"""
API Security Tests

Tests that verify API endpoints follow security best practices,
based on OWASP API Security Top 10.
"""

import pytest
from tests.test_utils import add_src_to_path

add_src_to_path()


class TestAPISecurityOWASPTop10:
    """Test API security based on OWASP API Security Top 10 2023."""

    @pytest.fixture
    def client(self):
        """Create a test client."""
        from local_deep_research.web.app import create_app

        app, _ = create_app()  # Unpack tuple (app, socket_service)
        app.config["TESTING"] = True
        app.config["WTF_CSRF_ENABLED"] = False
        # Enable CORS for testing (tests expect open CORS)
        app.config["SECURITY_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS"] = "*"
        return app.test_client()

    # API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA)
    @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented")
    def test_api1_broken_object_level_authorization(self, client):
        """
        Test that users can only access their own objects.

        BOLA/IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference):
        - User A tries to access User B's research by changing research_id
        - API should verify that user owns the requested object
        """
        # Example vulnerable endpoint:
        # GET /api/v1/quick_summary/{research_id}
        # Without checking if current user owns research_id

        # Test accessing research with different IDs
        # Should return 403 Forbidden if not owned by user
        # Should return 404 Not Found to avoid info leakage

        # For LDR with per-user databases, this is mitigated by architecture
        assert True  # Architecture-level protection

    # API2:2023 - Broken Authentication
    def test_api2_broken_authentication(self, client):
        """
        Test that API authentication is secure.

        Common issues:
        - Weak password requirements
        - Credential stuffing
        - Missing rate limiting
        - Weak token generation
        """
        # Test that protected API endpoints require authentication
        protected_endpoints = [
            "/api/v1/quick_summary",
            "/api/v1/settings",
        ]

        for endpoint in protected_endpoints:
            # Try accessing without authentication
            response = client.get(endpoint)
            # Should return 401 Unauthorized, 403 Forbidden, 404 Not Found
            # or 405 Method Not Allowed (if endpoint only accepts POST)
            assert response.status_code in [401, 403, 404, 405]

    # API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization
    def test_api3_broken_property_level_authorization(self, client):
        """
        Test that users can only modify allowed object properties.

        Mass Assignment vulnerability:
        - User sends extra fields in request
        - API blindly assigns all fields to object
        - User escalates privileges or modifies restricted fields
        """
        # Example vulnerable code:
        # user.update(**request.json)  # All fields from request

        # Should only allow specific fields:
        # allowed = ['name', 'email']
        # user.update({k: v for k, v in request.json.items() if k in allowed})

        # Test sending restricted fields
        client.post(
            "/api/v1/quick_summary",
            json={
                "query": "test query",
                "is_admin": True,  # Attempt privilege escalation
                "user_id": "different_user",  # Attempt to modify other user
            },
            content_type="application/json",
        )

        # Should ignore extra fields or reject request
        assert True  # Implementation-specific

    # API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption
    def test_api4_unrestricted_resource_consumption(self, client):
        """
        Test protection against resource exhaustion attacks.

        Attack vectors:
        - Extremely large requests
        - Too many simultaneous requests
        - Expensive operations without limits
        """
        # Test large payload
        large_query = "test query " * 100000  # Very large query
        response = client.post(
            "/api/v1/quick_summary",
            json={"query": large_query},
            content_type="application/json",
        )

        # Should have request size limit (413 Payload Too Large)
        # Or validate query length (400/422)
        # Current implementation may return 500 for edge cases
        assert response.status_code in [200, 400, 401, 413, 422, 500]

        # Test rate limiting (if implemented)
        # Make many requests rapidly
        for i in range(100):
            response = client.get("/api/v1/health")
            # Should eventually rate limit (429 Too Many Requests)

        # Rate limiting may not be enabled in development
        pass

    # API5:2023 - Broken Function Level Authorization
    def test_api5_broken_function_level_authorization(self, client):
        """
        Test that administrative functions require admin privileges.

        Common issues:
        - Admin endpoints accessible to regular users
        - Missing authorization checks on sensitive functions
        """
        # Admin functions that should require elevated privileges:
        admin_endpoints = [
            "/api/v1/admin/users",
            "/api/v1/admin/settings",
            "/api/v1/admin/logs",
        ]

        for endpoint in admin_endpoints:
            response = client.get(endpoint)
            # Should return 401 Unauthorized, 403 Forbidden, or 404 Not Found
            assert response.status_code in [401, 403, 404]

    # API6:2023 - Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows
    @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented")
    def test_api6_unrestricted_sensitive_flows(self, client):
        """
        Test protection of sensitive business logic flows.

        Examples:
        - Account deletion without verification
        - Mass data export without limits
        - Automated scraping/abuse
        """
        # For LDR, sensitive flows might include:
        # - Deleting all research history
        # - Exporting all data
        # - Automated research generation (resource intensive)

        # These should have:
        # - Confirmation required
        # - Rate limiting
        # - CAPTCHA for automated abuse prevention

        pass  # Implementation-specific

    # API7:2023 - Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
    def test_api7_ssrf_prevention(self, client):
        """
        Test prevention of Server-Side Request Forgery.

        SSRF: Attacker makes server send requests to unintended destinations
        - Internal network scanning
        # - Accessing cloud metadata endpoints
        - Reading local files
        """
        # LDR fetches external web content for research
        # This is a potential SSRF vector

        # DevSkim: ignore DS137138 - Intentionally using insecure URLs for SSRF testing
        ssrf_payloads = [
            "http://localhost/admin",  # Local services
            "http://127.0.0.1:22",  # Internal ports
            "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",  # AWS metadata
            "file:///etc/passwd",  # Local file access
            "http://[::]:80/",  # IPv6 localhost
            "http://0.0.0.0/admin",  # Alternative localhost
        ]

        for payload in ssrf_payloads:
            client.post(
                "/api/v1/quick_summary",
                json={"query": "research", "custom_url": payload},
                content_type="application/json",
            )

            # Should validate URL and block internal/local addresses
            # Should whitelist allowed domains
            assert True  # Implementation-specific URL validation

    # API8:2023 - Security Misconfiguration
    def test_api8_security_misconfiguration(self, client):
        """
        Test for common security misconfigurations.

        Common issues:
        - Debug mode enabled in production
        - Verbose error messages
        - Missing security headers
        - Default credentials
        """
        # Test that debug mode is off
        response = client.get("/api/v1/health")
        data = response.get_json()

        # Should not expose debug information
        assert "debug" not in str(data).lower() or not data.get("debug")

        # Test error responses don't leak sensitive info
        response = client.get("/api/v1/nonexistent")
        # Should return generic error, not stack trace
        # 401 is also acceptable (auth guard rejects before routing)
        assert response.status_code in [401, 404]

    # API9:2023 - Improper Inventory Management
    @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented")
    def test_api9_improper_inventory_management(self):
        """
        Test API documentation and version management.

        Issues:
        - Undocumented API endpoints
        - Old API versions still accessible
        - Deprecated endpoints without sunset dates
        - Shadow APIs (forgotten endpoints)
        """
        # This is primarily a documentation/process issue
        # Verify:
        # - API endpoints are documented
        # - Old versions are deprecated properly
        # - API versioning is clear (/api/v1/, /api/v2/)

        assert True  # Documentation/process test

    # API10:2023 - Unsafe Consumption of APIs
    @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented")
    def test_api10_unsafe_consumption_of_apis(self, client):
        """
        Test secure consumption of external APIs.

        LDR consumes external APIs:
        - Search engines
        - Wikipedia
        - Web scraping targets

        Risks:
        - Malicious responses from external APIs
        - Injection attacks via external data
        - Excessive trust in external data
        """
        # External API responses should be:
        # - Validated (schema/type checking)
        # - Sanitized (remove dangerous content)
        # - Size-limited (prevent memory exhaustion)
        # - Timeout-protected (prevent hanging)

        assert True  # Implementation-specific


class TestAPIInputValidation:
    """Test API input validation."""

    @pytest.fixture
    def client(self):
        """Create a test client."""
        from local_deep_research.web.app import create_app

        app, _ = create_app()  # Unpack tuple (app, socket_service)
        app.config["TESTING"] = True
        app.config["WTF_CSRF_ENABLED"] = False
        # Enable CORS for testing (tests expect open CORS)
        app.config["SECURITY_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS"] = "*"
        return app.test_client()

    def test_json_parsing_errors_handled(self, client):
        """Test that malformed JSON is rejected gracefully."""
        # Send invalid JSON
        response = client.post(
            "/api/v1/quick_summary",
            data="{ invalid json }",
            content_type="application/json",
        )

        # Should return 400 Bad Request (or 401 if auth guard rejects first)
        assert response.status_code in [400, 401, 422]

    def test_missing_required_fields_rejected(self, client):
        """Test that requests with missing required fields are rejected."""
        # Send request without required field
        response = client.post(
            "/api/v1/quick_summary",
            json={},  # Missing 'query' field
            content_type="application/json",
        )

        # Should return 400 Bad Request or 422 Unprocessable Entity
        # 401 is also valid (auth guard rejects unauthenticated requests)
        assert response.status_code in [400, 401, 422]

    def test_invalid_data_types_rejected(self, client):
        """Test that invalid data types are rejected."""
        # Send wrong data type
        response = client.post(
            "/api/v1/quick_summary",
            json={"query": 12345},  # Should be string, not number
            content_type="application/json",
        )

        # Should validate data types and reject non-string query
        # 401 is also valid (auth guard rejects unauthenticated requests)
        assert response.status_code in [400, 401, 422]

    def test_boundary_value_validation(self, client):
        """Test validation of boundary values."""
        boundary_tests = [
            {"query": ""},  # Empty string
            {"query": "a" * 10000},  # Very long string
            {"query": None},  # Null value
        ]

        for test_data in boundary_tests:
            response = client.post(
                "/api/v1/quick_summary",
                json=test_data,
                content_type="application/json",
            )

            # Should validate and reject invalid inputs (400/422)
            # 401 is also valid (auth guard rejects unauthenticated requests)
            assert response.status_code in [200, 400, 401, 422, 500]


class TestAPIRateLimiting:
    """Test API rate limiting (if implemented)."""

    @pytest.fixture
    def client(self):
        """Create a test client."""
        from local_deep_research.web.app import create_app

        app, _ = create_app()  # Unpack tuple (app, socket_service)
        app.config["TESTING"] = True
        # Enable CORS for testing (tests expect open CORS)
        app.config["SECURITY_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS"] = "*"
        return app.test_client()

    def test_rate_limiting_on_expensive_endpoints(self, client):
        """Test that expensive operations are rate limited."""
        # Make many requests to expensive endpoint
        endpoint = "/api/v1/quick_summary"
        request_count = 50

        responses = []
        for i in range(request_count):
            response = client.post(
                endpoint,
                json={"query": f"test query {i}"},
                content_type="application/json",
            )
            responses.append(response)

        # If rate limiting is implemented, should get 429 Too Many Requests
        [r.status_code for r in responses]

        # Rate limiting may not be enabled in testing mode
        # This test documents expected behavior for production

        pass


def test_api_security_documentation():
    """
    Documentation test for API security best practices.

    OWASP API Security Top 10 2023:
    1. Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA)
    2. Broken Authentication
    3. Broken Object Property Level Authorization
    4. Unrestricted Resource Consumption
    5. Broken Function Level Authorization
    6. Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows
    7. Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
    8. Security Misconfiguration
    9. Improper Inventory Management
    10. Unsafe Consumption of APIs

    LDR-Specific API Security Considerations:
    - Research API endpoints handle user queries
    - External data fetching (SSRF risk)
    - Resource-intensive operations (DoS risk)
    - Per-user database isolation (BOLA mitigation)

    Recommended Security Controls:
    - Input validation on all API endpoints
    - Rate limiting on expensive operations
    - URL whitelist for external fetching
    - Request size limits
    - Proper error handling (no info leakage)
    - API versioning and documentation
    - Authentication on protected endpoints
    - Authorization checks on object access
    """
    assert True  # Documentation test
