---
jurisdiction: "Ohio"
slug: ohio
countryCode: US
snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-10"
lastReviewed: "2026-06-03"
canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/ohio
license: CC BY 4.0
stale: false
---

> [!IMPORTANT]
> **Informational only — not legal advice.** This is a snapshot of an OpenAgreements practice note,
> provided for general information. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney-client
> relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
> Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
>
> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/ohio · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-10 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © UseJunior

# Non-Competes in Ohio[^about]

Ohio enforces non-competes only when the restraint is reasonable under the Raimonde rule, and its courts may reform an overbroad covenant or decline to enforce it at all.


## At a glance

| Question | Ohio |
| --- | --- |
| **Are non-competes enforceable?** | Allowed if reasonable |
| **Bottom line** | Ohio enforces an employee non-compete only to the extent it is reasonable under the Raimonde test — no broader than needed to protect the employer, not unduly harsh on the employee, and not injurious to the public. |
| **Main law or case** | Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21 (1975) |
| **Main exceptions** | Physician public-interest scrutiny; pending S.B. 301 (nonprofit-hospital cap) and S.B. 11 (broad ban) not enacted |
| **Can a court narrow it?** | Yes — rewrites to reasonable |
| **Applies to contractors?** | Unclear |
| **Restriction extended during a breach?** | Yes — a covenant may not expire while enforceability is litigated (Homan) |
| **Maximum length set by law** | No statutory cap |

## Are employee non-compete agreements enforceable in Ohio? {#employee-noncompetes}

**Short answer.** Yes, sometimes. Ohio is a reasonableness state, not a general ban state. A non-compete is enforceable only to the extent it is reasonable — meaning it is no greater than needed to protect the employer, does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public [^raimonde-reasonableness-test].

The controlling standard comes from the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in *Raimonde v. Van Vlerah*, which set out a three-part rule of reasonableness for post-employment restraints [^raimonde-reasonableness-test]. There is no general Ohio non-compete statute for the ordinary workforce; enforceability is judge-made, applied covenant by covenant on its own facts.

Because the test is holistic, no single term is decisive. A court weighs the employer's protectable interest, the burden on the employee, and the public effect together, rather than checking a covenant against fixed numbers.

> [!NOTE]
> **Practice note.**
>
> Do not treat Ohio as either a free-for-all or a ban state. Test every covenant against the three *Raimonde* prongs — employer protection, hardship on the employee, and public injury — before assuming an Ohio restraint is enforceable [^raimonde-reasonableness-test].

## Is continued at-will employment enough consideration for an Ohio non-compete? {#consideration}

**Short answer.** Yes. Unlike some states, Ohio holds that an employer's agreement to continue an at-will employment relationship is itself sufficient consideration for a non-compete an existing employee signs [^lakeland-continued-employment].

In *Lake Land Employment Group of Akron, LLC v. Columber*, the Ohio Supreme Court held that consideration exists when an employer continues an at-will relationship that it could legally have terminated without cause in exchange for the employee's assent to the covenant [^lakeland-continued-employment]. That makes Ohio more employer-favorable on consideration than states that require new, independent value for a mid-employment covenant.

The rule is not a blank check. Continued employment supplies the consideration, but the covenant must still survive the *Raimonde* reasonableness analysis to be enforceable [^q2-raimonde-reasonableness].

> [!CAUTION]
> **Drafting note.**
>
> Do not assume adequate consideration cures an overbroad covenant. Continued at-will employment satisfies *Lake Land*, but a restraint that fails *Raimonde* on time, territory, or scope is still unenforceable [^lakeland-continued-employment][^q2-raimonde-reasonableness].

## What legitimate business interests can support an Ohio non-compete? {#protectable-interests}

**Short answer.** Confidential information, trade secrets, and customer goodwill are the core interests that justify a tailored Ohio restraint. The Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act supplies the statutory trade-secret overlay that runs alongside the covenant [^outsa-trade-secret-definition].

*Raimonde* itself lists the factors a court weighs, including whether the employee possessed confidential information or trade secrets and whether the covenant targets unfair competition rather than ordinary competition [^raimonde-confidential-factor]. A covenant that merely suppresses ordinary competition, untethered to a protectable interest, will not stand.

The Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act, codified at R.C. 1333.61 through 1333.69, defines a trade secret by the twin tests of independent economic value from secrecy and reasonable efforts to maintain that secrecy [^outsa-trade-secret-definition]. The Act gives a separate remedy: actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined regardless of any contract [^outsa-injunction]. A non-solicitation or confidentiality strategy under the Act is often a stronger backstop than a broad non-compete.

> [!CAUTION]
> **Drafting note.**
>
> Do not use an Ohio non-compete to block competition disconnected from a protectable interest. Tie the restraint to identified confidential information, trade secrets, or customer goodwill, and keep a separate confidentiality and trade-secret strategy under R.C. 1333.61 et seq. [^outsa-trade-secret-definition][^raimonde-confidential-factor].

## What duration and geographic scope are reasonable for an Ohio non-compete? {#duration-geography}

**Short answer.** There is no statutory cap. Ohio courts weigh duration and territory together against the employer's actual protectable interest under *Raimonde*, and they may cut back a restraint that reaches further than necessary [^q4-raimonde-factors][^metrohealth-modified].

Because the standard is holistic, geography and duration are evaluated against the employer's real footprint rather than fixed numbers [^q4-raimonde-factors]. A restraint limited to the area and time genuinely needed to protect customer relationships or confidential information is far easier to defend than a long, open-ended, statewide ban.

When a covenant overshoots, an Ohio court may trim it. In *MetroHealth System v. Khandelwal*, the court of appeals upheld a trial court's decision to narrow an overbroad physician covenant — modifying it rather than voiding it — because it was more restrictive than necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests [^metrohealth-modified].

> [!CAUTION]
> **Drafting note.**
>
> Do not copy a fixed term or radius from another form. Match duration and territory to the employee's role and the employer's actual market, because an Ohio court evaluates the restraint as a whole and there is no safe-harbor number [^q4-raimonde-factors][^metrohealth-modified].

## Will an Ohio court reform or refuse to enforce an overbroad non-compete? {#court-narrowing}

**Short answer.** It depends. *Raimonde* abandoned strict blue-penciling and lets Ohio courts enforce an overbroad covenant only to the extent reasonable, but reformation is discretionary — a court may instead refuse to rewrite an abusively broad covenant [^raimonde-reformation][^kross-discretionary].

*Raimonde* holds that a covenant imposing unreasonable restrictions will be enforced to the extent necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests, giving Ohio courts the power to modify rather than void [^raimonde-reformation]. But that power is not automatic. In *Kross Acquisition Co. v. Groundworks Ohio, LLC*, the First District confirmed that modifying a covenant is within the trial court's discretion, and it affirmed a refusal to rewrite a covenant so overbroad that reforming it would require the court to rebuild the agreement from scratch [^kross-discretionary].

There is also a real cost to overreaching. In *Cintas Corp. v. Perry*, applying Ohio law, the employer's own prevailing-party fee clause boomeranged: after the covenant failed, the court held the former employee was entitled to recover his attorney's fees and litigation costs under that contract [^cintas-fee-shift].

> [!CAUTION]
> **Drafting note.**
>
> Do not rely on reformation as a safety net for an aggressive Ohio covenant. Draft tiered, severable, reasonable restraints, because a court may refuse to rewrite an overbroad covenant — and a one-sided fee clause can shift fees to the departing employee when the covenant fails [^kross-discretionary][^cintas-fee-shift].

## Can a successor company enforce a non-compete after a merger in Ohio? {#successor-enforcement}

**Short answer.** Yes, after a statutory merger. In *Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel*, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the surviving company may enforce non-competes the absorbed company's employees signed, as if it had stepped into the original employer's shoes — provided the covenant is reasonable [^acordia-successor].

On reconsideration, the court in *Acordia* clarified that a merged entity can enforce acquired non-compete agreements without separate assignment language, because by operation of the merger statutes it succeeds to the predecessor's contracts [^acordia-successor]. The covenant still has to satisfy *Raimonde* in the successor's hands.

That holding turns on a statutory merger. A deal structured as an asset purchase, or a covenant the parties intend to be personal to the original employer, can raise different assignability questions — so buyers should not assume every restrictive covenant transfers automatically.

> [!CAUTION]
> **Drafting note.**
>
> Do not rely on *Acordia* for every transaction. It addresses covenants that pass by statutory merger; in an asset deal, include express assignment and successor-and-assigns language so the buyer can enforce the restraint [^acordia-successor].

## Does an Ohio non-compete toll or extend during breach or litigation? {#tolling-extension}

**Short answer.** It can. Ohio appellate courts have held that a non-compete may not expire while its enforceability is being litigated, so the restricted period can be effectively extended until the case is resolved [^homan-tolling].

In *Homan, Inc. v. A1 AG Services, L.L.C.*, the Third District adopted the Sixth District's rule that a covenant not to compete may not expire while the enforceability of the contract is being litigated [^homan-tolling]. The court applied that rule to a covenant whose period it had already reformed for reasonableness, so the defendant remained bound for the remaining reasonable term after the litigation concluded.

This judicial tolling is equitable rather than automatic, and it operates against the *Raimonde* reasonableness backdrop [^q7-raimonde-reasonableness]. A contractual extension-on-breach clause must itself be reasonable; an open-ended or indefinite extension risks being cut back like any other overbroad term.

> [!NOTE]
> **Practice note.**
>
> Do not assume a fixed Ohio covenant simply lapses on its stated end date while a dispute is pending. Under *Homan*, the period can be tolled during litigation — but draft any extension-on-breach clause as a reasonable, bounded restraint tied to the breach, not an indefinite one [^homan-tolling][^q7-raimonde-reasonableness].

## Which Ohio workers face special non-compete treatment? {#industry-specific-limits}

**Short answer.** Physicians are the established category receiving special scrutiny. Ohio enforces their covenants but tests them closely under the public-injury prong, and a pending bill would add statutory limits for certain nonprofit-hospital clinicians [^metrohealth-physician-standard][^williams-public-injury][^sb301-healthcare-cap].

Ohio courts apply a heightened public-interest analysis to physician covenants: a restraint is unreasonable where it imposes undue hardship on the physician and is injurious to the public because the physician's services are vital to the community and the demand for that expertise is critical [^metrohealth-physician-standard]. The principle is long-standing — in *Williams v. Hobbs*, the court affirmed findings that a physician's services were vital to the public and that the covenant was injurious to the public [^williams-public-injury].

There is no enacted Ohio statute banning health care non-competes today. A pending bill, Senate Bill 301, would let a nonprofit hospital impose only a limited restriction on certain clinicians — no more than six months and within a fifteen-mile radius — and would void waivers of that protection [^sb301-healthcare-cap]. It has not become law.

> [!NOTE]
> **Practice note.**
>
> Do not draft a physician or other health care non-compete in Ohio as if it were an ordinary commercial restraint. Expect heightened public-interest scrutiny under *MetroHealth* and *Williams*, and monitor Senate Bill 301, which would cap covered hospital clinician covenants if enacted [^metrohealth-physician-standard][^sb301-healthcare-cap].

## Did the FTC's federal non-compete rule change Ohio non-compete law? {#federal-ftc-overlay}

**Short answer.** No. The FTC's 2024 nationwide Non-Compete Rule was set aside by a federal court before it took effect, so Ohio non-competes remain governed by Ohio common law [^ryan-ftc-set-aside].

In *Ryan LLC v. Federal Trade Commission*, the court held the FTC lacked statutory authority to issue the rule and that the rule was arbitrary and capricious [^ryan-ftc-authority]. It set the rule aside with nationwide effect so that it would not be enforced or take effect [^ryan-ftc-set-aside].

That outcome does not make every Ohio covenant enforceable. It simply removes the FTC rule as a nationwide overlay and leaves Ohio's *Raimonde* reasonableness analysis in control.

"The Non-Compete Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 910.1–.6, is hereby SET ASIDE and shall not be enforced or otherwise take effect on September 4, 2024, or thereafter."[^ryan-ftc-set-aside]

## What Ohio non-compete reform efforts should employers watch? {#pending-reform}

**Short answer.** None is law yet. The headline proposal, Senate Bill 11, would broadly prohibit employer non-competes, but it remains in committee and would apply only prospectively if enacted [^sb11-prohibition][^sb11-prospective].

Senate Bill 11 would bar an employer from entering into, presenting, or enforcing an agreement that prevents a worker from taking other work or operating a business after the employment relationship ends [^sb11-prohibition]. Crucially, even if it passed, the bill voids only agreements entered into, modified, or extended on or after its effective date — it would not reach back to invalidate covenants already in place [^sb11-prospective].

The enacted baseline therefore remains common-law reasonableness under *Raimonde*, plus the trade-secret overlay. These bills signal a possible direction of travel, not current law.

> [!NOTE]
> **Practice note.**
>
> Treat Senate Bill 11 as a monitoring item, not present Ohio law. Recheck the Ohio General Assembly's bill status before changing forms or telling workers that Ohio has banned non-competes, and note that S.B. 11 as drafted would apply only to agreements made or modified after its effective date [^sb11-prohibition][^sb11-prospective].

[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org) · Maintained by [UseJunior](https://usejunior.com). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Ohio. This article synthesizes Ohio primary law and is not legal advice from a Ohio-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

[^raimonde-reasonableness-test]: **Raimonde v. Van Vlerah** — "A covenant restraining an employee from competing with his former employer upon termination of employment is reasonable if it is no greater than is required for the protection of the employer, does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public." *Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6865409/raimonde-v-van-vlerah/#:~:text=A%20covenant%20restraining%20an%20employee,not%20injurious%20to%20the%20public.>

[^lakeland-continued-employment]: **Lake Land Employment Group of Akron, LLC v. Columber** — "We therefore hold that consideration exists to support a noncompetition agreement when, in exchange for the assent of an at-will employee to a proffered noncompetition agreement, the employer continues an at-will employment relationship that could legally be terminated without cause." *Lake Land Emp. Group of Akron, LLC v. Columber, 101 Ohio St. 3d 242, 2004-Ohio-786.* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6892723/lake-land-employment-group-of-akron-llc-v-columber/#:~:text=We%20therefore%20hold%20that%20consideration,legally%20be%20terminated%20without%20cause.>

[^q2-raimonde-reasonableness]: **Raimonde v. Van Vlerah** — "A covenant restraining an employee from competing with his former employer upon termination of employment is reasonable if it is no greater than is required for the protection of the employer, does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public." *Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6865409/raimonde-v-van-vlerah/#:~:text=A%20covenant%20restraining%20an%20employee,not%20injurious%20to%20the%20public.>

[^outsa-trade-secret-definition]: **Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.61** — "(1) It derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.(2) It is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." *Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.61(D).* <https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-1333.61>

[^raimonde-confidential-factor]: **Raimonde v. Van Vlerah** — "whether the employee is possessed with confidential information or trade secrets; whether the covenant seeks to eliminate competition which would be unfair to the employer or merely seeks to eliminate ordinary competition" *Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6865409/raimonde-v-van-vlerah/#:~:text=whether%20the%20employee%20is%20possessed,seeks%20to%20eliminate%20ordinary%20competition>

[^outsa-injunction]: **Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.62** — "Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined." *Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.62(A).* <https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-1333.62>

[^q4-raimonde-factors]: **Raimonde v. Van Vlerah** — "A covenant restraining an employee from competing with his former employer upon termination of employment is reasonable if it is no greater than is required for the protection of the employer, does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public." *Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6865409/raimonde-v-van-vlerah/#:~:text=A%20covenant%20restraining%20an%20employee,not%20injurious%20to%20the%20public.>

[^metrohealth-modified]: **MetroHealth System v. Khandelwal** — "In short, evidence presented at the hearing supported the trial court’s finding that the 2015 noncompete agreement was more restrictive than necessary but that it could be modified to protect MetroHealth’s legitimate business interests." *MetroHealth Sys. v. Khandelwal, 2022-Ohio-77, 183 N.E.3d 590 (8th Dist.).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6205147/metrohealth-sys-v-khandelwal/#:~:text=In%20short%2C%20evidence%20presented%20at,protect%20MetroHealth%E2%80%99s%20legitimate%20business%20interests.>

[^raimonde-reformation]: **Raimonde v. Van Vlerah** — "Courts are empowered to modify or amend employment agreements to achieve such results." *Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6865409/raimonde-v-van-vlerah/#:~:text=Courts%20are%20empowered%20to%20modify,agreements%20to%20achieve%20such%20results.>

[^kross-discretionary]: **Kross Acquisition Co. v. Groundworks Ohio, LLC** — "We agree that it is within a trial court’s discretion to modify a noncompetition agreement, and so we review its decision not to modify such an agreement for an abuse of discretion." *Kross Acquisition Co. v. Groundworks Ohio, LLC, 2024-Ohio-592, 236 N.E.3d 453 (1st Dist.).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9475789/kross-acquisition-co-llc-v-groundworks-ohio-llc/#:~:text=We%20agree%20that%20it%20is,for%20an%20abuse%20of%20discretion.>

[^cintas-fee-shift]: **Cintas Corp. v. Perry** — "The district court correctly concluded Perry was entitled to attorney’s fees and litigation costs under the employment agreement." *Cintas Corp. v. Perry, 517 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 2008).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1462207/cintas-corporation-v-perry/#:~:text=The%20district%20court%20correctly%20concluded,costs%20under%20the%20employment%20agreement.>

[^acordia-successor]: **Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel** — "We hold that the L.L.C. may enforce the noncompete agreements as if it had stepped into the shoes of the original contracting companies, provided that the noncompete agreements are reasonable under the circumstances of this case." *Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel, 133 Ohio St. 3d 356, 2012-Ohio-4648, 978 N.E.2d 823.* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2690659/acordia-of-ohio-llc-v-fishel/#:~:text=We%20hold%20that%20the%20L.L.C.,the%20circumstances%20of%20this%20case.>

[^homan-tolling]: **Homan, Inc. v. A1 AG Services, L.L.C.** — "The Sixth Appellate District has held that a covenant not to compete may not expire while the enforceability of that contract is being litigated." *Homan, Inc. v. A1 AG Servs., L.L.C., 175 Ohio App. 3d 51, 2008-Ohio-277, 885 N.E.2d 253 (3d Dist.).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3953241/homan-inc-v-a1-ag-services-llc/#:~:text=The%20Sixth%20Appellate%20District%20has,that%20contract%20is%20being%20litigated.>

[^q7-raimonde-reasonableness]: **Raimonde v. Van Vlerah** — "A covenant restraining an employee from competing with his former employer upon termination of employment is reasonable if it is no greater than is required for the protection of the employer, does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public." *Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6865409/raimonde-v-van-vlerah/#:~:text=A%20covenant%20restraining%20an%20employee,not%20injurious%20to%20the%20public.>

[^metrohealth-physician-standard]: **MetroHealth System v. Khandelwal** — "A covenant restraining a physician-employee from competing with his employer upon termination of employment is unreasonable where it imposes undue hardship on the physician and is injurious to the public, the physician’s services are vital to the health, care and treatment of the public, and the demand for his medical expertise is critical to the people in the community." *MetroHealth Sys. v. Khandelwal, 2022-Ohio-77, 183 N.E.3d 590 (8th Dist.).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6205147/metrohealth-sys-v-khandelwal/#:~:text=A%20covenant%20restraining%20a%20physician%2Demployee,the%20people%20in%20the%20community.>

[^williams-public-injury]: **Williams v. Hobbs** — "The covenant imposes an undue hardship on the plaintiff, and also, it is injurious to the public." *Williams v. Hobbs, 9 Ohio App. 3d 331, 460 N.E.2d 287 (10th Dist. 1983).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4007467/williams-v-hobbs/#:~:text=The%20covenant%20imposes%20an%20undue,is%20injurious%20to%20the%20public.>

[^sb301-healthcare-cap]: **Ohio S.B. 301 (136th General Assembly)** — "the employee will refrain, for a period not to exceed six months, from obtaining employment within a radius of fifteen miles of the physical location where the employee was employed with the hospital." *S.B. 301, 136th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2025).* <https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/136/sb301>

[^ryan-ftc-set-aside]: **Ryan LLC v. Federal Trade Commission** — "The Non-Compete Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 910.1–.6, is hereby SET ASIDE and shall not be enforced or otherwise take effect on September 4, 2024, or thereafter." *Ryan LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 746 F. Supp. 3d 369 (N.D. Tex. 2024).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10205745/ryan-llc-v-federal-trade-commission/#:~:text=The%20Non%2DCompete%20Rule%2C%2016%20C.F.R.,September%204%2C%202024%2C%20or%20thereafter.>

[^ryan-ftc-authority]: **Ryan LLC v. Federal Trade Commission** — "In sum, the Court concludes that the FTC lacks statutory authority to promulgate the Non- Compete Rule, and that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious." *Ryan LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 746 F. Supp. 3d 369 (N.D. Tex. 2024).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10205745/ryan-llc-v-federal-trade-commission/#:~:text=In%20sum%2C%20the%20Court%20concludes%20that,Rule%20is%20arbitrary%20and%20capricious.>

[^sb11-prohibition]: **Ohio S.B. 11 (136th General Assembly)** — "Beginning on the effective date of this section, no employer shall enter into, attempt to enter into, present to a worker or prospective worker as a term of hire, or attempt to enforce an agreement, or part of an agreement, that prohibits the worker from, penalizes the worker for, or functions to prevent the worker from seeking or accepting work with a person, or operating a business, after the conclusion of the relationship between the employer and worker, including any of the following:" *S.B. 11, 136th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2025).* <https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/136/sb11>

[^sb11-prospective]: **Ohio S.B. 11 (136th General Assembly)** — "An agreement, or part of an agreement, between an employer and worker entered into, modified, or extended on or after the effective date of this section that is prohibited under division (A) of this section is void." *S.B. 11, 136th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2025).* <https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/136/sb11>
