus | Owner | Deliverable |
|-----|-------|-------|-------------|
| **Day 1** | Shared library (`pkg/authwebhook`) | Shared Webhook Team | Reusable user extraction logic |
| **Day 2** | WFE handler (`/authenticate/workflowexecution`) | Shared Webhook Team | WFE authentication handler |
| **Day 3** | RAR handler (`/authenticate/remediationapproval`) | Shared Webhook Team | RO authentication handler |
| **Day 4** | Deployment + cert management | Shared Webhook Team | Single deployment, HA setup |
| **Day 5** | Integration + E2E tests | Shared Webhook Team | Test coverage for WE + RO |

**WE-Specific Work** (Day 2):
- Handler: `internal/webhook/workflowexecution/handler.go`
- Logic: Populate `blockClearance` with authenticated user
- Tests: 8 unit tests
- Audit: Emit `workflowexecution.block.cleared` event

---

## 🧪 **Test Coverage**

### **Unit Tests** (Day 2, 8 tests)
- ✅ Webhook extracts authenticated user from req.UserInfo
- ✅ Webhook validates clearReason is not empty
- ✅ Webhook validates clearReason is at least 10 characters
- ✅ Webhook populates blockClearance with authenticated user
- ✅ Webhook clears blockClearanceRequest after processing
- ✅ Reconciler processes blockClearance and resets wasExecutionFailure
- ✅ Reconciler clears blockClearance after processing
- ✅ Metric increments on block clearance

### **Integration Tests** (Day 5, 3 tests)
- ✅ Full webhook flow: request → authentication → clearance
- ✅ Audit event recorded with authenticated user
- ✅ Original failed WFE preserved (not deleted)

### **E2E Tests** (Day 5, 2 tests)
- ✅ Operator clears block via kubectl patch
- ✅ Future executions allowed after clearance
- ✅ Audit trail completeness verified

---

## 🎯 **Success Metrics**

| Metric | Definition | Target |
|--------|------------|--------|
| **Implementation Completeness** | All acceptance criteria met | 100% |
| **Test Coverage** | Unit + Integration + E2E | 100% |
| **SOC2 Compliance** | All 4 controls satisfied | 100% |
| **Audit Trail Completeness** | Every clearance audited | 100% |
| **RBAC Enforcement** | Unauthorized users denied | 100% |

---

## 📚 **References**

### **MUST READ** ⭐
1. **[DD-AUTH-001: Shared Authentication Webhook](../architecture/decisions/DD-AUTH-001-shared-authentication-webhook.md)** - AUTHORITATIVE design decision
2. **[SHARED_AUTHENTICATION_WEBHOOK_TRIAGE_DEC_19_2025.md](../handoff/SHARED_AUTHENTICATION_WEBHOOK_TRIAGE_DEC_19_2025.md)** - Triage analysis
3. **[SHARED_AUTH_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_TO_RO_TEAM_DEC_19_2025.md](../handoff/SHARED_AUTH_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_TO_RO_TEAM_DEC_19_2025.md)** - RO team notification

### **Supporting Documents**
4. [BR_WE_013_BLOCK_CLEARANCE_ADDENDUM_V1.0.md](../services/crd-controllers/03-workflowexecution/implementation/BR_WE_013_BLOCK_CLEARANCE_ADDENDUM_V1.0.md) - Implementation details
5. [WE_BR_WE_013_SOC2_COMPLIANCE_TRIAGE_DEC_19_2025.md](../handoff/WE_BR_WE_013_SOC2_COMPLIANCE_TRIAGE_DEC_19_2025.md) - SOC2 analysis
6. [SOC2_V1_0_MVP_WORK_TRIAGE_DEC_20_2025.md](../handoff/SOC2_V1_0_MVP_WORK_TRIAGE_DEC_20_2025.md) - SOC2 v1.0 requirements

---

## 🔄 **Cross-Team Coordination**

### **Shared Webhook Team**
- **Responsibility**: Implement `kubernaut-auth-webhook` service
- **Timeline**: 5 days
- **Coordination**: Daily standup during implementation week

### **RemediationOrchestrator (RO) Team**
- **Notification Sent**: December 19, 2025
- **Document**: [SHARED_AUTH_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_TO_RO_TEAM_DEC_19_2025.md](../handoff/SHARED_AUTH_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_TO_RO_TEAM_DEC_19_2025.md)
- **RO Handler**: Day 3 of shared webhook implementation
- **Benefit**: Same webhook for approval decisions (ADR-040)

---

## Changelog

| Version | Date | Changes |
|---------|------|---------|
| 1.1 | 2025-12-20 | Added TR-5: Controller ServiceAccount Bypass - critical implementation requirement for preventing webhook interference with controller reconciliation loop. Includes mutual exclusion validation (controller CANNOT modify operator-managed fields, operators CANNOT modify controller-managed fields). References WEBHOOK_CONTROLLER_BYPASS_PATTERN_DEC_20_2025.md and ADR-051. |
| 1.0 | 2025-12-20 | Initial standalone BR document (extracted from BUSINESS_REQUIREMENTS.md) |

---

**Document Status**: ✅ **APPROVED** - Ready for Implementation
**Version**: 1.1
**Approved By**: WE Team + RO Team (cross-team validation December 19, 2025)
**Implementation Plan**: [SHARED_AUTHENTICATION_WEBHOOK_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN_V1.0.md](../services/shared/authentication-webhook/SHARED_AUTHENTICATION_WEBHOOK_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN_V1.0.md)

