---
jurisdiction: "Maryland"
slug: maryland
countryCode: US
snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-10"
lastReviewed: "2026-06-03"
canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/maryland
license: CC BY 4.0
stale: false
---

> [!IMPORTANT]
> **Informational only — not legal advice.** This is a snapshot of an OpenAgreements practice note,
> provided for general information. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney-client
> relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
> Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
>
> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/maryland · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-10 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © UseJunior

# Non-Competes in Maryland[^about]

Maryland enforces non-competes only when the restraint is reasonable under common law, and a statute voids them outright for low-wage, veterinary, and many health care workers.


## At a glance

| Question | Maryland |
| --- | --- |
| **Are non-competes enforceable?** | Allowed if reasonable |
| **Bottom line** | Maryland enforces an ordinary employee non-compete only if it is reasonable under the Becker common-law test, but a statute voids covenants outright for low-wage, veterinary, and many health care workers. |
| **Main law or case** | Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93 (1973); Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716 |
| **Main exceptions** | Low-wage ban (≤150% min wage); veterinary ban; health-care ≤$350k ban; high-earner clinician cap (1 yr/10 mi); client/patient-list carve-out |
| **Can a court narrow it?** | Only strikes wording |
| **Applies to contractors?** | Unclear |
| **Restriction extended during a breach?** | Unsettled |
| **Maximum length set by law** | No fixed cap for ordinary employees; 1 year for covered health-care |

## Are employee non-compete agreements enforceable in Maryland? {#employee-noncompetes}

**Short answer.** Yes, sometimes. Maryland is a reasonableness state, not a general ban state, so an ordinary employee non-compete is enforceable only if the employer has a legally protected interest, the restraint is no wider in scope and duration than reasonably necessary, it does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and it does not violate public policy [^seneca-four-part-test][^becker-general-rule].

The common-law test traces to *Becker v. Bailey* and is restated in modern federal decisions applying Maryland law. In practice the recurring questions are protectable interest, scope and duration, hardship on the employee, and the public interest [^seneca-four-part-test][^becker-general-rule].

Maryland layers a statute on top of that common-law test. Labor and Employment § 3-716 makes a covenant null and void for whole categories of workers — low-wage employees, veterinary professionals, and many health care workers — before ordinary reasonableness balancing ever applies [^statute-3716-null-void].

> [!NOTE]
> **Practice note.**
>
> Do not treat Maryland as a pure reasonableness state or as a total-ban state. Start with the worker's wage and occupation, apply § 3-716 if the worker is covered, and only then run the common-law reasonableness test on any covenant that survives [^statute-3716-null-void][^seneca-four-part-test].

## Which Maryland workers are automatically protected from non-competes? {#statutory-voids}

**Short answer.** Section 3-716 voids non-competes outright for employees who earn 150% or less of the State minimum wage, for veterinary practitioners and technicians, and for many licensed health care workers who provide direct patient care and earn $350,000 or less [^statute-150-threshold][^statute-vet-ban][^statute-healthcare-void].

The wage line is keyed to the State minimum wage in § 3-413, which has been $15.00 per hour since January 1, 2024, so the covered ceiling is $22.50 per hour [^statute-minimum-wage]. A covenant against any employee at or below that 150% line is void [^statute-150-threshold].

The 2024 amendment in House Bill 1388 added two occupation-based bans. The veterinary ban applies retroactively to agreements entered into on or before its effective date [^hb1388-vet-retroactive]. The statute also voids covenants for licensed health-occupations employees who provide direct patient care and earn $350,000 or less, and that health care expansion applies only to agreements executed on or after July 1, 2025 [^statute-healthcare-void][^hb1388-health-prospective].

> [!NOTE]
> **Practice note.**
>
> Do not rely on a § 3-716 covenant for a low-wage, veterinary, or covered health care worker. For those workers the covenant is void by statute, so the employer's protection has to come from confidentiality terms and trade-secret law, not from the non-compete [^statute-150-threshold][^statute-healthcare-void].

## How are non-competes capped for high-earning Maryland health care workers? {#healthcare-high-earners}

**Short answer.** For a direct-patient-care health care employee who earns more than $350,000, a covenant is not void but is capped: it cannot run longer than one year or reach more than ten miles from the primary place of employment [^statute-highearner-bucket][^statute-cap-duration][^statute-cap-geography].

The statute draws a line at $350,000 in total annual compensation. At or below that figure the covenant is void; above it, the high-earner bucket applies and the employer may use a covenant only within the statutory one-year and ten-mile limits [^statute-highearner-bucket][^statute-cap-duration][^statute-cap-geography].

Staying inside the cap is necessary, not sufficient. Section 3-716(b) sets outer limits; it does not guarantee enforceability, so a covenant within the cap still has to satisfy the ordinary common-law reasonableness test [^becker-highearner-reasonableness].

There is also a patient-notice duty. On a patient's request, the employer must tell the patient where the departing clinician will be practicing [^statute-patient-notice].

> [!CAUTION]
> **Drafting note.**
>
> Do not copy a longer term or wider radius into a Maryland high-earner clinician covenant. Anything beyond one year or ten miles from the primary practice site exceeds the statutory cap, and pair the covenant with the required patient-notice process [^statute-cap-duration][^statute-patient-notice].

## What legitimate business interests can support a Maryland non-compete? {#protectable-interests}

**Short answer.** Maryland enforces a covenant only to protect genuine interests such as unique services, trade secrets, customer routes or lists, and customer goodwill — not to prevent ordinary competition [^becker-protectable-interests][^fowler-no-broader-than-necessary].

*Becker* describes the categories Maryland courts recognize: covenants are enforced against employees who provide unique services, or to prevent misuse of trade secrets, routes, or client lists, or solicitation of customers [^becker-protectable-interests]. Even when a legitimate interest exists, the restraint can be no broader than necessary to protect it [^fowler-no-broader-than-necessary].

Section 3-716 reinforces that focus. Section 3-716(a)'s void rule carves out provisions aimed at the taking or use of a client or patient list or other proprietary client information — signaling that protecting customer data is treated differently from blocking competition outright [^statute-client-list-carveout].

> [!CAUTION]
> **Drafting note.**
>
> Do not use a Maryland non-compete to block ordinary competition unconnected to a protectable interest. Tie the restraint to specific unique services, trade secrets, customer lists, or goodwill, and handle confidential-information protection through separate confidentiality and trade-secret terms [^becker-protectable-interests][^statute-client-list-carveout].

## What duration and geographic scope are reasonable for a Maryland non-compete? {#duration-geography}

**Short answer.** Outside the § 3-716 categories there is no fixed cap for ordinary employees. Maryland courts judge time and territory case by case, asking whether the restraint is reasonable on the specific facts [^ruhl-no-yardstick][^seneca-overbroad].

*Ruhl* makes the fact-specific nature explicit: there is no arbitrary yardstick for what protection is reasonably necessary, no fixed measure of undue hardship, and no precise scale for the public interest [^ruhl-no-yardstick]. A covenant is overbroad when it exceeds what is reasonably necessary to protect the employer's interest [^seneca-overbroad].

Scope of the prohibited activity matters as much as miles and months. In *Medispec*, a federal court applying Maryland law held a covenant unenforceable on its face because it barred the former employee from working in essentially any capacity, far beyond his prior sales role [^medispec-facially-overbroad].

> [!CAUTION]
> **Drafting note.**
>
> Do not copy a duration or radius from another Maryland form without matching the worker's role and customer exposure. A broad activity ban that sweeps in work unrelated to the employee's actual job is the kind of facial overbreadth that sinks a Maryland covenant [^medispec-facially-overbroad][^seneca-overbroad].

## Is continued at-will employment enough consideration for a Maryland non-compete? {#continued-employment-consideration}

**Short answer.** Yes. Maryland treats an employer's agreement to continue an at-will employee as sufficient consideration for a covenant signed after employment begins [^simko-mutuality][^simko-minority-view].

*Simko* is the anchor. The court reasoned that because the at-will relationship is mutual, the employer's promise not to terminate in exchange for the covenant is just as good as the employee's promise to keep working [^simko-mutuality]. The court treated the contrary view — that continued at-will employment is not consideration — as the distinct minority position [^simko-minority-view].

> [!NOTE]
> **Practice note.**
>
> Do not assume a bare recital cures a consideration problem. Maryland accepts continued employment as consideration, but the record is cleaner when the agreement and the surrounding documents show that signing was connected to the employee's continued employment [^simko-mutuality].

## Will a Maryland court blue-pencil or rewrite an overbroad non-compete? {#court-narrowing}

**Short answer.** Maryland courts blue-pencil rather than rewrite. A court may strike an offending, severable portion of a covenant and enforce what remains, but if the unreasonable language is not severable the whole covenant fails — and employers cannot count on a court redrafting an indivisible overbroad term into a new, enforceable one [^holloway-blue-pencil][^holloway-mechanical-rule].

*Holloway* describes the typical Maryland response to an invalid portion of a covenant: blue-pencil the violative words and, if what is excised is severable, enforce the rest; otherwise the entire agreement is void [^holloway-blue-pencil]. The traditional, strict version of that rule is mechanical — a court strikes words and enforces what is left only if the remainder still stands as a complete, valid contract [^holloway-mechanical-rule]. Maryland's focus is therefore on severability: the *Holloway* litigation, affirmed in part by the Maryland Supreme Court, turned on whether the covenant could be severed (there, on a client-by-client basis) rather than on a court rewriting the bargain.

*Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook* shows the partial-enforcement side in practice. Where an overbroad restriction is not so interwoven as to be logically inseparable from the rest of the contract, a Maryland court will sever it and enforce the lawful remainder when partial enforcement works no injury to the public and no injustice to the parties [^hebb-severable-partial-enforcement].

> [!CAUTION]
> **Drafting note.**
>
> Draft severable, tiered restrictions rather than relying on a savings clause that asks a court to invent a narrower Maryland radius or duration. Whether a court applies a strict blue pencil or a more granular severance, an indivisible overbroad term gives it nothing to enforce [^holloway-blue-pencil][^holloway-mechanical-rule].

## How does the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act protect employers when a covenant is void? {#trade-secrets-mutsa}

**Short answer.** The Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act gives employers a separate remedy that does not depend on a non-compete. It defines what counts as a trade secret, authorizes injunctions against misappropriation, and allows damages including exemplary damages for willful, malicious conduct [^mutsa-trade-secret-definition][^mutsa-injunction][^mutsa-exemplary-damages].

A trade secret is information that derives independent economic value from not being generally known and is the subject of reasonable secrecy efforts [^mutsa-trade-secret-definition]. Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined, and for willful and malicious misappropriation a court may award exemplary damages of up to twice the damages awarded under the statute's compensatory-damages provision [^mutsa-injunction][^mutsa-exemplary-damages].

Trade-secret remedies can also outrun a contract's damages cap. In *Ingram v. Cantwell-Cleary*, the court declined to enforce a non-compete's liquidated-damages provisions because they did not bar a separate recovery for trade-secret misappropriation, and it upheld findings that customer lists and pricing data were misappropriated trade secrets [^ingram-liquidated-not-bar][^ingram-trade-secret-finding].

> [!NOTE]
> **Practice note.**
>
> Where § 3-716 voids the covenant, build the protection plan around confidentiality and the trade-secret statute instead. Identify the actual trade secrets, document reasonable secrecy measures, and preserve the statutory injunction and damages remedies that do not depend on an enforceable non-compete [^mutsa-trade-secret-definition][^mutsa-injunction].

## Does a Maryland non-compete toll or extend during breach or litigation? {#tolling-extension}

**Short answer.** This is an open Maryland question. No staged Maryland statute or appellate decision squarely endorses automatic judicial tolling or enforcement of an extension-on-breach clause after the stated restricted period expires [^ruhl-reasonableness-backdrop][^becker-reasonableness-backdrop].

Maryland law on pausing the clock during a violation, or extending a covenant for the length of litigation, is unsettled. The safest reading is that any such extension still has to satisfy the same reasonableness test that governs the covenant itself [^ruhl-reasonableness-backdrop]. If an extension-on-breach clause turns a fixed one-year restraint into an open-ended one, a court could find it unreasonable on the facts [^becker-reasonableness-backdrop].

> [!NOTE]
> **Practice note.**
>
> Open question: Maryland authority does not settle whether an extension-on-breach or tolling clause is enforceable after the original period expires. Draft any tolling clause as a separate, reasonable restraint tied to the duration of the breach, and do not assume a Maryland court will automatically extend an expired covenant [^ruhl-reasonableness-backdrop][^becker-reasonableness-backdrop].

## Did the FTC's federal non-compete rule change Maryland non-compete law? {#federal-ftc-overlay}

**Short answer.** No. A federal court set aside the FTC's 2024 nationwide Non-Compete Rule, so Maryland non-competes remain governed by Maryland's statute, Maryland common law, and the state's trade-secret act [^ryan-rule-set-aside].

In *Ryan LLC v. FTC*, the court held the rule unlawful and set it aside, stating that the rule would not be enforced or take effect on its September 4, 2024 effective date [^ryan-rule-set-aside]. That removes the FTC rule as a nationwide overlay but does not make every Maryland covenant enforceable — § 3-716 and Maryland common law still control.

"The Rule shall not be enforced or otherwise take effect on its effective date of September 4, 2024, or thereafter."[^ryan-rule-set-aside]

## What recent Maryland non-compete changes should employers watch? {#recent-amendments}

**Short answer.** The most recent enacted change is House Bill 1016 (2026), now Chapter 301. It is enacted but not yet effective: beginning October 1, 2026, it extends § 3-716's void rule to a new, narrow category — employees of a licensed architect whose employer, after employing more than 30 workers based mainly in Maryland, relocates the majority of that workforce out of state or no longer has its principal place of business in Maryland [^hb1016-architect-out-of-state].

This is the fourth wave of § 3-716 amendments, after the 2019 low-wage ban, the 2023 amendment altering the application of the prohibition (Senate Bill 591, Chapter 266, effective October 1, 2023 — the change that keyed the low-wage threshold to the State minimum wage), and the 2024 veterinary and health care expansion [^sb591-2023-threshold]. Mechanically, the new law inserts the architect category as a new § 3-716(a)(1)(i)3 and renumbers the existing veterinary category to (a)(1)(i)4, effective October 1, 2026 — so the subsection numbers used throughout this note reflect the statute as it reads before that date. The provision is narrow and prospective: it applies only to agreements executed on or after the effective date [^hb1016-architect-out-of-state].

A broader 2025 effort to clarify that § 3-716 reaches only post-separation restrictions died in committee, so the active-employment reach of the statute's conflict-of-interest language remains unsettled.

> [!NOTE]
> **Practice note.**
>
> Treat the § 3-716 categories as a moving target. Re-check the worker's wage band and occupation against the current statute each session, and remember the architect provision is enacted but does not begin until agreements executed on or after October 1, 2026 [^hb1016-architect-out-of-state].

[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org) · Maintained by [UseJunior](https://usejunior.com). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Maryland. This article synthesizes Maryland primary law and is not legal advice from a Maryland-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

[^seneca-four-part-test]: **Seneca One Finance, Inc. v. Bloshuk** — "In Maryland, a restrictive employment covenant will only be enforced if it meets four requirements: ‘(1) the employer must have a legally protected interest, (2) the restrictive covenant must be no wider in scope and duration than is reasonably necessary to protect the employer’s interest, (3) the covenant cannot impose an undue hardship on the employee, and (4) the covenant cannot violate public policy.’" *Seneca One Fin., Inc. v. Bloshuk, 214 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D. Md. 2016).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7322313/seneca-one-finance-inc-v-bloshuk/#:~:text=In%20Maryland%2C%20a%20restrictive%20employment,covenant%20cannot%20violate%20public%20policy.%E2%80%9D>

[^becker-general-rule]: **Becker v. Bailey** — "The general rule in Maryland is that if a restrictive covenant in an employment contract is supported by adequate consideration and is ancillary to the employment contract, an employee’s agreement not to compete with his employer upon leaving the employment will be upheld ‘if the restraint is confined within limits which are no wider as to area and duration than are reasonably necessary for the protection of the business of the employer and do not impose undue hardship on the employee or disregard the interests of the public.’" *Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93 (1973).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2322561/becker-v-bailey/#:~:text=The%20general%20rule%20in%20Maryland,the%20interests%20of%20the%20public.%E2%80%9D>

[^statute-3716-null-void]: **Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716** — "A noncompete or conflict of interest provision in an employment contract or a similar document or agreement that restricts the ability of an employee to enter into employment with a new employer or to become self–employed in the same or similar business or trade shall be null and void as being against the public policy of the State." *Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716(a)(3).* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gle&section=3-716>

[^statute-150-threshold]: **Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716** — "an employee who earns equal to or less than 150% of the State minimum wage rate established under § 3–413 of this title" *Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716(a)(1)(i)1.* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gle&section=3-716>

[^statute-vet-ban]: **Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716** — "an employee licensed as a veterinary practitioner or veterinary technician under Title 2, Subtitle 3 of the Agriculture Article" *Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716(a)(1)(i)3.* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gle&section=3-716>

[^statute-healthcare-void]: **Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716** — "employment in a position for which the employee: A. is required to be licensed under the Health Occupations Article; B. is employed in a position that provides direct patient care; and C. earns equal to or less than $350,000 in total annual compensation" *Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716(a)(1)(i)2.* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gle&section=3-716>

[^statute-minimum-wage]: **Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-413** — "the State minimum wage rate is: (i) for the 12–month period beginning January 1, 2023, $13.25 per hour; and (ii) beginning January 1, 2024, $15.00 per hour." *Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-413(c)(1).* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gle&section=3-413>

[^hb1388-vet-retroactive]: **2024 Md. Laws ch. 378 (H.B. 1388)** — "That this Act shall be construed to apply retroactively and shall be applied to and interpreted to affect an employment contract or a similar contract or agreement entered into on or before the effective date of this Act." *2024 Md. Laws ch. 378, § 2 (H.B. 1388).* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2024rs/Chapters_noln/CH_378_hb1388e.pdf>

[^hb1388-health-prospective]: **2024 Md. Laws ch. 378 (H.B. 1388)** — "That § 3–716(a)(1)(i)2 and (b) of the Labor and Employment Article, as enacted by Section 1 of this Act, shall be construed to apply only to employment contracts or similar documents or agreements for employment executed on or after July 1, 2025." *2024 Md. Laws ch. 378, § 3 (H.B. 1388).* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2024rs/Chapters_noln/CH_378_hb1388e.pdf>

[^statute-highearner-bucket]: **Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716** — "This subsection applies only to an employment contract or similar document or agreement concerning employment in a position for which the employee: (i) is required to be licensed under the Health Occupations Article; (ii) is employed in a position that provides direct patient care; and (iii) earns more than $350,000 in total annual compensation." *Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716(b)(1).* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gle&section=3-716>

[^statute-cap-duration]: **Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716** — "The period for which a noncompete or conflict of interest provision in an employment contract or similar document or agreement is in effect may not exceed 1 year from the last day of employment." *Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716(b)(2)(i).* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gle&section=3-716>

[^statute-cap-geography]: **Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716** — "The geographical restriction in a noncompete or conflict of interest provision in an employment contract or similar document or agreement may not exceed 10 miles from the primary place of employment." *Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716(b)(2)(ii).* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gle&section=3-716>

[^becker-highearner-reasonableness]: **Becker v. Bailey** — "The general rule in Maryland is that if a restrictive covenant in an employment contract is supported by adequate consideration and is ancillary to the employment contract, an employee’s agreement not to compete with his employer upon leaving the employment will be upheld ‘if the restraint is confined within limits which are no wider as to area and duration than are reasonably necessary for the protection of the business of the employer and do not impose undue hardship on the employee or disregard the interests of the public.’" *Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93 (1973).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2322561/becker-v-bailey/#:~:text=The%20general%20rule%20in%20Maryland,the%20interests%20of%20the%20public.%E2%80%9D>

[^statute-patient-notice]: **Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716** — "On request of a patient, an employer of an employee described in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall provide notice to a patient of the new location where a former employee will be practicing." *Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716(b)(3).* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gle&section=3-716>

[^becker-protectable-interests]: **Becker v. Bailey** — "These decisions demonstrate that Maryland follows the general rule that restrictive covenants may be applied and enforced only against those employees who provide unique services, or to prevent the future misuse of trade secrets, routes or lists of clients, or solicitation of customers." *Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93 (1973).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2322561/becker-v-bailey/#:~:text=These%20decisions%20demonstrate%20that%20Maryland,clients%2C%20or%20solicitation%20of%20customers.>

[^fowler-no-broader-than-necessary]: **Fowler v. Printers II, Inc.** — "Of course, even a restrictive covenant that serves an employer’s ‘legitimate interest’ can be no broader, or more restrictive, than necessary to effectuate that interest." *Fowler v. Printers II, Inc., 89 Md. App. 448 (1991).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1930228/fowler-v-printers-ii-inc/#:~:text=Of%20course%2C%20even%20a%20restrictive,necessary%20to%20effectuate%20that%20interest.>

[^statute-client-list-carveout]: **Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716** — "This subsection does not apply to an employment contract or a similar document or agreement with respect to the taking or use of a client or patient list or other proprietary client–related or patient–related information." *Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716(a)(2).* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gle&section=3-716>

[^ruhl-no-yardstick]: **Ruhl v. F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co.** — "There is no arbitrary yardstick as to what protection of the business of the employer is reasonably necessary, no categorical measurement of what constitutes undue hardship on the employee, no precise scales to weigh the interest of the public." *Ruhl v. F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118 (1967).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2292892/ruhl-v-f-a-bartlett-tree-expert-co/#:~:text=There%20is%20no%20arbitrary%20yardstick,the%20interest%20of%20the%20public.>

[^seneca-overbroad]: **Seneca One Finance, Inc. v. Bloshuk** — "A restrictive covenant is overbroad if it exceeds the limits of what is reasonably necessary to protect the employer’s legally protected interest." *Seneca One Fin., Inc. v. Bloshuk, 214 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D. Md. 2016).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7322313/seneca-one-finance-inc-v-bloshuk/#:~:text=A%20restrictive%20covenant%20is%20overbroad,the%20employer%E2%80%99s%20legally%20protected%20interest.>

[^medispec-facially-overbroad]: **Medispec, Ltd. v. Chouinard** — "Here, an examination of the particular facts is not necessary because the clause is overly broad on its face." *Medispec, Ltd. v. Chouinard, 133 F. Supp. 3d 771 (D. Md. 2015).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7315898/medispec-ltd-v-chouinard/#:~:text=Here%2C%20an%20examination%20of%20the,overly%20broad%20on%20its%20face.>

[^simko-mutuality]: **Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co.** — "Given the inherent mutuality, we see no basis for distinguishing the employee’s consent to continue from the flip side of the coin — the employer’s consent not to terminate." *Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co., 55 Md. App. 561 (1983).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1983736/simko-inc-v-graymar-co/#:~:text=Given%20the%20inherent%20mutuality%2C%20we,employer%E2%80%99s%20consent%20not%20to%20terminate.>

[^simko-minority-view]: **Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co.** — "the viewpoint which holds that continuation of an at-will employee is not sufficient consideration for a covenant not to compete represents the distinct minority." *Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co., 55 Md. App. 561 (1983).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1983736/simko-inc-v-graymar-co/#:~:text=the%20viewpoint%20which%20holds%20that,compete%20represents%20the%20distinct%20minority.>

[^holloway-blue-pencil]: **Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co.** — "The typical response in the reported appellate decisions in this State, in which the Courts have ruled a portion of an employee noncompetition agreement invalid, has been to ‘blue pencil’ (cross out) the violative portions of the agreement and, if the excised portions of the agreement are severable, to permit the agreement to stand minus the unenforceable wording; otherwise the entire agreement is void." *Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 78 Md. App. 205 (1989), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 319 Md. 324 (1990).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1991703/holloway-v-faw-casson-co/#:~:text=The%20typical%20response%20in%20the,the%20entire%20agreement%20is%20void.>

[^holloway-mechanical-rule]: **Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co.** — "By this rule, the divisibility of a promise in excessive restraint of trade is determined by purely mechanical means: if the promise is so worded that the excessive restraint can be eliminated by crossing out a few of the words with a ‘blue pencil,’ while at the same time the remaining words constitute a complete and valid contract, the contract as thus ‘blue penciled’ will be enforced." *Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 78 Md. App. 205 (1989), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 319 Md. 324 (1990).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1991703/holloway-v-faw-casson-co/#:~:text=By%20this%20rule%2C%20the%20divisibility,%E2%80%9Cblue%20penciled%E2%80%9D%20will%20be%20enforced.>

[^hebb-severable-partial-enforcement]: **Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc.** — "In the instant case the partial enforcement of the restrictions works no injury to the public and creates no injustice to the parties, thus the restrictions are severable and thus partially enforceable." *Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc., 25 Md. App. 478 (1975).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2195970/hebb-v-stump-harvey-cook-inc/#:~:text=In%20the%20instant%20case%20the,severable%20and%20thus%20partially%20enforceable.>

[^mutsa-trade-secret-definition]: **Md. Code, Com. Law § 11-1201** — "‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." *Md. Code, Com. Law § 11-1201(e).* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcl&section=11-1201>

[^mutsa-injunction]: **Md. Code, Com. Law § 11-1202** — "Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined." *Md. Code, Com. Law § 11-1202(a).* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcl&section=11-1202>

[^mutsa-exemplary-damages]: **Md. Code, Com. Law § 11-1203** — "If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award exemplary damages in an amount not exceeding twice any award made under subsection (a) of this section." *Md. Code, Com. Law § 11-1203(d).* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcl&section=11-1203>

[^ingram-liquidated-not-bar]: **Ingram v. Cantwell-Cleary Co.** — "We hold that the court did not err in declining to enforce the liquidated damages provisions contained in Appellants’ Non-Compete Agreements because they did not bar Cantwell-Cleary from recovering damages under its separate claims for misappropriation" *Ingram v. Cantwell-Cleary Co., 259 Md. App. 102 (2023).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9454756/ingram-v-cantwell-cleary-co/#:~:text=We%20hold%20that%20the%20court,its%20separate%20claims%20for%20misappropriation>

[^ingram-trade-secret-finding]: **Ingram v. Cantwell-Cleary Co.** — "We also hold that the court did not err in finding that Cantwell-Cleary’s confidential customer lists and pricing information constituted trade secrets and that Appellants had misappropriated that information." *Ingram v. Cantwell-Cleary Co., 259 Md. App. 102 (2023).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9454756/ingram-v-cantwell-cleary-co/#:~:text=We%20also%20hold%20that%20the,Appellants%20had%20misappropriated%20that%20information.>

[^ruhl-reasonableness-backdrop]: **Ruhl v. F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co.** — "Covenants of this nature are in restraint of trade; the test is whether the particular restraint is reasonable on the specific facts." *Ruhl v. F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118 (1967).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2292892/ruhl-v-f-a-bartlett-tree-expert-co/#:~:text=Covenants%20of%20this%20nature%20are,reasonable%20on%20the%20specific%20facts.>

[^becker-reasonableness-backdrop]: **Becker v. Bailey** — "The general rule in Maryland is that if a restrictive covenant in an employment contract is supported by adequate consideration and is ancillary to the employment contract, an employee’s agreement not to compete with his employer upon leaving the employment will be upheld ‘if the restraint is confined within limits which are no wider as to area and duration than are reasonably necessary for the protection of the business of the employer and do not impose undue hardship on the employee or disregard the interests of the public.’" *Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93 (1973).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2322561/becker-v-bailey/#:~:text=The%20general%20rule%20in%20Maryland,the%20interests%20of%20the%20public.%E2%80%9D>

[^ryan-rule-set-aside]: **Ryan LLC v. Federal Trade Commission** — "The Rule shall not be enforced or otherwise take effect on its effective date of September 4, 2024, or thereafter." *Ryan LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 746 F. Supp. 3d 369 (N.D. Tex. 2024).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10205745/ryan-llc-v-federal-trade-commission/#:~:text=The%20Rule%20shall%20not%20be%20enforced%20or%20otherwise%20take%20effect%20on%20its%20effective%20date%20of%20September%204%2C%202024%2C%20or%20thereafter.>

[^hb1016-architect-out-of-state]: **2026 Md. Laws ch. 301 (H.B. 1016)** — "That § 3–716(a)(1)(i)3 of the Labor and Employment Article, as enacted by Section 1 of this Act, shall be construed to apply only to employment contracts or similar documents or agreements for employment executed on or after the effective date of this Act." *2026 Md. Laws ch. 301, § 2 (H.B. 1016).* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2026rs/Chapters_noln/CH_301_hb1016e.pdf>

[^sb591-2023-threshold]: **2023 Md. Laws ch. 266 (S.B. 591)** — "FOR the purpose of altering the application of the prohibition on including a noncompete or conflict of interest provision in an employment contract or similar document or agreement" *2023 Md. Laws ch. 266 (S.B. 591).* <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2023rs/Chapters_noln/CH_266_sb0591t.pdf>
