# Security Review Report

**Branch**: feat/176-tmux-abstraction-layer -> main
**Date**: 2026-05-17
**Diff scope**: `git diff 40f9537...HEAD` (5 incremental commits: style, test, fix)

## Issues in Your Changes (BLOCKING)

### CRITICAL

(none)

### HIGH

(none)

## Issues in Code You Touched (Should Fix)

(none)

## Pre-existing Issues (Not Blocking)

(none)

## Suggestions (Lower Confidence)

(none)

## Summary

| Category | CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW |
|----------|----------|------|--------|-----|
| Blocking | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Should Fix | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pre-existing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

**Security Score**: 9/10
**Recommendation**: APPROVED

## Analysis Notes

The incremental diff (5 commits) contains no security-relevant changes. All modifications are refactoring, style, error-handling observability, and test coverage improvements:

1. **`tmux-connector.ts` refactoring** -- Extracted `buildActiveSession()`, `startSentinelWatcher()`, `startMessagesWatcher()`, `forceDeliverRemaining()` from larger methods. Pure structural extraction with no new trust boundaries, inputs, or shell interactions.

2. **Cleanup result handling** -- All three cleanup call sites (`spawn`, `destroy`, `triggerExit`, `dispose`) now check the `Result` from `hooks.cleanup()` and log failures. This is a positive security/reliability improvement -- previously cleanup errors were silently discarded.

3. **MIN_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS clamp** -- New constant (1000ms) prevents a tight-loop `setInterval` from a misconfigured `checkIntervalMs`. This is a reliability improvement that also prevents a minor DoS vector where an attacker-controlled staleness config could spin the CPU.

4. **Staleness iteration safety** -- Stale sessions are now collected into `staleEntries[]` before calling `triggerExit()`, preventing mutation of `activeSessions` during iteration. No security impact.

5. **SAFE_PATH_REGEX relocation** -- Moved from `tmux-hooks.ts` to `types.ts` and re-exported from `index.ts`. The regex itself (`/^[a-zA-Z0-9/_.\-]+$/`) is unchanged. No security impact.

6. **JSDoc correction** -- Comment updated from "double-quoted" to "single-quoted" to match actual behavior. Accurate documentation is a security positive.

7. **Async error handling** -- `handleMessageFile` promise rejections are now caught in the `startMessagesWatcher` callback. This prevents unhandled promise rejections but introduces no new attack surface.

### Pre-existing security posture (unchanged by this diff, not blocking)

The broader tmux layer has a well-designed security model reviewed in prior rounds:
- `TASK_ID_REGEX`, `SESSION_NAME_REGEX`, and `SAFE_PATH_REGEX` gate all values embedded in shell scripts
- `escapeSingleQuoted()` handles the single remaining dynamic context (cwd, command, env values)
- `agentCommand`/`agentArgs` are documented as a trust boundary (must come from config, not user input)
- Communication targets are validated against `SESSION_NAME_REGEX` before shell embedding
- Env var keys are filtered against POSIX regex before injection

The score is 9/10 rather than 10/10 because the broader layer (outside this diff) embeds `agentCommand`/`agentArgs` as-is into generated shell scripts, relying on caller discipline rather than enforcement. This is a documented design decision and is not introduced by this diff.
