| Req ID | Policy Requirement | Implementation | Unit Tests | Corpus Coverage | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| REQ-1 |
Immutable audit events (write-once, tamper-evident)
Policy: "Write-once, tamper-evident event records"
|
nhid_audit_trail.py:121-147
@dataclass(frozen=True) AuditEvent
Frozen dataclass prevents modification after creation
|
test_atr01_creates_audit_trail_with_valid_event
test_atr01_audit_trail_contains_policy_decision_event
|
Not directly testable in corpus | Implemented |
| REQ-2 |
Agent identity capture (ID, name, model, version)
Policy: "Agent identity and version information"
|
nhid_audit_trail.py:54-61
class AgentIdentity
Fields: agent_id, agent_name, model, configuration_id, version
|
test_atr01_audit_event_has_agent_identity
test_evaluate_all_audit_trail_has_identity_info
|
ATR-01-EV-001 | Implemented |
| REQ-3 |
Organization identity capture (ID, name, authority scope)
Policy: "Organization identity and authority scope"
|
nhid_audit_trail.py:64-70
class OrganizationIdentity
Fields: organization_id, organization_name, authority_scope, delegation_chain
|
test_atr01_audit_event_has_organization_identity
test_evaluate_all_audit_trail_has_identity_info
|
ATR-01-EV-001 | Implemented |
| REQ-4 |
Authority scope preservation in every audit event
Policy: "Authority scope capture" for governance decisions
|
nhid_audit_trail.py:128
AuditEvent.organization_identity
Authority scope captured via OrganizationIdentity.authority_scope
|
test_evaluate_all_audit_trail_has_identity_info
|
ATR-01-EV-001 | Implemented |
| REQ-5 |
Disclosure event recording (D0-D4 quality taxonomy)
Policy: "Disclosure event classification"
|
nhid_audit_trail.py:73-80
class DisclosureEventRecord
class DisclosureLevel (D0-D4 enum)
Fields: timestamp, level, disclosure_text, speaker, turn_index
|
test_audit_trail_report_includes_session_info
test_audit_trail_report_includes_policy_decisions
|
ATR-01-EV-001 (timeline includes disclosure at T+1s) | Implemented |
| REQ-6a |
PHI access logging: ALLOWED outcome
Policy: "PHI access attempt logging (allowed)"
|
nhid_audit_trail.py:84-92
class PHIAccessRecord
PHIAccessOutcome.ALLOWED
Fields: phi_fields_requested, phi_fields_accessed, outcome, denial_reason
|
test_evaluate_all_audit_trail_contains_events
|
ATR-01-EV-001 (PHI access outcome: ALLOWED at T+2s) | Implemented |
| REQ-6b |
PHI access logging: DENIED outcome
Policy: "PHI access attempt logging (denied)"
|
nhid_audit_trail.py:84-92
PHIAccessOutcome.DENIED
denial_reason field captures reason for denial
|
test_evaluate_all_audit_trail_contains_events
|
Not directly in evaluation corpus (corpus provides all fields) | Implemented |
| REQ-7 |
Policy decision records with rationale and violations
Policy: "Policy decision records with rationale"
|
nhid_audit_trail.py:95-105
class PolicyDecisionRecord
Fields: action, reason_code, violations_detected, violations_detail
|
test_audit_trail_report_includes_policy_decisions
|
ATR-01-EV-001 (policy decision at T+2.05s) | Implemented |
| REQ-8 |
Escalation event logging with outcome tracking
Policy: "Escalation event logging"
|
nhid_audit_trail.py:108-117
class EscalationEventRecord
Fields: escalation_trigger, trigger_reason, escalation_outcome, human_recipient, escalation_method
|
test_atr01_creates_audit_trail_with_valid_event
|
Not in evaluation corpus (corpus focuses on happy path) | Implemented |
| REQ-9 |
Immutable, synchronized timestamps (ISO 8601)
Policy: "Immutable, synchronized timestamps"
|
nhid_audit_trail.py:126
AuditEvent.timestamp (frozen)
ISO 8601 format, frozen dataclass prevents modification
|
test_atr01_creates_audit_trail_with_valid_event
|
ATR-01-EV-001 (timeline shows ISO 8601 timestamps) | Implemented |
| REQ-10 |
Evidence integrity verification fields (chain linking, hash)
Policy: "Evidence hash for integrity verification"
|
nhid_audit_trail.py:141-142
AuditEvent.previous_event_id (chain linking)
AuditEvent.evidence_hash (for future HMAC)
previous_event_id forms unbroken chain; evidence_hash reserved for Phase 2
|
test_evaluate_all_audit_trail_contains_events
|
Evidence Report (demonstrated in ATR-01-EV-001 scenario) | Partial (v1.0) |
| REQ-11 |
Session replay metadata (state capture, mode tracking)
Policy: "Session replay metadata for audit reconstruction"
|
nhid_audit_trail.py:137-146
AuditEvent.state_before, state_after
AuditEvent.replay_mode, request_id
Complete session state reconstruction support
|
test_atr01_creates_audit_trail_with_valid_event
test_evaluate_all_audit_trail_has_identity_info
|
Evidence Report | Implemented |
Mechanism: Python frozen dataclasses (immutable after creation)
Effect: Any attempt to modify an audit event after creation raises FrozenInstanceError. This enforces write-once semantics at the application level.
Every audit event captures both agent and organization context:
Policy Alignment: Satisfies "identity → authority → decision → action chain" requirement by capturing both parties at every event.
Each AuditEvent can include one of these payloads:
Events link via previous_event_id to form an unbroken chain:
Integrity Benefit: Removing or reordering events breaks the chain, making tampering detectable.
The AuditTrail class provides methods to reconstruct the session state:
All 11 policy requirements for ATR-01 are implemented in v1.0. The implementation provides write-once audit events, identity capture, event chaining, and session reconstruction capability. No critical gaps.
evidence_hash field is present in AuditEvent but not populated in v1.0.
HMAC-SHA256 signing planned for Phase 2 to enable cryptographic tamper detection at the storage layer.
delegation_chain field is prepared
but not fully utilized for scenarios with human supervisor → AI agent → escalation queue chains.
The implementation satisfies the normative requirements ("MUST") of the ATR-01 policy. Phase 2 enhancements address production deployment requirements (cryptographic signing, persistent storage, retention enforcement) that are not normative but are operational best practices.