{"type":"system","subtype":"init","cwd":"./bench/results/axi/bug_triage_search/run4/workspace","session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","tools":["Task","TaskOutput","Bash","Glob","Grep","ExitPlanMode","Read","Edit","Write","NotebookEdit","WebFetch","TodoWrite","WebSearch","TaskStop","AskUserQuestion","Skill","EnterPlanMode","EnterWorktree","ExitWorktree","CronCreate","CronDelete","CronList","ToolSearch","mcp__chrome-devtools__click","mcp__chrome-devtools__close_page","mcp__chrome-devtools__drag","mcp__chrome-devtools__emulate","mcp__chrome-devtools__evaluate_script","mcp__chrome-devtools__fill","mcp__chrome-devtools__fill_form","mcp__chrome-devtools__get_console_message","mcp__chrome-devtools__get_network_request","mcp__chrome-devtools__handle_dialog","mcp__chrome-devtools__hover","mcp__chrome-devtools__lighthouse_audit","mcp__chrome-devtools__list_console_messages","mcp__chrome-devtools__list_network_requests","mcp__chrome-devtools__list_pages","mcp__chrome-devtools__navigate_page","mcp__chrome-devtools__new_page","mcp__chrome-devtools__performance_analyze_insight","mcp__chrome-devtools__performance_start_trace","mcp__chrome-devtools__performance_stop_trace","mcp__chrome-devtools__press_key","mcp__chrome-devtools__resize_page","mcp__chrome-devtools__select_page","mcp__chrome-devtools__take_memory_snapshot","mcp__chrome-devtools__take_screenshot","mcp__chrome-devtools__take_snapshot","mcp__chrome-devtools__type_text","mcp__chrome-devtools__upload_file","mcp__chrome-devtools__wait_for"],"mcp_servers":[{"name":"chrome-devtools","status":"connected"},{"name":"claude.ai Google Calendar","status":"needs-auth"},{"name":"claude.ai Gmail","status":"needs-auth"}],"model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","permissionMode":"bypassPermissions","slash_commands":["update-config","debug","simplify","batch","loop","claude-api","test-driven-development","app-installer","release-notify-issues","cli-demo-recorder","readme-generator","compact","context","cost","heapdump","init","pr-comments","release-notes","review","security-review","extra-usage","insights"],"apiKeySource":"none","claude_code_version":"2.1.77","output_style":"default","agents":["general-purpose","statusline-setup","Explore","Plan","claude-code-guide"],"skills":["update-config","debug","simplify","batch","loop","claude-api","test-driven-development","app-installer","release-notify-issues","cli-demo-recorder","readme-generator"],"plugins":[],"uuid":"5e5bdaee-6ba4-4189-88cc-a9da5b5a090a","fast_mode_state":"off"}
{"type":"assistant","message":{"model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","id":"msg_01JKEUroReG8BNn5ytJAMdFY","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Let me search for issues in openclaw/openclaw mentioning 'rate limit' using gh-axi.","signature":"EvsBCkYICxgCKkALBNxHL3A098RJodBsX6d9M4sN/2mArZ7K8x5adyPPuKU+fsTC4p4W+Hqu3Z67TEmLzpftIgV5D2/hWN2tknKdEgyBPvrLcXiNhbueUCIaDCUXinworlvC/5wMnCIwRUp5fohEMgrunU+2+MgfDN75FCSnc7UeLRi8Ts33NyIjKcF46sbmSWIAdOruu4wvKmMQcEj3wEC9J5h5oBqfSYrsc0qZq7Iul1ScXOr37RD0Untm6ZSfbGouWn7rB00rdUVAHlHOGtFrUf/JEzw/3aa4G4zlTuVgGSDRnbcw8einWf3XiqTzbSw3jKl53zlirkWUTZIYAQ=="}],"stop_reason":null,"stop_sequence":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":3,"cache_creation_input_tokens":7381,"cache_read_input_tokens":8598,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":7381},"output_tokens":8,"service_tier":"standard","inference_geo":"not_available"},"context_management":null},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"19bb2200-c979-4d86-8677-f5f5dc1c1e53"}
{"type":"assistant","message":{"model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","id":"msg_01JKEUroReG8BNn5ytJAMdFY","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool_use","id":"toolu_016iiKkauDDT7w96QgbogRj2","name":"Bash","input":{"command":"gh-axi issue list --repo openclaw/openclaw --search \"rate limit\" --limit 100 --state all 2>&1","description":"Search for issues mentioning 'rate limit' in openclaw/openclaw"},"caller":{"type":"direct"}}],"stop_reason":null,"stop_sequence":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":3,"cache_creation_input_tokens":7381,"cache_read_input_tokens":8598,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":7381},"output_tokens":8,"service_tier":"standard","inference_geo":"not_available"},"context_management":null},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"cb1e0846-810e-47eb-84d6-9a504f6c6faa"}
{"type":"rate_limit_event","rate_limit_info":{"status":"allowed","resetsAt":1774126800,"rateLimitType":"five_hour","overageStatus":"rejected","overageDisabledReason":"org_level_disabled","isUsingOverage":false},"uuid":"82a24348-2c80-4621-b6b9-e6e32f471f6d","session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a"}
{"type":"user","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"tool_result","content":"Exit code 1\nerror: \"issue list does not support --search. Use `gh-axi search issues \\\"<query>\\\"` instead for full-text search with total counts.\"\ncode: VALIDATION_ERROR","is_error":true,"tool_use_id":"toolu_016iiKkauDDT7w96QgbogRj2"}]},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"e13ae416-404f-4725-b504-288268486390","timestamp":"2026-03-21T18:45:30.670Z","tool_use_result":"Error: Exit code 1\nerror: \"issue list does not support --search. Use `gh-axi search issues \\\"<query>\\\"` instead for full-text search with total counts.\"\ncode: VALIDATION_ERROR"}
{"type":"assistant","message":{"model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","id":"msg_015yJCi5JX5RYuN3SoU9ynfv","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool_use","id":"toolu_01GPMLXR16ojLSVChXPMVWNU","name":"Bash","input":{"command":"gh-axi search issues \"rate limit\" --repo openclaw/openclaw 2>&1","description":"Search for issues mentioning 'rate limit' in openclaw/openclaw"},"caller":{"type":"direct"}}],"stop_reason":null,"stop_sequence":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":1,"cache_creation_input_tokens":222,"cache_read_input_tokens":15979,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":222},"output_tokens":19,"service_tier":"standard","inference_geo":"not_available"},"context_management":null},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"c818997c-fcaf-4a11-9914-6f484fbb66ef"}
{"type":"user","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"tool_use_id":"toolu_01GPMLXR16ojLSVChXPMVWNU","type":"tool_result","content":"count: 839 (showing first 30)\nissues[30]{number,title,repo,state,author,labels,created}:\n  35288,Built-in rate limit notifications,openclaw/openclaw,open,salvador-clawi,none,16d ago\n  50769,\"Rate Limit Request: Increase clawhub skill installation quota\",openclaw/openclaw,open,zouyuechun,none,1d ago\n  48603,\"[Feature]:  API rate limit reached. Please try again later.\",openclaw/openclaw,open,gbpnkans,enhancement,4d ago\n  48484,\"[Feature]: Expose Anthropic rate limit headers in session_status\",openclaw/openclaw,open,greatzambino,enhancement,4d ago\n  24711,\"Feature: Cache keepalive pings during rate-limit cooldowns\",openclaw/openclaw,open,peteranderss0n,stale,26d ago\n  27423,\"Bug: Cache Usage Exceeds 100% Causing Rate Limit Errors\",openclaw/openclaw,open,LegionZYX,stale,23d ago\n  50637,\"[Bug]: WS handshake rate-limiter bypassed by synthetic device identity field\",openclaw/openclaw,open,coygeek,none,1d ago\n  29854,\"Feature: configurable rate-limit cooldown backoff for auth profiles\",openclaw/openclaw,open,elvio-devaware,none,21d ago\n  13923,\"[Feature]: Provider rate-limit / quota query tool\",openclaw/openclaw,open,ukr-coder,enhancement,1mo ago\n  42401,\"Feature: expose provider rate-limit headroom in models status / probe\",openclaw/openclaw,open,nikolaincode,none,11d ago\n  44477,\"Feature: Support multiple API keys per provider as rate limit backup\",openclaw/openclaw,open,mikewilson9,none,8d ago\n  6966,Dynamic Model Switching Based on API Rate Limits,openclaw/openclaw,open,dreamingbinary,enhancement,1mo ago\n  43447,\"Kimi/Moonshot 'Rate Limit' error masks insufficient funds, causes UI lockout\",openclaw/openclaw,open,superstizzle,none,9d ago\n  22294,\"500/503 errors misclassified as rate_limit, triggering unnecessary cooldowns\",openclaw/openclaw,open,DanRWilloughby,none,28d ago\n  28019,\"[agents] Customizable error messages for rate limit / model failure responses\",openclaw/openclaw,open,Tranman324,stale,22d ago\n  48988,\"[Bug]: Error masking + global circuit breaker causes total outage when any single provider fails\",openclaw/openclaw,open,vonscons,none,4d ago\n  50866,Telegram 429 rate limit causes crash spiral when multiple agents/crons post simultaneously,openclaw/openclaw,open,rets85,none,1d ago\n  36119,\"Feature: Mid-run profile rotation on 429 + configurable rate limit cooldown\",openclaw/openclaw,open,Kenneth77chu,none,16d ago\n  43932,Rate limit errors surfaced to chat should include model/provider/task context,openclaw/openclaw,open,AlphaComposite,none,9d ago\n  11352,Auth profile cooldown backoff too aggressive for transient rate limits,openclaw/openclaw,open,sazora,bug,1mo ago\n  22136,Fallback models not triggered when primary provider enters rate-limit cooldown,openclaw/openclaw,open,Rebolvsk,stale,28d ago\n  30341,\"[Bug]: [Webchat] False rate limit error on Gemini fallback (refresh required)\",openclaw/openclaw,open,gmvp3,bug,20d ago\n  41515,Embedded runner reports 'API rate limit reached' when provider has full headroom,openclaw/openclaw,open,AbebaCo,none,11d ago\n  39191,\"bug: synology-chat ignores SYNOLOGY_RATE_LIMIT=0 (parseInt || 30 truthy check)\",openclaw/openclaw,open,scoootscooob,none,13d ago\n  21414,\"[Feature]: Add hook for when a rate limit error occurs.\",openclaw/openclaw,open,lex-the-lobster,enhancement,29d ago\n  38853,\"[Bug]: Discord channel reconnect loop triggers Cloudflare rate-limit ban (Error 1015)\",openclaw/openclaw,open,djgeorg3,none,14d ago\n  31101,\"[Bug]: Telegram partial message spam loop when API rate limit / model fallback\",openclaw/openclaw,open,ansori-riza,none,19d ago\n  50421,Mid-conversation rate limits bypass model fallback (retry_limit return instead of FailoverError throw),openclaw/openclaw,open,TechFath3r,none,2d ago\n  43879,\"[Bug]: Auth profile cooldown is per-profile, not per-model — rate limit on one model blocks fallback to models with available capacity\",openclaw/openclaw,open,haynzz,none,9d ago\n  28997,\"Control UI webchat loses auth token on WebSocket reconnect, triggers rate limiter\",openclaw/openclaw,open,bogdano2,none,22d ago","is_error":false}]},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"6c9f2b9d-3180-4b93-a890-d9bfcb5ffdef","timestamp":"2026-03-21T18:45:52.698Z","tool_use_result":{"stdout":"count: 839 (showing first 30)\nissues[30]{number,title,repo,state,author,labels,created}:\n  35288,Built-in rate limit notifications,openclaw/openclaw,open,salvador-clawi,none,16d ago\n  50769,\"Rate Limit Request: Increase clawhub skill installation quota\",openclaw/openclaw,open,zouyuechun,none,1d ago\n  48603,\"[Feature]:  API rate limit reached. Please try again later.\",openclaw/openclaw,open,gbpnkans,enhancement,4d ago\n  48484,\"[Feature]: Expose Anthropic rate limit headers in session_status\",openclaw/openclaw,open,greatzambino,enhancement,4d ago\n  24711,\"Feature: Cache keepalive pings during rate-limit cooldowns\",openclaw/openclaw,open,peteranderss0n,stale,26d ago\n  27423,\"Bug: Cache Usage Exceeds 100% Causing Rate Limit Errors\",openclaw/openclaw,open,LegionZYX,stale,23d ago\n  50637,\"[Bug]: WS handshake rate-limiter bypassed by synthetic device identity field\",openclaw/openclaw,open,coygeek,none,1d ago\n  29854,\"Feature: configurable rate-limit cooldown backoff for auth profiles\",openclaw/openclaw,open,elvio-devaware,none,21d ago\n  13923,\"[Feature]: Provider rate-limit / quota query tool\",openclaw/openclaw,open,ukr-coder,enhancement,1mo ago\n  42401,\"Feature: expose provider rate-limit headroom in models status / probe\",openclaw/openclaw,open,nikolaincode,none,11d ago\n  44477,\"Feature: Support multiple API keys per provider as rate limit backup\",openclaw/openclaw,open,mikewilson9,none,8d ago\n  6966,Dynamic Model Switching Based on API Rate Limits,openclaw/openclaw,open,dreamingbinary,enhancement,1mo ago\n  43447,\"Kimi/Moonshot 'Rate Limit' error masks insufficient funds, causes UI lockout\",openclaw/openclaw,open,superstizzle,none,9d ago\n  22294,\"500/503 errors misclassified as rate_limit, triggering unnecessary cooldowns\",openclaw/openclaw,open,DanRWilloughby,none,28d ago\n  28019,\"[agents] Customizable error messages for rate limit / model failure responses\",openclaw/openclaw,open,Tranman324,stale,22d ago\n  48988,\"[Bug]: Error masking + global circuit breaker causes total outage when any single provider fails\",openclaw/openclaw,open,vonscons,none,4d ago\n  50866,Telegram 429 rate limit causes crash spiral when multiple agents/crons post simultaneously,openclaw/openclaw,open,rets85,none,1d ago\n  36119,\"Feature: Mid-run profile rotation on 429 + configurable rate limit cooldown\",openclaw/openclaw,open,Kenneth77chu,none,16d ago\n  43932,Rate limit errors surfaced to chat should include model/provider/task context,openclaw/openclaw,open,AlphaComposite,none,9d ago\n  11352,Auth profile cooldown backoff too aggressive for transient rate limits,openclaw/openclaw,open,sazora,bug,1mo ago\n  22136,Fallback models not triggered when primary provider enters rate-limit cooldown,openclaw/openclaw,open,Rebolvsk,stale,28d ago\n  30341,\"[Bug]: [Webchat] False rate limit error on Gemini fallback (refresh required)\",openclaw/openclaw,open,gmvp3,bug,20d ago\n  41515,Embedded runner reports 'API rate limit reached' when provider has full headroom,openclaw/openclaw,open,AbebaCo,none,11d ago\n  39191,\"bug: synology-chat ignores SYNOLOGY_RATE_LIMIT=0 (parseInt || 30 truthy check)\",openclaw/openclaw,open,scoootscooob,none,13d ago\n  21414,\"[Feature]: Add hook for when a rate limit error occurs.\",openclaw/openclaw,open,lex-the-lobster,enhancement,29d ago\n  38853,\"[Bug]: Discord channel reconnect loop triggers Cloudflare rate-limit ban (Error 1015)\",openclaw/openclaw,open,djgeorg3,none,14d ago\n  31101,\"[Bug]: Telegram partial message spam loop when API rate limit / model fallback\",openclaw/openclaw,open,ansori-riza,none,19d ago\n  50421,Mid-conversation rate limits bypass model fallback (retry_limit return instead of FailoverError throw),openclaw/openclaw,open,TechFath3r,none,2d ago\n  43879,\"[Bug]: Auth profile cooldown is per-profile, not per-model — rate limit on one model blocks fallback to models with available capacity\",openclaw/openclaw,open,haynzz,none,9d ago\n  28997,\"Control UI webchat loses auth token on WebSocket reconnect, triggers rate limiter\",openclaw/openclaw,open,bogdano2,none,22d ago","stderr":"","interrupted":false,"isImage":false,"noOutputExpected":false}}
{"type":"assistant","message":{"model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","id":"msg_01Hbfrnm5gdgHszhKGozaRSc","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The search returned 839 total results. Now I need to get the 5 most recent ones and check if they have assignees. Looking at the results, the most recent ones appear to be:\n1. #50769 - 1d ago\n2. #50637 - 1d ago\n3. #50866 - 1d ago\n4. #50421 - 2d ago\n5. #48603 - 4d ago\n\nBut I need to check for assignees. Let me get more details on those 5 issues. Actually, looking at the output, the `assignee` field isn't shown. Let me view each issue individually or try to get more details.\n\n\nI'm seeing several issues from the past few days, with the most recent cluster being from 1 day ago. To get the assignee information, I'll need to fetch the details for these issues individually or request the data in a format that includes that field.","signature":" "}],"stop_reason":null,"stop_sequence":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":1,"cache_creation_input_tokens":1388,"cache_read_input_tokens":16201,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":1388},"output_tokens":8,"service_tier":"standard","inference_geo":"not_available"},"context_management":null},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"94c41b9b-d353-4ae5-9295-c52b537d6104"}
{"type":"assistant","message":{"model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","id":"msg_01Hbfrnm5gdgHszhKGozaRSc","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"text","text":"The search returned **839 total results**. Now let me get assignee details for the 5 most recent issues (#50866, #50769, #50637, #50421, and the next most recent)."}],"stop_reason":null,"stop_sequence":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":1,"cache_creation_input_tokens":1388,"cache_read_input_tokens":16201,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":1388},"output_tokens":8,"service_tier":"standard","inference_geo":"not_available"},"context_management":null},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"2405f571-0e2e-467f-b20a-c8078f51a78e"}
{"type":"assistant","message":{"model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","id":"msg_01Hbfrnm5gdgHszhKGozaRSc","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool_use","id":"toolu_01Ffr8NVg4x3BewweqEkbsX9","name":"Bash","input":{"command":"for n in 50866 50769 50637 50421 48988; do\n  gh-axi issue view $n --repo openclaw/openclaw 2>&1 | grep -E \"^(number|title|state|assignees?)\" | head -5\n  echo \"---\"\ndone","description":"Get assignee info for the 5 most recent rate limit issues"},"caller":{"type":"direct"}}],"stop_reason":null,"stop_sequence":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":1,"cache_creation_input_tokens":1388,"cache_read_input_tokens":16201,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":1388},"output_tokens":8,"service_tier":"standard","inference_geo":"not_available"},"context_management":null},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"b26dfe62-3678-4c94-b7dd-1b9c536f9f0d"}
{"type":"user","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"tool_use_id":"toolu_01Ffr8NVg4x3BewweqEkbsX9","type":"tool_result","content":"---\n---\n---\n---\n---","is_error":false}]},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"40e1d9a0-2266-48ec-b9ba-8e1d45def31c","timestamp":"2026-03-21T18:46:04.954Z","tool_use_result":{"stdout":"---\n---\n---\n---\n---","stderr":"","interrupted":false,"isImage":false,"noOutputExpected":false}}
{"type":"assistant","message":{"model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","id":"msg_01KMvKYMMdggMuSESff87ndf","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool_use","id":"toolu_01EbUnptfWzDcXeT16fs5HoT","name":"Bash","input":{"command":"gh-axi issue view 50866 --repo openclaw/openclaw 2>&1 | head -20","description":"View issue 50866 details"},"caller":{"type":"direct"}}],"stop_reason":null,"stop_sequence":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":1,"cache_creation_input_tokens":601,"cache_read_input_tokens":17589,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":601},"output_tokens":19,"service_tier":"standard","inference_geo":"not_available"},"context_management":null},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"de88ee11-3436-4f25-a1b3-3d4307a735dc"}
{"type":"user","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"tool_use_id":"toolu_01EbUnptfWzDcXeT16fs5HoT","type":"tool_result","content":"issue:\n  number: 50866\n  title: Telegram 429 rate limit causes crash spiral when multiple agents/crons post simultaneously\n  state: open\n  author: rets85\n  created: 1d ago\n  body: \"## Problem\\n\\nWhen multiple agent sessions or cron jobs complete around the same time (e.g., after an Anthropic API overload clears, or after a gateway restart fires missed cron jobs), the gateway attempts to send all queued Telegram messages in a burst. This triggers Telegram's 429 rate limit (`Too Many Requests: retry after 40`), which causes a cascade of delivery failures.\\n\\n## Observed Behavior\\n\\n1. Anthropic API returns `overloaded_error` for multiple concurrent sessions\\n2. Sessions queue up, t\\n... (truncated, 2996 chars total — use --full to see complete body)\"\nhelp[4]:\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue comment 50866 --body \"...\"` to comment\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue close 50866` to close\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50866 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi search prs \"50866\" --repo openclaw/openclaw` to find PRs referencing this issue","is_error":false}]},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"cd96439d-b2cb-4b18-87c9-658d2afd3a4c","timestamp":"2026-03-21T18:46:07.571Z","tool_use_result":{"stdout":"issue:\n  number: 50866\n  title: Telegram 429 rate limit causes crash spiral when multiple agents/crons post simultaneously\n  state: open\n  author: rets85\n  created: 1d ago\n  body: \"## Problem\\n\\nWhen multiple agent sessions or cron jobs complete around the same time (e.g., after an Anthropic API overload clears, or after a gateway restart fires missed cron jobs), the gateway attempts to send all queued Telegram messages in a burst. This triggers Telegram's 429 rate limit (`Too Many Requests: retry after 40`), which causes a cascade of delivery failures.\\n\\n## Observed Behavior\\n\\n1. Anthropic API returns `overloaded_error` for multiple concurrent sessions\\n2. Sessions queue up, t\\n... (truncated, 2996 chars total — use --full to see complete body)\"\nhelp[4]:\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue comment 50866 --body \"...\"` to comment\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue close 50866` to close\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50866 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi search prs \"50866\" --repo openclaw/openclaw` to find PRs referencing this issue","stderr":"","interrupted":false,"isImage":false,"noOutputExpected":false}}
{"type":"assistant","message":{"model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","id":"msg_01C3UDHiAMmapsnpZMkXxpyT","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The output doesn't show assignees field. Let me check with --full flag or see if there's another way to get assignee info.","signature":"EqMCCkYICxgCKkC01LZ3D1iDWpFx55SYAIIXeLPYNTvoMcuyeB7Xtf+E/cNqGYRmTsZpQTr6SPi6yraZ5mLjwUwESoGuorivwovgEgyy/YllOBowtFieQrkaDB5NUjMB79Kmp44EnSIwHGCHjAMYwZYSSdJ9hniA4Oe/iSSgkVH8VwDuN/l9wn0aaDtyd4vfrd6v+3vYu138KooBIc5m9WN+QmQCwd9Zgj56XV3sxwZYd6tWt5lCftEjSrC6KF1YUZIXYWMT6scYQtrXhjqeHM10hjDzetTTzUdA+J05/x7kXUyC1wizgmXQwfI/PHIbkqP3seFjKsj/PFyVMfGa89bhTXkide8DKISYRnrz5LrtpXOE6Iqwcl24l6oUY3L+VrYofq7eGAE="}],"stop_reason":null,"stop_sequence":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":1,"cache_creation_input_tokens":440,"cache_read_input_tokens":18190,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":440},"output_tokens":8,"service_tier":"standard","inference_geo":"not_available"},"context_management":null},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"13122e62-831e-47f6-8905-9e375c206776"}
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{"type":"user","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"tool_use_id":"toolu_01Hf94b1Zed3LenN9Wtpy8br","type":"tool_result","content":"  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50866 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50769 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50637 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50421 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 48988 --add-assignee <user>` to assign","is_error":false}]},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"223a9043-e101-4541-8d0c-0e10acd46751","timestamp":"2026-03-21T18:46:13.984Z","tool_use_result":{"stdout":"  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50866 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50769 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50637 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50421 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 48988 --add-assignee <user>` to assign","stderr":"","interrupted":false,"isImage":false,"noOutputExpected":false}}
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{"type":"user","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"tool_use_id":"toolu_015m6ZKenTESaDhkkAuWEDVD","type":"tool_result","content":"issue:\n  number: 50866\n  title: Telegram 429 rate limit causes crash spiral when multiple agents/crons post simultaneously\n  state: open\n  author: rets85\n  created: 1d ago\n  body: \"## Problem\\n\\nWhen multiple agent sessions or cron jobs complete around the same time (e.g., after an Anthropic API overload clears, or after a gateway restart fires missed cron jobs), the gateway attempts to send all queued Telegram messages in a burst. This triggers Telegram's 429 rate limit (`Too Many Requests: retry after 40`), which causes a cascade of delivery failures.\\n\\n## Observed Behavior\\n\\n1. Anthropic API returns `overloaded_error` for multiple concurrent sessions\\n2. Sessions queue up, then all complete once API recovers\\n3. Gateway sends ~10+ Telegram messages within seconds to the same group\\n4. Telegram returns `429: Too Many Requests: retry after 40`\\n5. Delivery recovery retries immediately (within milliseconds), getting 429 again\\n6. Lane wait times exceed 100-195 seconds\\n7. Session locks become stale (dead-pid)\\n8. Gateway crashes/restarts\\n9. Post-restart, 5+ missed cron jobs fire simultaneously\\n10. Cycle repeats\\n\\n## Root Causes\\n\\n### 1. No global Telegram send rate limiter\\nThe gateway has no outbound message queue that spaces sends. Multiple sessions/agents can all call sendMessage concurrently without coordination.\\n\\n### 2. Delivery retry ignores 429 `retry_after` header\\nThe retry mechanism uses configured `minDelayMs`/`maxDelayMs` (default 1-10s) but doesn't parse or respect Telegram's `retry after` value (typically 38-40s). Retries fire too fast and get 429'd again.\\n\\n### 3. Post-restart cron stampede\\nWhen the gateway restarts, it fires all missed cron jobs simultaneously (`running missed jobs after restart`). If 5+ jobs fire at once, each generating Telegram messages, the burst easily exceeds Telegram's rate limit.\\n\\n## Logs\\n\\n`\\nWARN: overloaded_error from anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6 (multiple runIds)\\nWARN: lane wait exceeded: topic:7 waitedMs=195206 queueAhead=1\\nERROR: telegram message failed: 429: Too Many Requests: retry after 40\\nWARN: Retry failed for delivery [id]: 429: Too Many Requests: retry after 38\\nWARN: removed stale session lock (dead-pid) x5\\n`\\n\\n## Suggested Fixes\\n\\n1. **Global Telegram send queue** - A per-chat rate limiter that spaces outbound messages (e.g., max 1 msg/50ms per chat, or ~20/sec which is under Telegram's limit)\\n2. **Parse 429 retry_after** - When Telegram returns 429 with `retry after N`, the retry mechanism should wait at least N seconds before retrying\\n3. **Stagger missed cron jobs** - Instead of firing all missed jobs simultaneously on restart, stagger them (e.g., 5-10 seconds apart)\\n\\n## Workaround Applied\\n\\n- Increased `channels.telegram.retry.minDelayMs` from 1000 to 40000 (matching retry-after)\\n- Increased `channels.telegram.retry.maxDelayMs` from 10000 to 60000\\n- Reduced retry attempts from 5 to 3\\n- Reduced `agents.defaults.maxConcurrent` from 4 to 2\\n- Staggered cron schedules to avoid 9:00 AM and 9:00 PM clusters\\n\\n## Environment\\n\\n- OpenClaw 2026.3.13 (61d171a)\\n- Windows 10, Node 22.18.0\\n- Telegram channel with forum/topics enabled\\n- ~50 active cron jobs\\n- 5 configured agents (main + 4 specialized)\"\nhelp[4]:\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue comment 50866 --body \"...\"` to comment\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue close 50866` to close\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50866 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi search prs \"50866\" --repo openclaw/openclaw` to find PRs referencing this issue\n===\nissue:\n  number: 50769\n  title: \"Rate Limit Request: Increase clawhub skill installation quota\"\n  state: open\n  author: zouyuechun\n  created: 1d ago\n  body: \"### Description\\nI am requesting an increase in the rate limit for skill installations via `clawhub` CLI.\\n\\n### Current Behavior\\nWhen attempting to install skills using `clawhub install`, I receive a rate limit error after installing approximately 10 skills within a short period.\\n\\n### Error Message\\n```\\nRate limit exceeded. Please try again later or request a quota increase.\\n```\\n\\n### Use Case\\nAs an active OpenClaw user, I need to install multiple skills to:\\n- Set up Windows UI automation capabilities\\n- Enable file system access operations\\n- Configure various productivity tools\\n\\nThe current limit of ~10 skills per day is insufficient for initial setup and testing.\\n\\n### Requested Quota\\nPlease increase the daily skill installation limit to **50** or provide a one-time bypass for account setup.\\n\\n### Environment\\n- OpenClaw Version: 2026.3.13 (61d171a)\\n- OS: Windows 10\\n- Node.js: v24.11.1\\n\\n### Additional Context\\nThis is for personal use on a single machine. I understand the rate limiting is in place to prevent abuse, and I am happy to provide any additional information needed.\\n\\nThank you for considering this request!\"\nhelp[4]:\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue comment 50769 --body \"...\"` to comment\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue close 50769` to close\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50769 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi search prs \"50769\" --repo openclaw/openclaw` to find PRs referencing this issue\n===\nissue:\n  number: 50637\n  title: \"[Bug]: WS handshake rate-limiter bypassed by synthetic device identity field\"\n  state: open\n  author: coygeek\n  created: 1d ago\n  body: \"## Severity Assessment\\n\\n### CVSS Assessment\\n\\n| Metric | v3.1 | v4.0 |\\n|--------|------|------|\\n| **Score** | 9.1 / 10.0 | 9.3 / 10.0 |\\n| **Severity** | Critical | Critical |\\n| **Vector** | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |\\n| **Calculator** | [CVSS v3.1 Calculator](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) | [CVSS v4.0 Calculator](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) |\\n\\n### Threat Model Alignment\\n**Classification:** `security-specific`\\n\\nThe `gateway.auth` trust boundary is crossed: `SECURITY.md` identifies `gateway.auth (token/password/device auth)` as a real trust boundary that \\\"authenticates callers to gateway APIs.\\\" Rate limiting is the anti-brute-force protection for that boundary. When an attacker includes any `device` object in the `connect` params, the shared-secret rate limiter is suppressed for all auth failures (only applied on success), allowing unlimited credential guessing against the gateway token/password without triggering lockout. This affects any gateway reachable from a non-loopback address and is not covered by the Out of Scope section.\\n## Impact\\n\\nAny unauthenticated remote caller can disable the shared-secret brute-force rate-limiter by including a syntactically valid device identity object in the WebSocket `connect` handshake, allowing unlimited token/password guesses without triggering lockout. For any gateway with a non-loopback bind address (LAN, Tailscale, or public reverse proxy), rate-limit protection on the shared secret is wholly absent when the attacker includes a device field. The attacker can iterate credential guesses at network speed until the correct token or password is found.\\n\\n## Affected Component\\n\\n**File:** `src/gateway/server/ws-connection/auth-context.ts:99–134`\\n\\n```typescript\\nconst { token: deviceTokenCandidate, source: deviceTokenCandidateSource } =\\n  params.hasDeviceIdentity ? resolveDeviceTokenCandidate(params.connectAuth) : {};\\nconst hasDeviceTokenCandidate = Boolean(deviceTokenCandidate);\\n\\nlet authResult: GatewayAuthResult = await authorizeWsControlUiGatewayConnect({\\n  auth: params.resolvedAuth,\\n  connectAuth: sharedConnectAuth,\\n  req: params.req,\\n  trustedProxies: params.trustedProxies,\\n  allowRealIpFallback: params.allowRealIpFallback,\\n  rateLimiter: hasDeviceTokenCandidate ? undefined : params.rateLimiter,  // rate limiter dropped\\n  clientIp: params.clientIp,\\n  rateLimitScope: AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_SHARED_SECRET,\\n});\\n\\nif (\\n  hasDeviceTokenCandidate &&\\n  authResult.ok &&           // only on SUCCESS — failures go unrecorded\\n  params.rateLimiter &&\\n  (authResult.method === \\\"token\\\" || authResult.method === \\\"password\\\")\\n) {\\n  // post-success rate-limit check only\\n}\\n```\\n\\n`resolveDeviceTokenCandidate` (lines 63–76) returns `{ token: auth.token, source: \\\"shared-token-fallback\\\" }` when `auth.token` is provided (line 71–75), making `hasDeviceTokenCandidate = true` whenever any device object plus an `auth.token` field are present.\\n\\n**Secondary location:** `src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts:446–470`\\n\\n```typescript\\nconst deviceRaw = connectParams.device;     // client-controlled\\nconst controlUiAuthPolicy = resolveControlUiAuthPolicy({ isControlUi, ..., deviceRaw });\\nconst device = controlUiAuthPolicy.device;  // = deviceRaw for non-Control-UI clients\\n\\nlet { authResult, ... } = await resolveConnectAuthState({\\n  ...\\n  hasDeviceIdentity: Boolean(device),       // true whenever client sends any device object\\n  ...\\n});\\n```\\n\\n`resolveControlUiAuthPolicy` at `connect-policy.ts:31` sets `device = deviceRaw` for non-dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth clients, so any client-supplied device object passes through directly.\\n\\n## Technical Reproduction\\n\\n1. Start an OpenClaw gateway with a non-loopback bind address (e.g., `--bind 0.0.0.0`) and token/password auth.\\n2. Connect to the gateway WebSocket endpoint from a remote host.\\n3. Send a `connect` request frame including a `device` object (any syntactically valid public key, nonce, and signature) alongside `auth.token` with an incorrect value:\\n   ```json\\n   {\\n     \\\"type\\\": \\\"req\\\", \\\"id\\\": \\\"1\\\", \\\"method\\\": \\\"connect\\\",\\n     \\\"params\\\": {\\n       \\\"minProtocol\\\": 1, \\\"maxProtocol\\\": 1,\\n       \\\"role\\\": \\\"operator\\\", \\\"scopes\\\": [],\\n       \\\"client\\\": { \\\"id\\\": \\\"test-client\\\", \\\"mode\\\": \\\"cli\\\", \\\"version\\\": \\\"0.0.1\\\" },\\n       \\\"device\\\": {\\n         \\\"id\\\": \\\"<any-derived-id>\\\",\\n         \\\"publicKey\\\": \\\"<any-ed25519-public-key-base64url>\\\",\\n         \\\"signature\\\": \\\"<any-signature>\\\",\\n         \\\"signedAt\\\": 1234567890,\\n         \\\"nonce\\\": \\\"<any-nonce>\\\"\\n       },\\n       \\\"auth\\\": { \\\"token\\\": \\\"<WRONG_TOKEN>\\\" }\\n     }\\n   }\\n   ```\\n4. Observe: connection is rejected (wrong token), but no rate-limit failure is recorded for the source IP.\\n5. Repeat step 3 thousands of times with different token guesses. The gateway never returns a rate-limit error and never locks out the IP.\\n\\nDevice signature validation happens after `resolveConnectAuthState` returns; providing a bogus device object is sufficient to suppress the rate limiter.\\n\\n## Demonstrated Impact\\n\\nRoot cause: `resolveConnectAuthState` (auth-context.ts:109) passes `rateLimiter: undefined` to `authorizeWsControlUiGatewayConnect` whenever `hasDeviceTokenCandidate` is true. The post-auth block at lines 114–134 only executes on `authResult.ok === true`, so failed shared-secret attempts — the only ones an attacker making wrong guesses generates — are never recorded via `recordFailure()`. The design intent is to defer the rate-limit count to avoid double-counting for device-token auth flows; the implementation silently discards all failed shared-secret attempts when a device field is present. For loopback-only deployments this is unexploitable (`auth-rate-limit.ts` exempts loopback IPs explicitly), but any non-loopback-exposed gateway has no brute-force protection when the attacker includes a device field.\\n\\n## Environment\\n\\nVerified against `v2026.3.13-1` (`src/gateway/server/ws-connection/auth-context.ts:99–134`). Affects all gateway deployments with `auth.mode=token` or `auth.mode=password` where the WS port is reachable from a non-loopback address.\\n\\n## Remediation Advice\\n\\nWhen `hasDeviceTokenCandidate` is true and shared-secret auth fails (`!authResult.ok`), the failure should still be recorded against the rate limiter using `AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_SHARED_SECRET`. The existing deferred check path (lines 114–134) handles the success case; a symmetric `!authResult.ok` branch is needed to record failures. Alternatively, always pass the rate limiter to the primary auth call and let `authorizeWsControlUiGatewayConnect` decide which scope to attribute the failure to.\\n\\n<!-- submission-marker:AA-VFO-ws-auth-ratelimit-bypass-device-field -->\\n\"\nhelp[4]:\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue comment 50637 --body \"...\"` to comment\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue close 50637` to close\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50637 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi search prs \"50637\" --repo openclaw/openclaw` to find PRs referencing this issue\n===\nissue:\n  number: 50421\n  title: Mid-conversation rate limits bypass model fallback (retry_limit return instead of FailoverError throw)\n  state: open\n  author: TechFath3r\n  created: 2d ago\n  body: \"## Bug\\n\\nWhen a model succeeds on turn N but gets rate-limited on turn N+1 within the same embedded agent run, the model fallback mechanism is never triggered. The run is killed with a user-facing error instead of falling back to the next model in the chain.\\n\\n## Root cause\\n\\nWhen mid-conversation rate limits cycle through all auth profiles via `advanceAuthProfile()` → `continue`, each retry increments `runLoopIterations`. Once `MAX_RUN_LOOP_ITERATIONS` is exceeded at `src/agents/pi-embedded-runner/run.ts:887`, the code **returns** an error result payload:\\n\\n```typescript\\nreturn {\\n  payloads: [{ text: \\\"Request failed after repeated internal retries...\\\", isError: true }],\\n  meta: { ..., error: { kind: \\\"retry_limit\\\", message } },\\n};\\n```\\n\\nSince `runFallbackCandidate()` in `src/agents/model-fallback.ts` only treats **thrown** errors as failures, this returned result is wrapped as `{ ok: true, result }` — a \\\"success.\\\" The fallback loop at line 667 sees a success and exits without trying the next model candidate.\\n\\nAdditionally, the FailoverError re-throw at `run.ts:782-785` (initial auth profile setup) exits the function before the `try-finally` cleanup block at line 882-1697, which can leave runtime auth refresh timers orphaned when profile resolution itself throws.\\n\\n## Reproduction\\n\\n1. Configure two model fallback candidates: `openai/gpt-x` → `groq/llama-x`\\n2. Start an embedded agent run that succeeds on the first API call\\n3. Trigger a rate limit (429) on the subsequent API call within the same run\\n4. All auth profiles for the primary provider enter cooldown\\n5. The retry loop exhausts `MAX_RUN_LOOP_ITERATIONS`\\n\\n**Expected:** FailoverError is thrown, `runWithModelFallback()` catches it and tries `groq/llama-x`.\\n**Actual:** Error result is returned (not thrown), model fallback never triggers, user sees \\\"Request failed after repeated internal retries.\\\"\\n\\n## Fix\\n\\nThe retry-limit exit at line 887-917 should throw a `FailoverError` (instead of returning an error result) when:\\n- `fallbackConfigured` is true, AND\\n- the last failure reason is failover-worthy (rate_limit, overloaded, auth, billing)\\n\\nThis allows `runFallbackCandidate()` to catch it and the model fallback loop to try the next candidate.\"\nhelp[4]:\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue comment 50421 --body \"...\"` to comment\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue close 50421` to close\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50421 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi search prs \"50421\" --repo openclaw/openclaw` to find PRs referencing this issue\n===\nissue:\n  number: 48988\n  title: \"[Bug]: Error masking + global circuit breaker causes total outage when any single provider fails\"\n  state: open\n  author: vonscons\n  created: 4d ago\n  body: \"## Environment\\n- **OpenClaw Version:** 2026.3.8\\n- **OS:** Ubuntu (Docker container on VPS)\\n- **Channels:** Telegram (2 bots)\\n- **Providers:** Z.ai (GLM-4.7), Groq (Llama 3.3 70B), Ollama (Qwen 3)\\n\\n## Problem Summary\\n\\nA single misconfigured provider (wrong Z.ai endpoint) cascaded into **total outage across ALL providers**, including local Ollama which has no rate limits. The root cause is two compounding behaviors:\\n\\n1. **Error masking**: ALL provider errors (auth failures, wrong endpoints, plan limitations) are mapped to generic \\\"API rate limit reached\\\"\\n2. **Global circuit breaker**: After repeated \\\"rate limit\\\" errors from one provider, the circuit breaker marks ALL providers as rate-limited, including unrelated ones\\n\\nThis is the same class of bug as #43447 (Kimi/Moonshot rate limit masking), but with a more severe cascade path.\\n\\n## Cascade Sequence (observed)\\n\\n```\\nGLM-5 request → error 1311 (model not on plan) → mapped to \\\"rate limit\\\"\\n  → fallback to GLM-4.7 → wrong endpoint → error 1113 → mapped to \\\"rate limit\\\"\\n    → fallback to Groq → retry storm from above failures → actual rate limit\\n      → fallback to Ollama → circuit breaker rejects instantly (214ms, no actual API call)\\n        → TOTAL FAILURE: all 4 providers \\\"rate limited\\\"\\n```\\n\\n**Evidence**: Ollama is local (localhost:11434, air-gapped Docker network). It has zero rate limiting capability. The 214ms rejection time proves the circuit breaker rejected the request without making any network call.\\n\\n## Root Causes\\n\\n### RC-1: Error masking (same as #43447)\\nAll provider errors are mapped to \\\"API rate limit reached\\\" regardless of actual error type:\\n- HTTP 1311 (plan limitation) → \\\"rate limit\\\"\\n- HTTP 1113 (wrong endpoint/auth) → \\\"rate limit\\\"  \\n- HTTP 429 (actual rate limit) → \\\"rate limit\\\"\\n- Connection refused → \\\"rate limit\\\"\\n\\nThis prevents users from diagnosing the actual problem and prevents the circuit breaker from distinguishing recoverable vs permanent failures.\\n\\n### RC-2: Global circuit breaker scope\\nThe circuit breaker appears to track failures globally rather than per-provider. After N failures from Provider A, Provider B and Provider C also get rejected without attempting a real API call. This turns any single-provider outage into a total outage.\\n\\n## Impact\\n- **Severity**: Critical (total service outage)\\n- **Duration**: Until manual SSH intervention to fix config and restart\\n- **User experience**: All Telegram bots unresponsive, \\\"rate limit reached\\\" on every message\\n- **Workaround**: Only include verified-working models in the fallback chain. Exclude any model that might fail.\\n\\n## Expected Behavior\\n1. **Preserve original error codes**: \\\"Plan limitation (1311)\\\" not \\\"rate limit\\\". \\\"Auth failure (1113)\\\" not \\\"rate limit\\\".\\n2. **Per-provider circuit breaker**: Failures from Z.ai should not affect Groq or Ollama circuit breaker state.\\n3. **Graceful degradation**: If primary fails, fallback should be attempted with a clean circuit breaker state.\\n\\n## Proposed Fix\\n1. Map provider errors to their actual categories (auth, billing, rate limit, network, plan limitation)\\n2. Scope circuit breaker state per provider ID, not globally\\n3. Only trigger circuit breaker on actual 429 responses, not on auth/config errors\\n\\n## Workaround (current)\\nOnly include verified-working models in `agents.defaults.model.fallbacks`. Any model that returns errors (even temporarily) will cascade to take down all providers.\\n\\n## Related\\n- #43447 — Same error masking bug (Kimi/Moonshot)\\n- #34624 — Global circuit breaker for model failover chains\\n- #47988 — Phase 6: LLM circuit breaker\"\nhelp[4]:\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue comment 48988 --body \"...\"` to comment\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue close 48988` to close\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 48988 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi search prs \"48988\" --repo openclaw/openclaw` to find PRs referencing this issue","is_error":false}]},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"3e776c6d-ae45-48f9-adaf-5f3a16086cb6","timestamp":"2026-03-21T18:46:19.661Z","tool_use_result":{"stdout":"issue:\n  number: 50866\n  title: Telegram 429 rate limit causes crash spiral when multiple agents/crons post simultaneously\n  state: open\n  author: rets85\n  created: 1d ago\n  body: \"## Problem\\n\\nWhen multiple agent sessions or cron jobs complete around the same time (e.g., after an Anthropic API overload clears, or after a gateway restart fires missed cron jobs), the gateway attempts to send all queued Telegram messages in a burst. This triggers Telegram's 429 rate limit (`Too Many Requests: retry after 40`), which causes a cascade of delivery failures.\\n\\n## Observed Behavior\\n\\n1. Anthropic API returns `overloaded_error` for multiple concurrent sessions\\n2. Sessions queue up, then all complete once API recovers\\n3. Gateway sends ~10+ Telegram messages within seconds to the same group\\n4. Telegram returns `429: Too Many Requests: retry after 40`\\n5. Delivery recovery retries immediately (within milliseconds), getting 429 again\\n6. Lane wait times exceed 100-195 seconds\\n7. Session locks become stale (dead-pid)\\n8. Gateway crashes/restarts\\n9. Post-restart, 5+ missed cron jobs fire simultaneously\\n10. Cycle repeats\\n\\n## Root Causes\\n\\n### 1. No global Telegram send rate limiter\\nThe gateway has no outbound message queue that spaces sends. Multiple sessions/agents can all call sendMessage concurrently without coordination.\\n\\n### 2. Delivery retry ignores 429 `retry_after` header\\nThe retry mechanism uses configured `minDelayMs`/`maxDelayMs` (default 1-10s) but doesn't parse or respect Telegram's `retry after` value (typically 38-40s). Retries fire too fast and get 429'd again.\\n\\n### 3. Post-restart cron stampede\\nWhen the gateway restarts, it fires all missed cron jobs simultaneously (`running missed jobs after restart`). If 5+ jobs fire at once, each generating Telegram messages, the burst easily exceeds Telegram's rate limit.\\n\\n## Logs\\n\\n`\\nWARN: overloaded_error from anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6 (multiple runIds)\\nWARN: lane wait exceeded: topic:7 waitedMs=195206 queueAhead=1\\nERROR: telegram message failed: 429: Too Many Requests: retry after 40\\nWARN: Retry failed for delivery [id]: 429: Too Many Requests: retry after 38\\nWARN: removed stale session lock (dead-pid) x5\\n`\\n\\n## Suggested Fixes\\n\\n1. **Global Telegram send queue** - A per-chat rate limiter that spaces outbound messages (e.g., max 1 msg/50ms per chat, or ~20/sec which is under Telegram's limit)\\n2. **Parse 429 retry_after** - When Telegram returns 429 with `retry after N`, the retry mechanism should wait at least N seconds before retrying\\n3. **Stagger missed cron jobs** - Instead of firing all missed jobs simultaneously on restart, stagger them (e.g., 5-10 seconds apart)\\n\\n## Workaround Applied\\n\\n- Increased `channels.telegram.retry.minDelayMs` from 1000 to 40000 (matching retry-after)\\n- Increased `channels.telegram.retry.maxDelayMs` from 10000 to 60000\\n- Reduced retry attempts from 5 to 3\\n- Reduced `agents.defaults.maxConcurrent` from 4 to 2\\n- Staggered cron schedules to avoid 9:00 AM and 9:00 PM clusters\\n\\n## Environment\\n\\n- OpenClaw 2026.3.13 (61d171a)\\n- Windows 10, Node 22.18.0\\n- Telegram channel with forum/topics enabled\\n- ~50 active cron jobs\\n- 5 configured agents (main + 4 specialized)\"\nhelp[4]:\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue comment 50866 --body \"...\"` to comment\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue close 50866` to close\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50866 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi search prs \"50866\" --repo openclaw/openclaw` to find PRs referencing this issue\n===\nissue:\n  number: 50769\n  title: \"Rate Limit Request: Increase clawhub skill installation quota\"\n  state: open\n  author: zouyuechun\n  created: 1d ago\n  body: \"### Description\\nI am requesting an increase in the rate limit for skill installations via `clawhub` CLI.\\n\\n### Current Behavior\\nWhen attempting to install skills using `clawhub install`, I receive a rate limit error after installing approximately 10 skills within a short period.\\n\\n### Error Message\\n```\\nRate limit exceeded. Please try again later or request a quota increase.\\n```\\n\\n### Use Case\\nAs an active OpenClaw user, I need to install multiple skills to:\\n- Set up Windows UI automation capabilities\\n- Enable file system access operations\\n- Configure various productivity tools\\n\\nThe current limit of ~10 skills per day is insufficient for initial setup and testing.\\n\\n### Requested Quota\\nPlease increase the daily skill installation limit to **50** or provide a one-time bypass for account setup.\\n\\n### Environment\\n- OpenClaw Version: 2026.3.13 (61d171a)\\n- OS: Windows 10\\n- Node.js: v24.11.1\\n\\n### Additional Context\\nThis is for personal use on a single machine. I understand the rate limiting is in place to prevent abuse, and I am happy to provide any additional information needed.\\n\\nThank you for considering this request!\"\nhelp[4]:\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue comment 50769 --body \"...\"` to comment\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue close 50769` to close\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50769 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi search prs \"50769\" --repo openclaw/openclaw` to find PRs referencing this issue\n===\nissue:\n  number: 50637\n  title: \"[Bug]: WS handshake rate-limiter bypassed by synthetic device identity field\"\n  state: open\n  author: coygeek\n  created: 1d ago\n  body: \"## Severity Assessment\\n\\n### CVSS Assessment\\n\\n| Metric | v3.1 | v4.0 |\\n|--------|------|------|\\n| **Score** | 9.1 / 10.0 | 9.3 / 10.0 |\\n| **Severity** | Critical | Critical |\\n| **Vector** | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |\\n| **Calculator** | [CVSS v3.1 Calculator](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) | [CVSS v4.0 Calculator](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) |\\n\\n### Threat Model Alignment\\n**Classification:** `security-specific`\\n\\nThe `gateway.auth` trust boundary is crossed: `SECURITY.md` identifies `gateway.auth (token/password/device auth)` as a real trust boundary that \\\"authenticates callers to gateway APIs.\\\" Rate limiting is the anti-brute-force protection for that boundary. When an attacker includes any `device` object in the `connect` params, the shared-secret rate limiter is suppressed for all auth failures (only applied on success), allowing unlimited credential guessing against the gateway token/password without triggering lockout. This affects any gateway reachable from a non-loopback address and is not covered by the Out of Scope section.\\n## Impact\\n\\nAny unauthenticated remote caller can disable the shared-secret brute-force rate-limiter by including a syntactically valid device identity object in the WebSocket `connect` handshake, allowing unlimited token/password guesses without triggering lockout. For any gateway with a non-loopback bind address (LAN, Tailscale, or public reverse proxy), rate-limit protection on the shared secret is wholly absent when the attacker includes a device field. The attacker can iterate credential guesses at network speed until the correct token or password is found.\\n\\n## Affected Component\\n\\n**File:** `src/gateway/server/ws-connection/auth-context.ts:99–134`\\n\\n```typescript\\nconst { token: deviceTokenCandidate, source: deviceTokenCandidateSource } =\\n  params.hasDeviceIdentity ? resolveDeviceTokenCandidate(params.connectAuth) : {};\\nconst hasDeviceTokenCandidate = Boolean(deviceTokenCandidate);\\n\\nlet authResult: GatewayAuthResult = await authorizeWsControlUiGatewayConnect({\\n  auth: params.resolvedAuth,\\n  connectAuth: sharedConnectAuth,\\n  req: params.req,\\n  trustedProxies: params.trustedProxies,\\n  allowRealIpFallback: params.allowRealIpFallback,\\n  rateLimiter: hasDeviceTokenCandidate ? undefined : params.rateLimiter,  // rate limiter dropped\\n  clientIp: params.clientIp,\\n  rateLimitScope: AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_SHARED_SECRET,\\n});\\n\\nif (\\n  hasDeviceTokenCandidate &&\\n  authResult.ok &&           // only on SUCCESS — failures go unrecorded\\n  params.rateLimiter &&\\n  (authResult.method === \\\"token\\\" || authResult.method === \\\"password\\\")\\n) {\\n  // post-success rate-limit check only\\n}\\n```\\n\\n`resolveDeviceTokenCandidate` (lines 63–76) returns `{ token: auth.token, source: \\\"shared-token-fallback\\\" }` when `auth.token` is provided (line 71–75), making `hasDeviceTokenCandidate = true` whenever any device object plus an `auth.token` field are present.\\n\\n**Secondary location:** `src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts:446–470`\\n\\n```typescript\\nconst deviceRaw = connectParams.device;     // client-controlled\\nconst controlUiAuthPolicy = resolveControlUiAuthPolicy({ isControlUi, ..., deviceRaw });\\nconst device = controlUiAuthPolicy.device;  // = deviceRaw for non-Control-UI clients\\n\\nlet { authResult, ... } = await resolveConnectAuthState({\\n  ...\\n  hasDeviceIdentity: Boolean(device),       // true whenever client sends any device object\\n  ...\\n});\\n```\\n\\n`resolveControlUiAuthPolicy` at `connect-policy.ts:31` sets `device = deviceRaw` for non-dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth clients, so any client-supplied device object passes through directly.\\n\\n## Technical Reproduction\\n\\n1. Start an OpenClaw gateway with a non-loopback bind address (e.g., `--bind 0.0.0.0`) and token/password auth.\\n2. Connect to the gateway WebSocket endpoint from a remote host.\\n3. Send a `connect` request frame including a `device` object (any syntactically valid public key, nonce, and signature) alongside `auth.token` with an incorrect value:\\n   ```json\\n   {\\n     \\\"type\\\": \\\"req\\\", \\\"id\\\": \\\"1\\\", \\\"method\\\": \\\"connect\\\",\\n     \\\"params\\\": {\\n       \\\"minProtocol\\\": 1, \\\"maxProtocol\\\": 1,\\n       \\\"role\\\": \\\"operator\\\", \\\"scopes\\\": [],\\n       \\\"client\\\": { \\\"id\\\": \\\"test-client\\\", \\\"mode\\\": \\\"cli\\\", \\\"version\\\": \\\"0.0.1\\\" },\\n       \\\"device\\\": {\\n         \\\"id\\\": \\\"<any-derived-id>\\\",\\n         \\\"publicKey\\\": \\\"<any-ed25519-public-key-base64url>\\\",\\n         \\\"signature\\\": \\\"<any-signature>\\\",\\n         \\\"signedAt\\\": 1234567890,\\n         \\\"nonce\\\": \\\"<any-nonce>\\\"\\n       },\\n       \\\"auth\\\": { \\\"token\\\": \\\"<WRONG_TOKEN>\\\" }\\n     }\\n   }\\n   ```\\n4. Observe: connection is rejected (wrong token), but no rate-limit failure is recorded for the source IP.\\n5. Repeat step 3 thousands of times with different token guesses. The gateway never returns a rate-limit error and never locks out the IP.\\n\\nDevice signature validation happens after `resolveConnectAuthState` returns; providing a bogus device object is sufficient to suppress the rate limiter.\\n\\n## Demonstrated Impact\\n\\nRoot cause: `resolveConnectAuthState` (auth-context.ts:109) passes `rateLimiter: undefined` to `authorizeWsControlUiGatewayConnect` whenever `hasDeviceTokenCandidate` is true. The post-auth block at lines 114–134 only executes on `authResult.ok === true`, so failed shared-secret attempts — the only ones an attacker making wrong guesses generates — are never recorded via `recordFailure()`. The design intent is to defer the rate-limit count to avoid double-counting for device-token auth flows; the implementation silently discards all failed shared-secret attempts when a device field is present. For loopback-only deployments this is unexploitable (`auth-rate-limit.ts` exempts loopback IPs explicitly), but any non-loopback-exposed gateway has no brute-force protection when the attacker includes a device field.\\n\\n## Environment\\n\\nVerified against `v2026.3.13-1` (`src/gateway/server/ws-connection/auth-context.ts:99–134`). Affects all gateway deployments with `auth.mode=token` or `auth.mode=password` where the WS port is reachable from a non-loopback address.\\n\\n## Remediation Advice\\n\\nWhen `hasDeviceTokenCandidate` is true and shared-secret auth fails (`!authResult.ok`), the failure should still be recorded against the rate limiter using `AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_SHARED_SECRET`. The existing deferred check path (lines 114–134) handles the success case; a symmetric `!authResult.ok` branch is needed to record failures. Alternatively, always pass the rate limiter to the primary auth call and let `authorizeWsControlUiGatewayConnect` decide which scope to attribute the failure to.\\n\\n<!-- submission-marker:AA-VFO-ws-auth-ratelimit-bypass-device-field -->\\n\"\nhelp[4]:\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue comment 50637 --body \"...\"` to comment\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue close 50637` to close\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50637 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi search prs \"50637\" --repo openclaw/openclaw` to find PRs referencing this issue\n===\nissue:\n  number: 50421\n  title: Mid-conversation rate limits bypass model fallback (retry_limit return instead of FailoverError throw)\n  state: open\n  author: TechFath3r\n  created: 2d ago\n  body: \"## Bug\\n\\nWhen a model succeeds on turn N but gets rate-limited on turn N+1 within the same embedded agent run, the model fallback mechanism is never triggered. The run is killed with a user-facing error instead of falling back to the next model in the chain.\\n\\n## Root cause\\n\\nWhen mid-conversation rate limits cycle through all auth profiles via `advanceAuthProfile()` → `continue`, each retry increments `runLoopIterations`. Once `MAX_RUN_LOOP_ITERATIONS` is exceeded at `src/agents/pi-embedded-runner/run.ts:887`, the code **returns** an error result payload:\\n\\n```typescript\\nreturn {\\n  payloads: [{ text: \\\"Request failed after repeated internal retries...\\\", isError: true }],\\n  meta: { ..., error: { kind: \\\"retry_limit\\\", message } },\\n};\\n```\\n\\nSince `runFallbackCandidate()` in `src/agents/model-fallback.ts` only treats **thrown** errors as failures, this returned result is wrapped as `{ ok: true, result }` — a \\\"success.\\\" The fallback loop at line 667 sees a success and exits without trying the next model candidate.\\n\\nAdditionally, the FailoverError re-throw at `run.ts:782-785` (initial auth profile setup) exits the function before the `try-finally` cleanup block at line 882-1697, which can leave runtime auth refresh timers orphaned when profile resolution itself throws.\\n\\n## Reproduction\\n\\n1. Configure two model fallback candidates: `openai/gpt-x` → `groq/llama-x`\\n2. Start an embedded agent run that succeeds on the first API call\\n3. Trigger a rate limit (429) on the subsequent API call within the same run\\n4. All auth profiles for the primary provider enter cooldown\\n5. The retry loop exhausts `MAX_RUN_LOOP_ITERATIONS`\\n\\n**Expected:** FailoverError is thrown, `runWithModelFallback()` catches it and tries `groq/llama-x`.\\n**Actual:** Error result is returned (not thrown), model fallback never triggers, user sees \\\"Request failed after repeated internal retries.\\\"\\n\\n## Fix\\n\\nThe retry-limit exit at line 887-917 should throw a `FailoverError` (instead of returning an error result) when:\\n- `fallbackConfigured` is true, AND\\n- the last failure reason is failover-worthy (rate_limit, overloaded, auth, billing)\\n\\nThis allows `runFallbackCandidate()` to catch it and the model fallback loop to try the next candidate.\"\nhelp[4]:\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue comment 50421 --body \"...\"` to comment\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue close 50421` to close\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 50421 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi search prs \"50421\" --repo openclaw/openclaw` to find PRs referencing this issue\n===\nissue:\n  number: 48988\n  title: \"[Bug]: Error masking + global circuit breaker causes total outage when any single provider fails\"\n  state: open\n  author: vonscons\n  created: 4d ago\n  body: \"## Environment\\n- **OpenClaw Version:** 2026.3.8\\n- **OS:** Ubuntu (Docker container on VPS)\\n- **Channels:** Telegram (2 bots)\\n- **Providers:** Z.ai (GLM-4.7), Groq (Llama 3.3 70B), Ollama (Qwen 3)\\n\\n## Problem Summary\\n\\nA single misconfigured provider (wrong Z.ai endpoint) cascaded into **total outage across ALL providers**, including local Ollama which has no rate limits. The root cause is two compounding behaviors:\\n\\n1. **Error masking**: ALL provider errors (auth failures, wrong endpoints, plan limitations) are mapped to generic \\\"API rate limit reached\\\"\\n2. **Global circuit breaker**: After repeated \\\"rate limit\\\" errors from one provider, the circuit breaker marks ALL providers as rate-limited, including unrelated ones\\n\\nThis is the same class of bug as #43447 (Kimi/Moonshot rate limit masking), but with a more severe cascade path.\\n\\n## Cascade Sequence (observed)\\n\\n```\\nGLM-5 request → error 1311 (model not on plan) → mapped to \\\"rate limit\\\"\\n  → fallback to GLM-4.7 → wrong endpoint → error 1113 → mapped to \\\"rate limit\\\"\\n    → fallback to Groq → retry storm from above failures → actual rate limit\\n      → fallback to Ollama → circuit breaker rejects instantly (214ms, no actual API call)\\n        → TOTAL FAILURE: all 4 providers \\\"rate limited\\\"\\n```\\n\\n**Evidence**: Ollama is local (localhost:11434, air-gapped Docker network). It has zero rate limiting capability. The 214ms rejection time proves the circuit breaker rejected the request without making any network call.\\n\\n## Root Causes\\n\\n### RC-1: Error masking (same as #43447)\\nAll provider errors are mapped to \\\"API rate limit reached\\\" regardless of actual error type:\\n- HTTP 1311 (plan limitation) → \\\"rate limit\\\"\\n- HTTP 1113 (wrong endpoint/auth) → \\\"rate limit\\\"  \\n- HTTP 429 (actual rate limit) → \\\"rate limit\\\"\\n- Connection refused → \\\"rate limit\\\"\\n\\nThis prevents users from diagnosing the actual problem and prevents the circuit breaker from distinguishing recoverable vs permanent failures.\\n\\n### RC-2: Global circuit breaker scope\\nThe circuit breaker appears to track failures globally rather than per-provider. After N failures from Provider A, Provider B and Provider C also get rejected without attempting a real API call. This turns any single-provider outage into a total outage.\\n\\n## Impact\\n- **Severity**: Critical (total service outage)\\n- **Duration**: Until manual SSH intervention to fix config and restart\\n- **User experience**: All Telegram bots unresponsive, \\\"rate limit reached\\\" on every message\\n- **Workaround**: Only include verified-working models in the fallback chain. Exclude any model that might fail.\\n\\n## Expected Behavior\\n1. **Preserve original error codes**: \\\"Plan limitation (1311)\\\" not \\\"rate limit\\\". \\\"Auth failure (1113)\\\" not \\\"rate limit\\\".\\n2. **Per-provider circuit breaker**: Failures from Z.ai should not affect Groq or Ollama circuit breaker state.\\n3. **Graceful degradation**: If primary fails, fallback should be attempted with a clean circuit breaker state.\\n\\n## Proposed Fix\\n1. Map provider errors to their actual categories (auth, billing, rate limit, network, plan limitation)\\n2. Scope circuit breaker state per provider ID, not globally\\n3. Only trigger circuit breaker on actual 429 responses, not on auth/config errors\\n\\n## Workaround (current)\\nOnly include verified-working models in `agents.defaults.model.fallbacks`. Any model that returns errors (even temporarily) will cascade to take down all providers.\\n\\n## Related\\n- #43447 — Same error masking bug (Kimi/Moonshot)\\n- #34624 — Global circuit breaker for model failover chains\\n- #47988 — Phase 6: LLM circuit breaker\"\nhelp[4]:\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue comment 48988 --body \"...\"` to comment\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue close 48988` to close\n  Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit 48988 --add-assignee <user>` to assign\n  Run `gh-axi search prs \"48988\" --repo openclaw/openclaw` to find PRs referencing this issue","stderr":"","interrupted":false,"isImage":false,"noOutputExpected":false}}
{"type":"assistant","message":{"model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","id":"msg_019BG5oBFUjn5uDrnKfb1PSB","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Based on the output, none of the 5 issues show an \"assignees\" field in the structured output. The help section for each shows \"Run `gh-axi -R openclaw/openclaw issue edit <number> --add-assignee <user>` to assign\" which implies they're all unassigned (if they had assignees, it would show them). The absence of an \"assignees\" field in the structured output likely means no assignees.\n\nNow let me summarize the results:\n\nTotal: 839 results\n\n5 most recent:\n1. #50866 - \"Telegram 429 rate limit causes crash spiral when multiple agents/crons post simultaneously\" - open - no assignee\n\n\n2. #50769 - \"Rate Limit Request: Increase clawhub skill installation quota\" - open - no assignee\n3. #50637 - \"[Bug]: WS handshake rate-limiter bypassed by synthetic device identity field\" - open - no assignee\n4. #50421 - \"Mid-conversation rate limits bypass model fallback (retry_limit return instead of FailoverError throw)\" - open - no assignee\n5. #48988 - \"[Bug]: Error masking + global circuit breaker causes total outage when any single provider fails\" - open - no assignee\n\nAll five issues are unassigned, which aligns with the missing assignees field in the structured output. I'm verifying the timestamps to identify which 4-day-old issue is actually the most recent, and since #48988 appeared first in the original results, that's my best choice for the fifth most recent issue.","signature":" "}],"stop_reason":null,"stop_sequence":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":1,"cache_creation_input_tokens":6300,"cache_read_input_tokens":19074,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":6300},"output_tokens":8,"service_tier":"standard","inference_geo":"not_available"},"context_management":null},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"bccc97aa-a741-4557-8439-9bd5122b0c5c"}
{"type":"assistant","message":{"model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","id":"msg_019BG5oBFUjn5uDrnKfb1PSB","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Here are the results:\n\n**Total results: 839**\n\n---\n\n**5 Most Recent Issues:**\n\n| # | Title | State | Assignee |\n|---|-------|-------|----------|\n| #50866 | Telegram 429 rate limit causes crash spiral when multiple agents/crons post simultaneously | Open | None |\n| #50769 | Rate Limit Request: Increase clawhub skill installation quota | Open | None |\n| #50637 | [Bug]: WS handshake rate-limiter bypassed by synthetic device identity field | Open | None |\n| #50421 | Mid-conversation rate limits bypass model fallback (retry\\_limit return instead of FailoverError throw) | Open | None |\n| #48988 | [Bug]: Error masking + global circuit breaker causes total outage when any single provider fails | Open | None |\n\nAll 5 of the most recent issues are **open** and **unassigned**."}],"stop_reason":null,"stop_sequence":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":1,"cache_creation_input_tokens":6300,"cache_read_input_tokens":19074,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":6300},"output_tokens":8,"service_tier":"standard","inference_geo":"not_available"},"context_management":null},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","uuid":"5f61f5a4-3d99-408e-b6be-22a1dfdbf6d0"}
{"type":"result","subtype":"success","is_error":false,"duration_ms":66191,"duration_api_ms":37348,"num_turns":7,"result":"Here are the results:\n\n**Total results: 839**\n\n---\n\n**5 Most Recent Issues:**\n\n| # | Title | State | Assignee |\n|---|-------|-------|----------|\n| #50866 | Telegram 429 rate limit causes crash spiral when multiple agents/crons post simultaneously | Open | None |\n| #50769 | Rate Limit Request: Increase clawhub skill installation quota | Open | None |\n| #50637 | [Bug]: WS handshake rate-limiter bypassed by synthetic device identity field | Open | None |\n| #50421 | Mid-conversation rate limits bypass model fallback (retry\\_limit return instead of FailoverError throw) | Open | None |\n| #48988 | [Bug]: Error masking + global circuit breaker causes total outage when any single provider fails | Open | None |\n\nAll 5 of the most recent issues are **open** and **unassigned**.","stop_reason":"end_turn","session_id":"f3ce15df-e029-4acb-9408-f10133de302a","total_cost_usd":0.13014030000000001,"usage":{"input_tokens":9,"cache_creation_input_tokens":16776,"cache_read_input_tokens":114261,"output_tokens":2195,"server_tool_use":{"web_search_requests":0,"web_fetch_requests":0},"service_tier":"standard","cache_creation":{"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":16776,"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0},"inference_geo":"","iterations":[],"speed":"standard"},"modelUsage":{"claude-sonnet-4-6":{"inputTokens":9,"outputTokens":2195,"cacheReadInputTokens":114261,"cacheCreationInputTokens":16776,"webSearchRequests":0,"costUSD":0.13014030000000001,"contextWindow":200000,"maxOutputTokens":32000}},"permission_denials":[],"fast_mode_state":"off","uuid":"94366e58-adcd-4674-80da-17ca1ebb6067"}
