# Web4 Threat Model
**Version**: 2.0
**Last Updated**: February 6, 2026
**Status**: Research prototype formal threat model
**Scope**: `/simulations/` attack research (160 attacks) + federation patterns + coordination framework

---

## Executive Summary

This document provides a **formal threat model** for Web4's trust-native security research, addressing the key gap identified in our honest assessment (see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)).

**What This Is:**
- Explicit enumeration of adversaries, assets, and attack scenarios
- Analysis of security mechanisms and their effectiveness
- Honest assessment of protections and gaps

**What This Isn't:**
- A guarantee of production readiness
- A claim of complete protection against all attacks
- A substitute for formal verification or adversarial testing

---

## 1. System Overview

### 1.1 What We're Protecting

**Web4 Federation Security Model:**
- Distributed AI platforms (SAGE neural MoE systems) coordinating via federation
- Trust established through reputation, economic stakes, and witness attestation
- Resources allocated via ATP (Attention-Time-Processing) framework
- Tasks delegated across platforms with quality-based accountability

**Key Innovation:**
Unlike traditional access control (static ACLs), Web4 treats security as **emergent property** of incentive-aligned interactions among autonomous AI agents and platforms.

**December 2025 Additions:**
- **LCT Unified Presence**: Cross-system presence format `lct://{component}:{instance}:{role}@{network}`
- **Coordination Framework**: Phase 2a-2d coordinators for runtime security decisions
- **Pattern Exchange**: Secure cross-system learning transfer (SAGE ↔ Web4)

**February 2026 Additions:**
- **Attack Simulation Suite**: 160 attacks across 40+ tracks (see `/simulations/attack_simulations.py`)
- **New Defense Layers**: Privacy/ZK (Track EI), Cross-Blockchain (Track EJ)
- **Comprehensive Coverage**: AI coordination, ESG gaming, behavioral economics, APT patterns

### 1.2 Architecture Layers

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Layer 5: Application (Federation Task Delegation)       │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 4: Security (Signatures, Stakes, Witnesses)       │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 3: Trust (Reputation, Quality Tracking)           │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 2: Economics (ATP Pricing, Resource Allocation)   │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 1: Identity (LCT, Platform Registration)          │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Each layer has distinct threat surfaces analyzed below.

---

## 2. Adversary Model

### 2.1 Adversary Capabilities

We consider adversaries with the following capabilities:

| Capability | Description | Assumed Access |
|-----------|-------------|----------------|
| **Network Control** | Can intercept, modify, or delay messages | Man-in-the-middle |
| **Sybil Creation** | Can create multiple fake identities | Unbounded (limited by ATP cost) |
| **Computational Power** | Can perform cryptographic operations | Modest (consumer hardware) |
| **Economic Resources** | Can stake ATP to create identities | Limited (not unlimited funds) |
| **Code Inspection** | Can read all open-source code | Full visibility |
| **Collusion** | Can coordinate with other malicious actors | Up to N-1 platforms (not majority) |

### 2.2 Adversary Goals

**Primary Attack Goals:**
1. **Reputation Manipulation**: Inflate own reputation or suppress competitors
2. **Resource Theft**: Consume ATP/resources without paying
3. **Task Forgery**: Claim tasks were delegated that weren't
4. **Proof Forgery**: Claim quality execution when actual quality was poor
5. **Denial of Service**: Prevent honest platforms from functioning
6. **Eclipse Attack**: Isolate honest platform from federation

### 2.3 Adversary Constraints

**What Adversaries CANNOT Do:**
- Break Ed25519 cryptography (computationally infeasible)
- Forge signatures without private keys
- Create identities without ATP stake
- Achieve majority control of federation (assumes honest majority)
- Arbitrarily rewrite blockchain/distributed state (not applicable - no blockchain in Web4)

**What Adversaries CAN Do:**
- Create Sybil identities (limited by ATP cost)
- Coordinate attacks with other malicious platforms
- Adaptively change strategies based on observations
- Exploit any implementation bugs or logical flaws

---

## 3. Assets and Trust Boundaries

### 3.1 Critical Assets

| Asset | Description | Criticality |
|-------|-------------|-------------|
| **Platform Private Keys** | Ed25519 signing keys | CRITICAL - compromise = total identity theft |
| **Reputation Scores** | Platform trust metrics | HIGH - determines delegation/witnessing |
| **ATP Balances** | Resource allocation credits | HIGH - determines task capability |
| **Task Results** | Execution outcomes | MEDIUM - affects user value |
| **Witness Attestations** | Quality claims | MEDIUM - affects reputation |

### 3.2 Trust Boundaries

```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                     TRUST BOUNDARY                       │
│  ┌────────────┐        ┌────────────┐        ┌────────┐ │
│  │  Platform  │◄──────►│  Platform  │◄──────►│Platform│ │
│  │   (Thor)   │   ATP  │  (Sprout)  │  Task  │ (Nova) │ │
│  │            │  Stake │            │  Proof │        │ │
│  └────────────┘        └────────────┘        └────────┘ │
│         ▲                     ▲                    ▲     │
│         │                     │                    │     │
│         └─────────────────────┴────────────────────┘     │
│              Witness Attestations (≥3 diversity)         │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
         │                                          │
         │        UNTRUSTED NETWORK                 │
         └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

**Trust Assumptions:**
- Platforms trust Ed25519 cryptography
- Platforms trust majority (≥2/3) of witnesses are honest
- Platforms trust ATP stake economic model (costs deter Sybils)
- Platforms do NOT trust individual peer platforms
- Platforms do NOT trust network (assume Byzantine network)

---

## 4. Threat Analysis by Layer

### 4.1 Layer 1: Identity Threats

#### T1.1: Sybil Attack (Identity Creation Spam)

**Threat:** Attacker creates many fake platform identities to:
- Gain majority control of witness attestations
- Dilute honest platform influence
- Create appearance of diversity

**Mitigation (Session #85):**
- ATP-aware identity stakes: 1,200 - 75,000 ATP per identity
- Stakes scale with capability (62.5× range)
- Economic barrier: 1000 GLOBAL identities = 60M ATP

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Prevents mass Sybil creation (high cost)
- ✅ Creates economic gradient (cheap for LOCAL, expensive for GLOBAL)
- ⚠️ Doesn't prevent well-funded attacker with >60M ATP

**Residual Risk:** MEDIUM (depends on ATP acquisition cost)

**Gap:** No empirical validation of stake amounts (are they actually deterrent?)

---

#### T1.2: Identity Theft (Private Key Compromise)

**Threat:** Attacker steals platform's Ed25519 private key to:
- Sign tasks/proofs on behalf of legitimate platform
- Drain ATP balance
- Damage platform reputation

**Mitigation (Session #86 Layer 2):**
- Ed25519 signatures on all tasks/proofs/attestations
- Public key registry (detect key mismatches)
- Signature verification before acceptance

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Prevents forgery without private key
- ❌ CANNOT prevent attack if key actually stolen
- ⚠️ No key revocation mechanism

**Residual Risk:** CRITICAL if key compromised

**Gap:** No key rotation, no hardware binding (TPM/Secure Enclave)

---

#### T1.3: Birth Certificate Forgery

**Threat:** Attacker claims to have staked ATP without actually bonding it

**Mitigation (Session #82):**
- Identity stake system tracks bonded ATP
- Stakes verified before platform registration

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Prevents unstaked identity registration
- ⚠️ Assumes ATP accounting system is correct

**Residual Risk:** LOW (depends on ATP accounting correctness)

---

### 4.2 Layer 2: Economic Threats

#### T2.1: Resource Exhaustion (ATP Drain)

**Threat:** Attacker floods platform with expensive tasks to:
- Deplete ATP budget
- Force CRISIS state
- Prevent legitimate task execution

**Mitigation (Session #84):**
- Rate limiting on task delegation
- ATP bounty requirements for challenges
- Reputation gating (low-reputation platforms limited)

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Prevents unlimited flooding
- ✅ Economic cost to attacker (bounty per task)
- ⚠️ Doesn't prevent slow drip attack

**Residual Risk:** MEDIUM

**Gap:** No dynamic rate limiting based on platform behavior

---

#### T2.2: ATP Hoarding

**Threat:** Attacker accumulates ATP to:
- Create economic monopoly
- Deny resources to others
- Manipulate pricing

**Mitigation:**
- ATP pricing framework (Session #82)
- Market-based pricing (supply/demand)

**Effectiveness:**
- ⚠️ Minimal (no actual ATP markets exist)
- ⚠️ No hoarding prevention mechanism

**Residual Risk:** HIGH

**Gap:** No economic modeling, no ATP issuance/burn mechanism

---

### 4.3 Layer 3: Trust/Reputation Threats

#### T3.1: Reputation Self-Promotion

**Threat:** Attacker inflates own reputation by:
- Creating Sybil witnesses to attest favorably
- Colluding with other malicious platforms
- Completing easy tasks to build false reputation

**Mitigation (Session #83):**
- Witness diversity: ≥3 platforms required
- Random witness selection (prevents shopping)
- Accuracy tracking (unreliable witnesses penalized)

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Prevents single-platform self-attestation
- ✅ Requires coordination of ≥3 platforms
- ⚠️ Vulnerable to well-coordinated cartels

**Residual Risk:** MEDIUM (depends on cartel formation difficulty)

**Gap:** No formal game-theoretic analysis of cartel incentives

---

#### T3.2: Reputation Washing (Fresh Start Attack)

**Threat:** Platform with low reputation abandons identity and creates fresh one

**Mitigation (Session #82):**
- Identity stakes (bonded ATP forfeited on slash)
- Progressive penalties (reputation decay on misbehavior)

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Creates economic cost (lost stake)
- ⚠️ Doesn't prevent if attacker willing to pay cost

**Residual Risk:** MEDIUM

**Gap:** No stake slashing protocol (what triggers slash?)

---

#### T3.3: Witness Cartel Formation

**Threat:** Group of platforms coordinate to:
- Always attest favorably for each other
- Always attest unfavorably for competitors
- Evade detection through rotation

**Mitigation (Session #86 Layer 3):**
- Platform cartel detection (co-witnessing patterns)
- Correlation analysis (≥0.8 correlation flagged)
- Cartel risk scoring per platform

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Detects simple reciprocal witnessing
- ⚠️ May miss sophisticated rotation strategies
- ⚠️ No automated response (just detection)

**Residual Risk:** MEDIUM-HIGH

**Gap:** No formal collusion detection algorithm, no automatic penalties

---

### 4.4 Layer 4: Security Protocol Threats

#### T4.1: Task Forgery

**Threat:** Attacker claims task was delegated by legitimate platform when it wasn't

**Mitigation (Session #86 Layer 2):**
- Ed25519 signatures on all FederationTasks
- Signature verification before task execution
- Public key registry (detect key mismatches)

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Prevents forgery without private key
- ✅ Signature verification catches invalid signatures
- ✅ Public key mismatch detected

**Residual Risk:** LOW (cryptographically secure)

---

#### T4.2: Proof Forgery / Parameter Tampering

**Threat:** Attacker modifies execution proof to:
- Inflate quality_score
- Reduce actual_cost
- Claim better performance than achieved

**Mitigation (Session #86 Layer 2):**
- Ed25519 signatures on ExecutionProofs
- Content hash includes all parameters
- Signature cache detects reuse with different content

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Tampering breaks signature
- ✅ Signature reuse detected (hash-based crypto fallback)
- ✅ Registry rejects invalid signatures

**Residual Risk:** LOW (cryptographically secure)

---

#### T4.3: Witness Forgery

**Threat:** Attacker creates fake witness attestations to:
- Validate low-quality execution
- Suppress honest witness claims

**Mitigation (Session #86 Layer 2 + 3):**
- Ed25519 signatures on WitnessAttestations
- Witness platform registration required
- Platform diversity enforcement (≥3 platforms)

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Unsigned attestations rejected
- ✅ Unregistered witnesses rejected
- ✅ Requires ≥3 colluding registered platforms

**Residual Risk:** MEDIUM (depends on cartel formation)

---

### 4.5 Layer 5: Federation/Application Threats

#### T5.1: Quality Score Inflation

**Threat:** Executing platform claims high quality when actual quality is low

**Mitigation (Session #86 Layer 3):**
- Cross-platform witness validation
- Consensus quality vs claimed quality comparison
- Quality tolerance threshold (±0.1)

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Requires ≥3 colluding witnesses to succeed
- ✅ Large discrepancies detected (>10% error)
- ⚠️ Small inflation (<10%) might pass

**Residual Risk:** MEDIUM

**Gap:** No ground truth verification (relies on witnesses only)

---

#### T5.2: Cross-Platform Eclipse

**Threat:** Attacker surrounds target platform with Sybil platforms to:
- Control all witness attestations target receives
- Isolate target from honest federation

**Mitigation (Session #86):**
- Platform diversity requirement (≥3 platforms)
- Random witness selection
- ATP stake cost (5 platforms × 60k ATP = 300k ATP)

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Requires controlling ≥3 platforms (expensive)
- ✅ Random selection prevents targeting
- ⚠️ Doesn't prevent well-funded attacker

**Residual Risk:** MEDIUM

**Cost to Attacker:** 300k ATP minimum (for 5 GLOBAL platforms)

---

#### T5.3: Challenge Evasion

**Threat:** Platform goes offline when challenged about quality to avoid verification

**Mitigation (Session #84 / HRM):**
- Challenge timeout (24 hours to respond)
- Progressive penalties (5% → 50% reputation decay)
- Strike tracking (WARNING → PERMANENT)

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Non-responsive platforms lose reputation
- ✅ Escalating penalties deter repeated evasion
- ⚠️ Doesn't recover from attack (only penalizes)

**Residual Risk:** LOW-MEDIUM

---

#### T5.4: Delegation Hijacking

**Threat:** Attacker intercepts task delegation and:
- Modifies task parameters
- Redirects to malicious platform
- Steals task results

**Mitigation (Session #86 Layer 2):**
- Ed25519 signatures on tasks (integrity)
- Signature verification (authenticity)
- Parameter tampering breaks signature

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Modification detected via signature
- ✅ Hijacked task rejected (signature invalid)
- ⚠️ Assumes network eventually delivers messages

**Residual Risk:** LOW (cryptographically secure)

---

## 5. Attack Scenarios and Mitigations

### 5.1 Scenario 1: Reputation Manipulation Attack

**Attacker Goal:** Inflate reputation to gain high-value task delegations

**Attack Steps:**
1. Create 3 Sybil platform identities (3 × 60k ATP = 180k ATP cost)
2. Have Sybils witness each other's tasks favorably
3. Build high reputation through mutual attestation
4. Receive valuable task delegations
5. Produce low-quality results (profit = delegation ATP - execution cost)

**Detection:**
- Cartel detector flags co-witnessing patterns (Session #86)
- Correlation score: 3 platforms always witnessing together → correlation ≥0.8
- Cartel risk score elevated for all 3 platforms

**Mitigation:**
- Challenge-response: Honest platforms challenge quality claims
- Re-execution reveals actual quality
- Witness accuracy tracked: Sybils marked as inaccurate
- Progressive penalties: Reputation decays 5% → 50%

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Cartel detected after ~10 co-witnessing events
- ✅ Challenges reveal low quality
- ✅ Reputation eventually destroyed
- ⚠️ Attacker may profit in short term before detection

**Residual Risk:** MEDIUM (short-term profit possible)

---

### 5.2 Scenario 2: Eclipse + Quality Inflation Attack

**Attacker Goal:** Isolate honest platform and feed it false quality data

**Attack Steps:**
1. Create 5 Sybil platforms around target (5 × 60k = 300k ATP cost)
2. Target delegates task to Sybil (based on false reputation)
3. Sybil produces low-quality result
4. Other Sybils attest to high quality (≥3 witnesses)
5. Target accepts low-quality result believing it's validated

**Detection:**
- Platform diversity: Target should check witness platform distribution
- Cartel detection: Same platforms always witnessing together
- Challenge mechanism: Target can challenge suspicious quality

**Mitigation:**
- Witness diversity: Requires ≥3 independent platforms
- Geographic/network diversity (NOT IMPLEMENTED)
- Challenge-response: Target re-executes to verify
- Reputation tracking: Sybils eventually flagged as inaccurate

**Effectiveness:**
- ⚠️ Platform diversity alone insufficient (all witnesses are Sybils)
- ✅ Challenge-response can reveal truth
- ⚠️ Requires target to be suspicious and challenge

**Residual Risk:** MEDIUM-HIGH

**Gap:** No automatic geographic/network diversity requirement

---

### 5.3 Scenario 3: Economic Denial of Service

**Attacker Goal:** Deplete target platform's ATP budget

**Attack Steps:**
1. Create Sybil platform with modest reputation
2. Delegate expensive tasks to target
3. Reject all results (never pay ATP bounty)
4. Repeat until target's ATP exhausted
5. Target enters CRISIS state, becomes unavailable

**Detection:**
- Pattern: Same platform repeatedly delegating but never accepting
- Reputation: Attacker reputation decays (task rejections)

**Mitigation:**
- ATP bounty: Delegator must provide bounty upfront
- Rate limiting: Max tasks per delegator per time window
- Reputation gating: Low-reputation platforms limited

**Effectiveness:**
- ✅ Upfront bounty prevents free attacks
- ✅ Rate limiting caps damage
- ⚠️ Attacker with high initial reputation can cause damage

**Residual Risk:** MEDIUM

**Gap:** No dynamic rate limiting based on platform behavior patterns

---

## 6. Security Properties and Guarantees

### 6.1 Formal Security Properties

| Property | Definition | Status | Evidence |
|----------|-----------|--------|----------|
| **Source Authentication** | Task/proof originated from claimed platform | ✅ YES | Ed25519 signatures (Session #86) |
| **Non-Repudiation** | Platform cannot deny signed task/proof | ✅ YES | Signature registry (Session #86) |
| **Integrity** | Task/proof parameters not modified in transit | ✅ YES | Content hash + signature (Session #86) |
| **Sybil Resistance** | Bounded number of fake identities | ⚠️ PARTIAL | ATP stake cost (Session #85) |
| **Byzantine Fault Tolerance** | Operates with minority dishonest platforms | ⚠️ ASSUMED | No formal proof |
| **Liveness** | Honest platforms eventually make progress | ⚠️ ASSUMED | No formal proof |

### 6.2 Economic Security

**Cost to Attack Analysis:**

| Attack | ATP Cost | Time to Execute | Detection Time | Net ROI |
|--------|---------|----------------|----------------|---------|
| Single Sybil (LOCAL) | 1,200 ATP | Instant | N/A | N/A |
| Single Sybil (GLOBAL) | 75,000 ATP | Instant | N/A | N/A |
| Cartel (3 GLOBAL) | 225,000 ATP | Days-Weeks | 10 co-witness events | NEGATIVE* |
| Eclipse (5 GLOBAL) | 300,000 ATP | Days-Weeks | After challenge | NEGATIVE* |
| Economic DoS | 10,000 ATP (bounty) | Hours | Immediate | NEGATIVE |

*Assumes challenges reveal truth and reputation destroyed before profit exceeds cost

**Key Insight:** Attacks are expensive (100k-300k ATP) but may have short-term profit window before detection.

### 6.3 What We Can Prove

**Cryptographic Guarantees (Assuming Ed25519 is Secure):**
- ✅ Task forgery requires private key (computationally infeasible)
- ✅ Proof tampering breaks signature (detected immediately)
- ✅ Witness forgery requires private key (computationally infeasible)

**Economic Guarantees (Assuming ATP Has Value):**
- ✅ Sybil creation has bounded cost (1,200 - 75,000 ATP)
- ✅ Cartel formation has high cost (≥225,000 ATP for 3 platforms)
- ⚠️ Cost may not exceed profit if attacks succeed before detection

**Trust Guarantees (Assuming Honest Majority):**
- ⚠️ Consensus quality is correct if ≥2/3 witnesses honest
- ⚠️ Federation operates if ≥2/3 platforms honest
- ❌ No formal proof of these assumptions

### 6.4 What We Cannot Prove

**No Formal Verification:**
- Game-theoretic Nash equilibrium (are incentives actually aligned?)
- Byzantine agreement (does consensus converge?)
- Cartel resistance (do detection mechanisms actually deter?)
- Economic soundness (are stake amounts optimal?)

**No Empirical Validation:**
- ATP costs actually deter Sybils
- Witness diversity actually prevents cartels
- Challenge-response actually reveals ground truth
- Real adversaries cannot exploit implementation bugs

---

## 7. Deployment Considerations

### 7.1 Production Readiness Checklist

**Cryptographic Layer:**
- [x] Ed25519 signatures implemented
- [x] Signature verification working
- [ ] Real cryptography (not hash-based fallback)
- [ ] Hardware key storage (TPM/Secure Enclave)
- [ ] Key rotation mechanism
- [ ] Key revocation protocol

**Economic Layer:**
- [x] ATP stake calculations
- [x] Dynamic stake scaling (62.5× range)
- [ ] Economic modeling of stake amounts
- [ ] Empirical validation of deterrence
- [ ] ATP market mechanisms
- [ ] Stake slashing protocol

**Trust Layer:**
- [x] Witness diversity enforcement
- [x] Accuracy tracking
- [x] Cartel detection (basic)
- [ ] Formal collusion resistance analysis
- [ ] Automated cartel response
- [ ] Ground truth verification system

**Protocol Layer:**
- [x] Signed task delegation
- [x] Signed execution proofs
- [x] Signed witness attestations
- [ ] Network protocol (HTTP/gRPC)
- [ ] Formal protocol specification
- [ ] Conformance tests

**Testing & Validation:**
- [x] Unit tests (all passing)
- [x] Integration tests (research scale)
- [x] Production scale tests (100 societies)
- [ ] Adversarial testing (red team)
- [ ] Fuzzing
- [ ] Formal verification

### 7.2 Risk Assessment

| Risk Category | Likelihood | Impact | Overall Risk | Mitigation Priority |
|--------------|-----------|--------|--------------|---------------------|
| Private key theft | LOW | CRITICAL | HIGH | Implement hardware keys |
| Sybil attack | MEDIUM | HIGH | HIGH | Validate stake amounts |
| Cartel formation | MEDIUM | HIGH | HIGH | Improve detection algorithms |
| Quality inflation | MEDIUM | MEDIUM | MEDIUM | Ground truth verification |
| Eclipse attack | LOW | HIGH | MEDIUM | Geographic diversity |
| Economic DoS | MEDIUM | MEDIUM | MEDIUM | Dynamic rate limiting |
| Implementation bugs | HIGH | VARIES | HIGH | Adversarial testing |

### 7.3 Recommended Deployment Strategy

**Phase 1: Controlled Testing (Current)**
- Limited participants (2-3 trusted platforms)
- Low-value tasks only
- Manual challenge-response
- Continuous monitoring

**Phase 2: Beta Federation (Future)**
- 5-10 semi-trusted platforms
- Moderate-value tasks
- Automated challenge-response
- Red team testing

**Phase 3: Production Federation (Future)**
- Open participation (with stake requirements)
- High-value tasks
- Full automation
- Formal audits

---

## 8. Research Gaps and Future Work

### 8.1 Critical Gaps (Must Address)

1. **Formal Threat Model Validation**
   - Current: Enumerated threats based on reasoning
   - Needed: Formal verification of security properties
   - Approach: Model checking, theorem proving

2. **Game-Theoretic Analysis**
   - Current: Assumed incentives deter attacks
   - Needed: Proof of Nash equilibrium
   - Approach: Mechanism design analysis

3. **Economic Modeling**
   - Current: Stake amounts are educated guesses
   - Needed: Empirical validation of deterrence
   - Approach: Agent-based simulation, real-world testing

4. **Adversarial Testing**
   - Current: All testing is synthetic (we attack ourselves)
   - Needed: Real adversaries, red team, fuzzing
   - Approach: Bug bounty, CTF challenges, penetration testing

### 8.2 Important Enhancements (Should Address)

5. **Geographic/Network Diversity**
   - Add diversity requirements beyond just platform count
   - Prevent Sybils from same network/region dominating

6. **Automated Cartel Response**
   - Current: Detection only, no automated response
   - Needed: Automatic penalties or stake slashing

7. **Ground Truth Verification**
   - Current: Relies on witness consensus
   - Needed: Independent re-execution or oracle

8. **Key Management**
   - Add key rotation, revocation, recovery mechanisms
   - Integrate hardware security modules

### 8.3 Nice to Have (Future Research)

9. **Privacy-Preserving Attestations**
   - Zero-knowledge proofs for quality without revealing results

10. **Cross-Chain Federation**
    - Extend to platforms on different blockchains/networks

11. **Reputation Transferability**
    - Allow platforms to port reputation across federations

---

## 9. Conclusion

### 9.1 Current Security Posture

**Strengths:**
- ✅ Comprehensive threat enumeration (8 attack categories, 15+ specific threats)
- ✅ Multi-layer defense-in-depth (cryptographic + economic + social)
- ✅ Honest assessment of gaps and limitations
- ✅ Working prototypes demonstrate feasibility

**Weaknesses:**
- ❌ No formal proofs of security properties
- ❌ No adversarial testing (all synthetic)
- ❌ No empirical validation of economic parameters
- ❌ Implementation gaps (key management, ground truth, etc.)

**Overall Assessment:**
Web4 has done **substantial security research** with thoughtful threat analysis and multi-layer mitigations. The work is **valuable as a research prototype** demonstrating novel trust-native security patterns. However, significant gaps remain before this could be **deployed in adversarial production environments**.

### 9.2 Recommendations

**For Researchers:**
- Use this threat model as foundation for formal analysis
- Focus on game-theoretic equilibrium proofs
- Design experiments to validate economic assumptions
- Publish findings to advance field

**For Developers:**
- Do NOT deploy in adversarial environments yet
- Use for controlled testing with trusted participants only
- Contribute adversarial test cases
- Help fill implementation gaps (key management, etc.)

**For Security Auditors:**
- Use threat model to guide audit focus
- Particularly scrutinize: key management, cartel detection, economic parameters
- Recommend formal verification before production use
- Validate assumptions (honest majority, ATP value, etc.)

### 9.3 Next Steps (Session #86 Roadmap)

**Immediate (Next Session):**
1. Integrate Phase 2 layers into FederationRouter (HRM)
2. Real-world federation test (Thor ↔ Sprout)
3. Promote `/game/` patterns to top-level docs

**Near-Term (Next Month):**
4. Formal game-theoretic analysis (mechanism design)
5. Economic modeling (agent-based simulation)
6. Red team testing (if collaborators available)

**Long-Term (Next Quarter):**
7. Formal verification of critical properties
8. Hardware key integration (TPM/Secure Enclave)
9. Production deployment strategy

---

## Appendix A: Attack Simulation Reference

**Full Attack Catalog**: See `/simulations/docs/ATTACK_CATALOG_SUMMARY.md`

**Attack Statistics (February 2026)**:
- **Total Attacks**: 160
- **Defense Rate**: 100% (all attacks defended)
- **Defense Layers**: 10 categories, 200+ individual defenses

**Attack Track Summary**:

| Track | Attacks | Focus |
|-------|---------|-------|
| 1-6 | Foundation | Metabolic, Sybil, ATP, Heartbeat |
| DN | 62-64 | Temporal consensus |
| DO | 65-66 | Side-channels |
| DP | 67-68 | Supply chain |
| DQ | 69-72 | AI/ML-specific |
| DR | 73-78 | Emergent coordination |
| DS | 79-84 | Long-con trust |
| DT | 85-90 | Appeals/recovery gaming |
| DU | 91-95 | Governance interface |
| DW | 96-99 | Cross-system chains |
| DX | 100 | Cryptographic weakness |
| DY | 101 | Information cascades |
| DZ | 102-106 | APT patterns |
| EA | 107-110 | Economic coalitions |
| EB | 111-114 | Behavioral economics |
| EC | 115-118 | Social engineering |
| ED | 119-122 | Regulatory arbitrage |
| EE | 123-126 | Emergent dynamics |
| EF | 127-134 | Future threats (AI, quantum, hardware) |
| EG | 135-142 | Cross-federation AI coordination |
| EH | 143-148 | Energy/ESG gaming |
| EI | 149-154 | Privacy/ZK protocols |
| EJ | 155-160 | Cross-blockchain arbitrage |

---

## Appendix B: Traditional Threat Catalog

Quick reference of originally enumerated threats:

| ID | Threat | Layer | Severity | Mitigation | Status |
|----|--------|-------|----------|-----------|--------|
| T1.1 | Sybil Attack | Identity | HIGH | ATP stakes | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| T1.2 | Identity Theft | Identity | CRITICAL | Ed25519 sigs | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| T1.3 | Birth Certificate Forgery | Identity | MEDIUM | Stake verification | ✅ MITIGATED |
| T2.1 | Resource Exhaustion | Economic | MEDIUM | Rate limiting | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| T2.2 | ATP Hoarding | Economic | MEDIUM | Market pricing | ❌ NONE |
| T3.1 | Reputation Self-Promotion | Trust | HIGH | Witness diversity | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| T3.2 | Reputation Washing | Trust | MEDIUM | Stake forfeiture | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| T3.3 | Witness Cartel | Trust | HIGH | Cartel detection | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| T4.1 | Task Forgery | Protocol | HIGH | Ed25519 sigs | ✅ MITIGATED |
| T4.2 | Proof Forgery | Protocol | HIGH | Ed25519 sigs | ✅ MITIGATED |
| T4.3 | Witness Forgery | Protocol | HIGH | Ed25519 sigs | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| T5.1 | Quality Inflation | Federation | HIGH | Consensus validation | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| T5.2 | Cross-Platform Eclipse | Federation | MEDIUM | Platform diversity | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| T5.3 | Challenge Evasion | Federation | MEDIUM | Progressive penalties | ✅ MITIGATED |
| T5.4 | Delegation Hijacking | Federation | MEDIUM | Ed25519 sigs | ✅ MITIGATED |

**Legend:**
- ✅ MITIGATED: Strong protection in place
- ⚠️ PARTIAL: Some protection, gaps remain
- ❌ NONE: No mitigation implemented

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**Document Status:** Living document, updated as security research progresses.

**Last Review:** February 6, 2026
**Attack Count**: 160 (increased from 126 in December 2025)
**Next Review:** April 2026 (After formal verification integration)

**Feedback:** Security researchers are encouraged to identify gaps, propose improvements, and contribute formal analysis.

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*"Honest threat modeling reveals gaps so they can be addressed, not hidden."*
