# Security Review Report

**Branch**: chore/v060-tech-debt -> main
**Date**: 2026-03-20
**Commits reviewed**: 5 (8f77d44, 7254a63, 4ec4e3d, 056bac9, c1c2861)

## Issues in Your Changes (BLOCKING)

### CRITICAL

No critical issues found.

### HIGH

No high-severity issues found.

## Issues in Code You Touched (Should Fix)

No should-fix issues found.

## Pre-existing Issues (Not Blocking)

No pre-existing issues found in the changed files.

## Suggestions (Lower Confidence)

No suggestions.

## Analysis Notes

### Changes Reviewed

1. **OutputRepository interface move** (#101) -- Pure refactoring: moved the `OutputRepository` interface from `src/implementations/output-repository.ts` to `src/core/interfaces.ts`. Updated 7 import paths across source and test files. No behavioral change, no new attack surface.

2. **BootstrapMode enum** (#104) -- Replaced three boolean flags (`skipResourceMonitoring`, `skipScheduleExecutor`, `skipRecovery`) with a `BootstrapMode` string union type (`'server' | 'cli' | 'run'`). Security considerations checked:
   - **Type safety**: `BootstrapMode` is a TypeScript string literal union -- the compiler rejects any value outside the three allowed modes. Default is `'server'` (most restrictive mode, all subsystems enabled). This is a safe default.
   - **Log injection**: Template literals in log messages (`mode=${mode}`) only interpolate the mode value which is constrained to the three-value union at compile time. No user input reaches these interpolation points.
   - **Subsystem gating correctness**: The flag derivation logic (`skipRecovery = mode === 'cli'`, etc.) was verified against the old boolean callers. `run.ts` previously set `skipScheduleExecutor: true, skipResourceMonitoring: true` which maps to `mode: 'run'`. `services.ts` previously set `skipScheduleExecutor: true, skipRecovery: true` which maps to `mode: 'cli'`. The `'server'` default enables all subsystems. No subsystem is accidentally disabled.

3. **ScheduleExecutor FAIL policy transaction** (#83) -- Wrapped schedule cancellation and audit-trail recording in a synchronous SQLite transaction (`database.runInTransaction()`). Security considerations checked:
   - **Race condition fix (positive)**: The old code had a TOCTOU gap -- `scheduleRepo.update()` could succeed while `scheduleRepo.recordExecution()` could fail, leaving a cancelled schedule with no audit trail. The new code wraps both operations in a single synchronous transaction with rollback on failure. This is a security improvement for data integrity.
   - **SQL injection**: All database operations use parameterized prepared statements (`this.updateStmt.run(...)`, `this.recordExecutionStmt.run(...)`). The `errorMessage` template literal (`Schedule missed by ${now - missedAt}ms`) only interpolates numeric values (both `now` and `missedAt` are `number` typed from `Date.now()`). No user-controlled input reaches the SQL layer.
   - **Transaction rollback correctness**: The `runInTransaction()` wrapper uses better-sqlite3's native synchronous transaction API which guarantees atomicity -- if any statement throws, all changes are rolled back. The new test (`should roll back schedule cancellation if execution recording fails`) explicitly verifies this rollback behavior.
   - **Event emission ordering**: The `ScheduleMissed` event is now emitted only after the transaction commits successfully (`break` on `!txResult.ok`). Previously, event emission was interleaved between the two database operations. This is a correctness improvement -- events now reflect committed state.

### Security Patterns Checked

| Pattern | Result |
|---------|--------|
| SQL injection (parameterized queries) | All queries use prepared statements with `?` placeholders |
| Hardcoded secrets | None introduced |
| Input validation | `BootstrapMode` is type-constrained; no new external input paths |
| Race conditions / TOCTOU | Fixed -- FAIL policy now uses atomic transaction |
| Authentication / authorization | No auth changes in scope |
| Cryptographic operations | None in scope |
| Path traversal | None in scope |
| Command injection | None in scope |
| Log injection | Template literals only interpolate type-constrained values |
| Error information disclosure | Error messages contain schedule IDs (internal UUIDs) and timing data; no PII or secrets |

## Summary

| Category | CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW |
|----------|----------|------|--------|-----|
| Blocking | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Should Fix | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pre-existing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

**Security Score**: 9/10
**Recommendation**: APPROVED

The score reflects the clean security posture of these changes. The transaction wrapping (#83) is a net security improvement, eliminating a data integrity race condition. The interface move (#101) is zero-risk refactoring. The mode enum (#104) uses a safe default (`'server'` enables all subsystems) and is type-constrained at compile time. No new attack surface, no secrets, no user-controlled input reaches sensitive operations.
