Here’s a straight-shooting merit review of the draft you zipped (`/web4-standard`), with concrete fixes and ready-to-paste language where it helps.

# What’s strong

- **Clear intent & scaffolding.** The repo is already organized like a standards track: core-spec, data formats, security, RFC submission, conformance tests, reference client, and governance docs. That’s the right frame.
- **Normative voice is present.** You’re invoking RFC-2119/8174 language and ABNF. Good instincts.
- **Early interop mindset.** A reference client + tests, even skeletal, is the correct center of gravity.
- **Pragmatic reuse.** DID/VC/JSON-LD hooks and an explicit `web4://` scheme show you’re not trying to reinvent everything.

# Top gaps to close (P0)

These are blockers for credible implementers and security reviewers.

1. **Handshake & crypto are only gestured at.**
    The spec names ECDSA P-256 + SHA-256, but the protocol lacks concrete, testable choices for:

   - **KEM/Key agreement:** pick **X25519** (and optionally P-256 ECDH for FIPS lanes).
   - **Session establishment:** standardize **HPKE (RFC 9180)** for envelope encryption; or specify **Noise** patterns (e.g., `XX`, `IK`, `XK`) with parameter suites.
   - **AEAD:** **AES-GCM-128** and **ChaCha20-Poly1305** as mandatory-to-implement.
   - **Hash/KDF:** **SHA-256** + **HKDF**.
   - **Forward secrecy & rotation:** define a ratchet or MLS channel if you need ongoing sessions.

   👉 *Action:* Add a “Cryptographic Suites” table and one canonical handshake. See “Ready-to-paste” below.

2. **Privacy & unlinkability aren’t engineered yet.**
    Today’s draft uses a globally stable `W4ID` (derived from a public key). That invites correlation. For Web4’s trust fabric you want **pairwise pseudonymous identifiers** by default:

   - Derive **pairwise W4IDs** per counterparty via HKDF(master_secret, peer_salt) and advertise only those.
   - Define **selective disclosure** credentials (JWT-VC *or* VC-Data-Model + BBS+ / SD-JWT-VC) to avoid over-sharing.
   - Mandate **GREASE-like extension padding** to frustrate fingerprinting.

3. **`web4://` URI grammar is not RFC-3986-clean.**
    Your examples put a DID-like token where an **authority** is expected; colons and unescaped bytes will break parsers.

   - Either register a **new scheme** whose authority is a hostname or opaque base-N label; or
   - Drop the scheme and use **DID URLs** (recommended if you want maximal reuse).

   👉 *Ready-to-paste ABNF (if you keep the scheme):*

   ```
   web4-URI   = "web4://" w4-authority path-abempty [ "?" query ] [ "#" fragment ]
   w4-authority = "w4id-" base32nopad
   ; w4-authority is an encoding of the pairwise W4ID key material.
   ```

   Provide an algorithm for converting pairwise W4ID → `base32nopad` and back.

4. **Message framing, canonicalization, and signatures.**
    JSON-LD is powerful but brittle operationally (canonicalization issues). You need **two concrete content profiles**:

   - **JOSE/JSON** profile (JWS/JWE) with JCS canonicalization for signatures.
   - **COSE/CBOR** profile for constrained/edge devices (Entity Attestation Tokens (EAT, RFC 9334) fit nicely here).
      Make one **mandatory-to-implement** and one **SHOULD**.

5. **Transport & discovery are hand-wavy.**
    Specify transports and discovery modes, even modularly:

   - **Transports:** QUIC/TLS, WebTransport, BLE GATT, WebRTC DataChannel (P2P), and a minimal TCP/TLS mapping.
   - **NAT traversal:** STUN/TURN/ICE profile for P2P modes.
   - **Discovery:** mDNS/DNS-SD, QR out-of-band, DNS over HTTPS bootstrap, or “witness relay”.

6. **No formal state machines, error taxonomy, or versioning.**
    Add per-protocol **state diagrams**, **error codes** (with a Problem Details (RFC 9457) JSON representation), and **capability/version negotiation** that’s resilient to downgrade (GREASE unknown feature bits).

7. **Missing your differentiators (LCT, T3/V3, ATP/ADP).**
    The draft doesn’t mention **Linked Control Tokens, trust/value tensors (T3/V3), or ATP/ADP energy semantics**—the essence of Web4. At minimum:

   - Define an **LCT object** (identity, lineage, policy, attestations) and how it binds to keys/resources.
   - Define **Trust/Value claims** as VC claimsets with tensor encodings (normative JSON/CBOR shape).
   - Define an **ATP/ADP metering subprotocol** (rate-limits, quotas, witness proofs of delivered value/energy).

# Important but not blocking (P1)

- **IANA sections & registries.** Create registries for:
  - `web4` extension IDs, subprotocol names, error codes, algorithm suite IDs, claim namespaces, witness types.
- **Extensibility & GREASE.** Document “ignore unknowns” + send random, reserved feature bits.
- **Conformance profiles.** Ship 3–4 profiles so vendors can land:
  1. *Edge Pairing-Only (COSE/CBOR)*
  2. *Pairing + Witness (off-ledger)*
  3. *Lightchain-Anchored (ledger optional)*
  4. *Enterprise Bridge (OIDC4VC, WebAuthn, HTTPS/QUIC)*
- **Governance & IPR.** Add a security response policy, CVE handling, and IPR/RF commitments that don’t collide with your LCT patents. Consider a **non-assert** on essential claims for core wire-level pieces; keep LCT implementation patents for value-layer.

# Nice to have (P2)

- **Interop bridges:** DIDComm v2 mapping, OIDC4VC(P/VP), WebAuthn/FIDO2 binding.
- **Remote attestation:** EAT/TPM/TEE attestations as optional witness signals.
- **Witnessing semantics:** define witness classes (time-stamper, auditor, oracle) and their required claims.

------

## Targeted redlines (by file)

**`core-spec/core-protocol.md`**

- Replace placeholder prose with a normative **Noise-style** or **HPKE-based** handshake section including:
  - Message types (`ClientHello`, `ServerHello`, `HandshakeAuth`, `SessionKeyUpdate`).
  - Transcript hash & anti-replay (nonce, windowing, and clock-skew guidance).
  - Capability negotiation (extension list with GREASE).
- Add **state machines** for client/server pairing and rekey.
- Define **error codes** (e.g., `W4_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SUITE`, `W4_ERR_REPLAY`, `W4_ERR_AUTHZ_DENIED`) and the Problem-Details JSON.

**Ready-to-paste: Algorithm suites table**

```
| Suite ID          | KEM      | Sig       | AEAD              | Hash    | Profile |
|-------------------|----------|-----------|-------------------|---------|---------|
| W4-BASE-1 (MUST)  | X25519   | Ed25519   | ChaCha20-Poly1305 | SHA-256 | COSE    |
| W4-FIPS-1 (SHOULD)| P-256ECDH| ECDSA-P256| AES-128-GCM       | SHA-256 | JOSE    |
```

**`core-spec/security-framework.md`**

- Expand to include **key lifetimes**, **forward secrecy**, **KCI resistance**, **downgrade protection**, and **privacy goals** (linkability bounds, observer model).
- Add **credential profiles:** JWT-VC (JOSE) and VC-DM 2.0 + BBS+ (COSE) with MUST/SHOULD guidance.

**`core-spec/data-formats.md`**

- Define **canonicalization** rules (JCS for JSON; CTAP2/COSE deterministic encoding for CBOR).

- Add a **Pairwise W4ID** derivation:

  ```
  sk_master = random(32)
  w4id_pair(sk_master, peer_salt) = multibase(base32_nopad(HKDF-SHA256(sk_master, info=peer_salt)))
  ```

- Specify **KID** formatting, multibase/multicodec recommendations, and `application/web4+json` / `application/web4+cbor` media types.

**`architecture/grammar_and_notation.md`**

- Replace the `web4://<w4id>` example with the corrected ABNF (above) or pivot to **DID URLs**.

**`implementation/reference/web4_client.py`**

- Add **Ed25519/X25519** support and **HKDF** usage for key derivation.
- Ensure constant-time comparisons, secure random nonces, AEAD misuse-resistance, and **replay windows**.
- Separate **serialization** from **crypto** (clean layers).
- Add **KAT vectors** and **negative tests** (bad signatures, expired nonces, wrong suite).

**`implementation/tests/test_web4_protocol.py`**

- Add test groups for: suite negotiation, GREASE handling, replay rejection, pairwise W4ID derivation, SD-JWT selective disclosure, and media-type canonicalization failures.

**`community/governance.md`**

- Add **Security.txt**, vulnerability handling SLA, and signposting for coordinated disclosure.
- Clarify decision venues (mailing list, issues, weekly calls) and the **ratification process** for registries.

**`submission/web4-rfc.md`**

- Expand **IANA Considerations** with concrete initial registry values (suite IDs, extension IDs).
- Fill **Security Considerations** with a real threat model (passive network observer, active MITM, malicious witness, ledger rollback, quota abuse/ATP drain).

------

## Witnessing, LCTs, T3/V3, ATP/ADP — bring your edge back in

Right now the draft could be any modern DID/VC + pairing spec. To make it **Web4**, encode your primitives:

**LCT (Linked Control Token) – normative object shape (JSON/CBOR)**

```
{
  "lct_id": "<multibase>",
  "subject": "<w4id or resource uri>",
  "lineage": [{"parent": "<lct_id>", "reason": "fork|upgrade|transfer", "ts": "<iso8601>"}],
  "policy": {"access": [...], "constraints": {...}},
  "attestations": [{"witness": "<w4id>", "type": "time|audit|oracle", "sig": "<jws|cose-sig>"}]
}
```

- Define **binding**: an LCT MUST bind (by signature) to the subject’s current public key material (or to a stable hardware root via EAT).
- Provide a **revocation & rotation** story (grace windows, split-brain resolution via witness quorum).

**T3/V3 trust-value tensors**

- Normatively define a **claimset** for trust/value coordinates (dimensions, units, range, provenance).
- Provide a **validation function** (how an agent computes effective trust for a decision within a Markov Relevancy Horizon).

**ATP/ADP metering (subprotocol)**

- Define quotas, proofs of work/value delivery, and rate-limit semantics:
  - `CreditGrant`, `UsageReport`, `Dispute`, `Settle`.
  - Witness role for **settlement proofs** (off-ledger by default; lightchain anchor optional).

------

## Ready-to-paste: Capability negotiation (GREASEd)

```
"capabilities": {
  "ext": [
    "w4_ext_noise_xx@1",           // real
    "w4_ext_sdjwt_vp@1",           // real
    "w4_ext_93f07f2a@0"            // GREASE: reserved, random
  ],
  "suites": ["W4-BASE-1", "W4-FIPS-1"],
  "media": ["application/web4+cbor", "application/web4+json"]
}
```

Receivers MUST ignore unknown `ext` entries and MUST NOT negotiate to an empty intersection if a supported mandatory capability exists.

## Ready-to-paste: Error object (Problem Details)

```
{
  "type": "about:blank",
  "title": "Unauthorized",
  "status": 401,
  "code": "W4_ERR_AUTHZ_DENIED",
  "detail": "Credential lacks required scope: write:lct",
  "instance": "web4://w4id-ABCD/.../messages/123"
}
```

------

## Overall verdict

- **Trajectory:** Right structure, right instincts.
- **Maturity:** *Alpha spec* (lots of “…” placeholders) — not yet implementable independently.
- **Priority work:** Lock down crypto/handshake, privacy, URI correctness, message canonicalization, and encode **LCT/T3/V3/ATP** as first-class normative objects and subprotocols. Add state machines, error taxonomy, and concrete conformance profiles.

If you want, I can take a first pass at:

1. a complete **“Core Handshake”** section (HPKE-based) with state diagrams, and
2. a **minimal LCT object** + **ATP metering subprotocol** draft—both ready to drop into `core-spec/`.