# Work Log: claude/relaxed-pare-db9f89

## Header

- Branch: `claude/relaxed-pare-db9f89`
- Classification: `feature`
- Classified by: `Claude Sonnet 4.6`
- Frozen: `2026-05-11`
- Created Date: `2026-05-11`
- Owner: `KbWen`
- Guardrails Mode: `Full`
- Current Phase: `ship`
- Checkpoint SHA: `d9807c0`
- Recommended Skills: `verification-before-completion (auto), karpathy-principles (auto), doc-lookup (scope: Semgrep/TruffleHog/dependency-audit)`
- Primary Domain Snapshot: `none`
- SSoT Sequence: `14`

---

## Session Info

- Agent: `Claude Sonnet 4.6`
- Session: `2026-05-11`
- Platform: `Claude Code CLI on Windows 11`
- Guardrails loaded: `§0, §0a, §1, §2, §2a, §2b, §3, §3.6, §4, §5, §5b, §6`
- Files Read: `6`

---

## Drift Log

- Skip Attempt: NO
- Gate Fail Reason: N/A
- Token Leak: NO
- ADR Coverage: No covering ADR found for `.github/workflows/` target path. ADR-001 covers AGENTS.md/guardrails; ADR-002 covers guard_context_write/lint; ADR-003 covers archive/INDEX.jsonl. None cover CI pipeline files. Surfaced to user at bootstrap per §0a Exit-1 protocol — user replied "GO", interpreted as skip /adr, proceed to /spec.

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## Task Description

Implement backlog item #20: CI security scanning pipeline. Add Semgrep (SAST static analysis), TruffleHog (secret detection), and dependency audit (npm/pip/pip-audit or GitHub Dependabot) to GitHub Actions CI. Goal: surface code-level vulnerabilities, leaked credentials, and known-CVE dependencies automatically on every PR.

Context Read Receipt:
- `current_state.md` → Last Updated 2026-05-11, Update Sequence 14
- Work Log → created (new)
- Spec Scope → no existing spec for #20 (backlog Spec File = —); need to create via /spec

Read Plan:
- Classification: feature | Guardrails Mode: Full
- Files read: bootstrap.md, current_state.md, ADR-001/002/003 frontmatter, skill_conflict_matrix.md
- Files skipped: engineering_guardrails.md (will read per feature-classification requirement), state_machine.md

---

## Phase Sequence

- bootstrap → (current)

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## External References

| Type | Path / URL | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Backlog | docs/specs/_product-backlog.md | #20 CI security scanning — P1, Pending |
| ADR | docs/adr/ADR-001-governance-friction-tuning.md | Governance friction; applies_to AGENTS.md/guardrails (no CI coverage) |
| ADR | docs/adr/ADR-002-guarded-governance-writes.md | Guard writes; applies_to .agentcortex/tools/* (no CI coverage) |
| ADR | docs/adr/ADR-003-hash-chained-audit-log.md | Audit chain; applies_to archive/INDEX.jsonl (no CI coverage) |

---

## Known Risk

- Semgrep false positives on governance scripts may block PRs; mitigation: scope to `.py`/`.sh` only, add `# nosemgrep` inline or `.semgrepignore` if needed.
- TruffleHog may flag example credential strings in docs/templates; mitigation: add `.trufflehog.yaml` with inline exclusions per finding.
- pip-audit exits non-zero when no requirements file exists; mitigation: conditional step (`if [ -f requirements*.txt ]`).
- Pinned action SHA rotation: versions will drift from HEAD; mitigation: Dependabot auto-PRs (or manual quarterly pin refresh).

## External References

| Type | Path / URL | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Action | semgrep/semgrep@v1.123.0 | Semgrep SAST — installed via `pip install semgrep==1.123.0` (no API token required) |
| Action | trufflesecurity/trufflehog@v3.94.3 | TruffleHog secret scan — official GitHub Action, pinned tag |
| Tool | pip-audit==2.10.0 (PyPI) | Dependency audit — `pip install pip-audit==2.10.0`, OSV-backed |
| Note | pip-audit severity | pip-audit has no --severity flag; fails on ANY finding (more conservative than AC-7 minimum — acceptable) |
| Spec | docs/specs/ci-security-scanning.md | Frozen spec — AC authority |

---

## Conflict Resolution

Skill pair check (verification-before-completion × karpathy-principles): compatible per conflict matrix. No conflicts in recommended set.

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## Skill Notes

none

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## Phase Summary

- bootstrap: classified as `feature`; #20 CI security scanning from backlog; no covering ADR (skipped /adr per user direction); no existing spec; next step = /spec to define AC and target files. ⚡ ACX
- plan: 3 target files (.github/workflows/security.yml new; validate.sh + validate.ps1 modified); 5 steps; risk = false-positive findings blocking PRs; Confidence: 92% — high ⚡ ACX
- implement: security.yml created (semgrep==1.123.0, trufflehog@v3.94.3, pip-audit==2.10.0); validate.sh+ps1 presence checks added; validate 83 PASS / 0 FAIL; security quick-scan PASS. ⚡ ACX
- review: 10/10 AC PROVEN; 1 HIGH fixed inline (pip-audit -r flag); security clean; red-team: tag mutability accepted per spec; verdict PASS. ⚡ ACX
- test: 26/26 PASS; PyYAML YAML-1.1 on-boolean fix applied; 4/4 adversarial mutations caught; all 10 ACs structurally verified. ⚡ ACX
- ship (downstream simulation): 3 missing runtime tools found (check_adr_coverage.py, append_chain_entry.py, append_lesson.py) + WARN message genericized; deploy whitelist expanded; downstream: 72 PASS / 3 WARN / 0 FAIL / 3 SKIP; source: 83 PASS / 0 WARN / 0 FAIL / 2 SKIP. ⚡ ACX
- ship (continuation r5–r8): 8 rounds of Opus review → 31 tests (was 26); TruffleHog SHA-pinned (47e7b7cd); Dependabot added; spec 4 amendments (Accepted Risks, AC-5 SHA req, AC-8 SKIP state, File Relationship); bash array for req_args; validate 83/0/0/2. Verdict: pass. SHA: 2ee0fd4. ⚡ ACX

---

## Gate Evidence

- Gate: bootstrap | Verdict: pass | Classification: feature | At: 2026-05-11
- Gate: plan | Verdict: pass | Classification: feature | At: 2026-05-11
- Gate: implement | Verdict: pass | Classification: feature | At: 2026-05-11
- Gate: review | Verdict: pass | Classification: feature | At: 2026-05-11
- Gate: test | Verdict: pass | Classification: feature | At: 2026-05-11
- Gate: ship | Verdict: pass | Classification: feature | At: 2026-05-11
- Gate: ship (r8-final) | Verdict: pass | Classification: feature | At: 2026-05-11

---

## Evidence

- validate.sh: `bash .agentcortex/bin/validate.sh` → 83 PASS / 0 WARN / 0 FAIL / 2 SKIP
- validate.ps1: `pwsh .agentcortex/bin/validate.ps1` → 83 PASS / 1 WARN (stale lock, advisory) / 0 FAIL / 2 SKIP
- security.yml YAML parse: valid (created, reviewed for injection/secret issues — clean)
- security quick-scan: A01/A02/A03 PASS; no secrets detected
- test: `python -m pytest tests/ci/test_security_workflow.py -v` → 26 PASS / 0 FAIL (all 10 ACs covered)
- adversarial: 4 mutations (--metrics=off removed, floating ref, only-verified removed, -r $f removed) → ALL CAUGHT
- downstream smoke test: deploy to tmpdir; bash $tmpdir/.agentcortex/bin/validate.sh → 72 PASS / 3 WARN / 0 FAIL / 3 SKIP (181 files deployed; tools gap fixed)
