---
artifact: pivot-decision
version: "1.0"
created: 2026-01-14
status: complete
context: B2C fitness app pivoting to B2B enterprise wellness
---

# Pivot Decision: FitTrack App

## Overview

| Attribute | Value |
|-----------|-------|
| **Decision Date** | January 14, 2026 |
| **Decision Maker(s)** | Sarah Kim (CEO), Michael Chen (CPO), Lisa Park (CTO) |
| **Product/Initiative** | FitTrack - Personal Fitness Tracking App |
| **Time in Market** | 8 months (launched May 2025) |
| **Investment to Date** | $1.2M seed funding, 18 months development, 6 FTEs |

---

## Executive Summary

**Decision:** Pivot to B2B Enterprise Wellness (Customer Segment Pivot)

After 8 months in market, our B2C fitness app has achieved 5,000 users but only 2% paid conversion, well below the 8% needed for sustainability. User interviews revealed strong interest from corporate wellness buyers, with 3 companies already asking about enterprise licensing. We're pivoting from B2C consumer to B2B enterprise wellness, targeting HR departments at companies with 500+ employees.

---

## Current State

### What We're Doing Now

FitTrack is a B2C mobile app that helps individuals track workouts, nutrition, and sleep. We monetize through a freemium model: free basic tracking, $9.99/month premium for advanced analytics and coaching. Our target customer is health-conscious individuals aged 25-45.

### Key Metrics

| Metric | Current | Target | Gap |
|--------|---------|--------|-----|
| Total Users | 5,200 | 50,000 | -90% |
| Paid Conversion | 2.1% | 8% | -74% |
| Monthly Revenue | $1,100 | $25,000 | -96% |
| 30-Day Retention | 18% | 40% | -55% |
| CAC | $12 | $8 | +50% |

### Timeline of Events

| Date | Milestone | Outcome |
|------|-----------|---------|
| May 2025 | App Store launch | 500 downloads first week |
| July 2025 | Paid tier launch | 1.8% conversion |
| Sept 2025 | Marketing push | CAC increased, conversion flat |
| Nov 2025 | Added social features | Slight retention improvement |
| Dec 2025 | 3 enterprise inquiries received | Unexpected inbound interest |
| Jan 2026 | Pivot evaluation | This document |

### Resources Invested

| Resource | Amount |
|----------|--------|
| Time | 18 months (10 months dev, 8 months in market) |
| Budget | $1.2M of $1.5M seed funding |
| Team | 6 people × 18 months |
| Opportunity cost | Could have tested B2B earlier based on signals |

---

## Evidence Summary

### Data That Triggered This Evaluation

1. **Conversion rate stuck at 2%** despite multiple pricing tests, feature additions, and marketing campaigns. The B2C fitness app market is brutally competitive.

2. **Three unsolicited enterprise inquiries** in Q4 from HR leaders who found our app and wanted to license it for their companies. We weren't pursuing this market.

3. **User interviews revealed job context**: When we asked converted users why they paid, 60% mentioned their employer either reimbursed it or they wished they would. The "fitness-conscious individual" is often a "wellness-benefit-seeking employee."

4. **Competitive analysis**: Direct B2C competitors (MyFitnessPal, Strava) have massive scale advantages. B2B wellness (Wellable, Virgin Pulse) is more fragmented with higher switching costs.

### Customer/User Feedback

**What Users Are Saying:**
- "I'd use this more if my company offered it as a benefit" - User interview, P7
- "My HR team is always looking for wellness solutions. You should talk to them." - User interview, P12
- "The app is good, but I have too many fitness apps already. If work paid for it, that'd change things." - User interview, P3

**What Enterprise Buyers Are Saying:**
- "We spend $400/employee on wellness benefits and have no idea if they work. Your analytics could show ROI." - Inbound inquiry, HR Director at 800-person company
- "Our current vendor is enterprise software from 2010. Your UX is 10 years better." - Inbound inquiry, Wellness Coordinator

**User Behavior Patterns:**
- Power users (top 10%) often share app to colleagues.word of mouth within companies
- Highest engagement on Monday mornings.suggests workplace wellness routines
- Most churned users cite "too many apps" as reason.commodity market problem

### Market Signals

- Corporate wellness market: $56B globally, growing 7% annually
- Post-COVID: Employers competing for talent via wellness benefits
- HR buyers increasingly have budget authority for wellness tools
- Enterprise wellness has 3-5 year contracts (sticky revenue)

### Internal Learnings

- Our analytics dashboard is more sophisticated than we realized.enterprise buyers loved it
- We underestimated how much we compete with free (Apple Health, Google Fit) in B2C
- The team has more B2B experience than B2C (3 of 6 came from enterprise SaaS)

---

## Hypothesis Review

### Original Hypotheses

| Hypothesis | Status | Evidence |
|------------|--------|----------|
| Health-conscious 25-45 year olds will pay $10/mo for premium fitness tracking | Invalidated | 2% conversion despite targeting; market saturated with free options |
| Social features will drive retention | Partially Invalidated | Minor lift (18% → 22% retention), not enough to change trajectory |
| We can achieve $8 CAC through organic + content marketing | Invalidated | CAC stuck at $12; paid channels even worse ($18) |
| Premium analytics differentiate us from free alternatives | Validated | Users who convert cite analytics as reason; enterprise buyers excited by this |

### Key Learnings from Validation

- Analytics capability is real and valued.just by wrong customer segment
- B2C fitness is a commodity market with winner-take-all dynamics
- Corporate buyers have budget and willingness to pay for wellness
- Our team's B2B DNA may be better suited to enterprise selling

---

## Options Considered

### Option 1: Persevere (Stay B2C Course)

**Description:** Continue B2C focus. Double down on marketing, add more viral features, explore influencer partnerships, and try to break through conversion ceiling.

**What Changes:**
- Hire growth marketer to optimize funnel
- Build more social/viral features
- Explore additional monetization (ads, affiliate)

**Rationale for Considering:**
- We have some users who love the product
- Pivoting means wasted B2C investment
- B2C success could be massive scale if it works

**Risks:**
- Continuing to burn cash on a market that may not work
- 3-6 more months of runway ($300K) needed to know
- Team morale already suffering from flat metrics

**Resource Requirements:** $300K additional runway, 3-6 months

---

### Option 2: Pivot to B2B Enterprise Wellness (Customer Segment Pivot)

**Description:** Reposition FitTrack as an enterprise wellness platform. Target HR departments at companies with 500+ employees. Shift from freemium to enterprise licensing ($3-5/employee/month).

**What Changes:**
- Add admin dashboard for HR buyers
- Build team analytics and reporting
- Enterprise SSO and security features
- Hire 1-2 B2B sales/partnerships roles
- Remove B2C freemium focus

**Rationale for Considering:**
- Inbound demand already exists (3 inquiries)
- Higher contract values ($50-200K/year vs $120/user/year)
- Longer retention cycles (3-year contracts)
- Better competitive position (fragmented market, inferior UX)

**Risks:**
- Longer sales cycles (3-6 months enterprise)
- Need to build sales capability
- May lose current B2C users
- Compliance requirements (SOC 2, GDPR)

**Resource Requirements:** $150K for MVP enterprise features, 2-3 months to market

---

### Option 3: Pivot to Platform/API (Technology Pivot)

**Description:** Stop being an app. Become the analytics layer that other fitness apps and devices integrate with. License our analytics engine to Apple Health, Garmin, etc.

**What Changes:**
- Sunset consumer app
- Build API-first platform
- Partner with device manufacturers
- B2B2C model

**Rationale for Considering:**
- Our analytics are genuinely good
- Avoids both B2C competition and B2B sales complexity
- Potential massive scale through partnerships

**Risks:**
- Long partnership cycles with big tech
- No existing relationships with potential partners
- Commoditization risk if analytics become table stakes
- Requires different team skills

**Resource Requirements:** $400K, 6-9 months, uncertain outcome

---

## Analysis

### Evaluation Criteria

| Criterion | Weight | Definition |
|-----------|--------|------------|
| Market Opportunity | High | Size and growth of addressable market |
| Competitive Advantage | High | Our defensibility and differentiation |
| Team Capability | Medium | Alignment with team skills and experience |
| Resource Requirements | Medium | Cash and time needed |
| Risk Level | Medium | Likelihood of failure |

### Options Comparison

| Criterion | Persevere (B2C) | B2B Enterprise | Platform/API |
|-----------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|
| Market Opportunity | Low (saturated) | High ($56B, growing) | Medium (uncertain) |
| Competitive Advantage | Low (commodity) | High (UX, analytics) | Medium (commoditization risk) |
| Team Capability | Medium (learning) | High (B2B DNA) | Low (no partnerships exp) |
| Resource Requirements | Medium ($300K) | Low ($150K) | High ($400K) |
| Risk Level | High (flat metrics) | Medium (new sales) | Very High (uncertain) |
| **Overall** | 2/5 | 4/5 | 2.5/5 |

---

## Decision

### Chosen Direction: Pivot to B2B Enterprise Wellness

**Decision Statement:**
FitTrack will pivot from B2C consumer fitness app to B2B enterprise wellness platform, targeting HR departments at companies with 500+ employees. We will sunset B2C marketing, build enterprise features, and hire B2B sales capability.

### Rationale

1. **Evidence of demand:** We have 3 inbound enterprise inquiries without trying. This is the strongest market signal we've received.

2. **Better unit economics:** Enterprise contracts ($50-200K) are 400-1600x higher LTV than B2C ($120/year). Even with longer sales cycles, the math works better.

3. **Team-market fit:** Our team has B2B DNA. Three of six team members have enterprise SaaS backgrounds. We've been fighting against our strengths.

4. **Competitive positioning:** B2B wellness is fragmented with legacy UX. Our consumer-grade design is a genuine differentiator. In B2C, we're one of hundreds of "good enough" apps.

5. **Resource efficiency:** B2B pivot requires $150K and 2-3 months.our most capital-efficient option.

### Trade-offs Accepted

| Trade-off | Impact | Why Acceptable |
|-----------|--------|----------------|
| Lose 5,000 B2C users | Community we built, brand awareness | Users weren't converting; sunk cost fallacy otherwise |
| Longer sales cycles | Cash flow delays 3-6 months | Enterprise contracts have upfront payments; VC can bridge if needed |
| Need to learn enterprise sales | New capability to build | Team has transferable skills; can hire experienced seller |
| Compliance requirements | Time and cost for SOC 2, etc. | Enterprise willingness to pay covers these costs |

### Dissenting Views

**Michael (CPO):** Concerned about abandoning B2C entirely. Suggested maintaining a small B2C presence for brand awareness and potential B2B2C. Decision: We'll keep the app available but stop active B2C investment. Enterprise employees can still use it individually.

---

## Implementation Plan

### Immediate Actions (Next 30 Days)

| Action | Owner | Due Date |
|--------|-------|----------|
| Contact 3 inbound enterprise leads | Sarah (CEO) | Jan 17 |
| Scope admin dashboard MVP | Michael (CPO) | Jan 21 |
| Draft enterprise pricing model | Sarah + Michael | Jan 21 |
| Pause B2C marketing spend | Lisa (CTO) | Jan 15 |
| Begin SOC 2 readiness assessment | Lisa | Jan 28 |
| Create enterprise sales one-pager | Sarah | Jan 21 |
| Post B2B account executive job listing | Sarah | Jan 24 |

### Resource Requirements

| Resource | Current | Needed | Gap |
|----------|---------|--------|-----|
| Runway | $300K (8 months) | $300K (12 months) | Bridge round or faster revenue |
| Headcount | 6 | 7-8 (add sales) | Hire 1-2 in Q1 |
| Technology | B2C app | Enterprise features | $150K development |

### Success Criteria

**How we'll know if this is working:**

| Metric | 30-Day Target | 90-Day Target |
|--------|---------------|---------------|
| Enterprise pipeline | 5 qualified opportunities | 15 qualified opportunities |
| Signed LOIs/pilots | 1 | 3 |
| Contract revenue (signed) | $0 | $75K ARR |
| Pilot feedback score | N/A | 4+/5 |

### Checkpoint Schedule

| Date | Checkpoint | Decision Point |
|------|------------|----------------|
| Feb 14 | 30-day review | Do we have pipeline? Continue or reconsider? |
| Apr 14 | 90-day review | Do we have contracts? Scale or iterate? |

---

## Communication Plan

### Internal Communication

| Audience | Message | Channel | When |
|----------|---------|---------|------|
| Full team | Pivot decision and rationale | All-hands meeting | Jan 15 |
| Board | Pivot strategy and funding needs | Board deck + call | Jan 17 |
| Advisors | Strategy shift, ask for B2B intros | Individual emails | Jan 20 |

### External Communication

| Audience | Message | Channel | When |
|----------|---------|---------|------|
| B2C users | "We're focusing on helping companies..." | In-app + email | Jan 22 |
| Inbound leads | "We're building this.let's talk" | Personal outreach | Jan 17 |
| Tech press | Not yet | N/A | After first contract |

---

## Appendix

### Supporting Documents

- Enterprise market sizing analysis (internal doc)
- User interview synthesis (enterprise quotes) (internal doc)
- Competitive analysis: B2B wellness (internal doc)
- SOC 2 readiness checklist (security doc)

### Pivot Type Reference

**This is a Customer Segment Pivot:** Same core product (fitness tracking + analytics), different customer (enterprises vs. individuals). This is one of the lower-risk pivot types because it leverages existing product capabilities.

Other pivot types considered but rejected:
- **Platform Pivot:** Too resource-intensive, uncertain outcome
- **Value Capture Pivot:** Tried different pricing in B2C, didn't work
- **Zoom-in Pivot:** Analytics alone aren't compelling without the tracking

---

*Decision documented on January 14, 2026. 30-day review scheduled for February 14, 2026.*
