# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""Location: ./tests/unit/mcpgateway/validation/test_validators_advanced.py
Copyright 2026
SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
Authors: Mihai Criveti

Test the validators module.
Author: Mihai Criveti

This module provides comprehensive tests for the SecurityValidator class,
including validation of names, identifiers, URIs, URLs, templates, and
dangerous content patterns (HTML/JavaScript).

The tests cover:
- Basic validation rules (empty values, length limits, character restrictions)
- XSS prevention (HTML tags, JavaScript patterns, event handlers)
- Case sensitivity handling
- Boundary detection for security patterns
- False positive prevention for legitimate content
- URL scheme validation and dangerous protocol detection
"""

# Standard
import socket
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch

# Third-Party
import pytest

# First-Party
from mcpgateway.common.validators import SecurityValidator


class DummySettings:
    """Mock settings for testing SecurityValidator.

    These settings define validation patterns and limits used throughout
    the tests. The patterns are designed to catch common XSS vectors while
    minimizing false positives.
    """

    # HTML pattern: Catches dangerous HTML tags that could be used for XSS
    validation_dangerous_html_pattern = (
        r"<(script|iframe|object|embed|link|meta|base|form|img|svg|video|audio|source|track|"
        r"area|map|canvas|applet|frame|frameset|html|head|body|style)\b|"
        r"</*(script|iframe|object|embed|link|meta|base|form|img|svg|video|audio|source|track|"
        r"area|map|canvas|applet|frame|frameset|html|head|body|style)>"
    )

    # JavaScript pattern: Enhanced pattern with case-insensitive matching and boundary detection
    # This is the NEW pattern being tested
    validation_dangerous_js_pattern = r"(?i)(?:^|\s|[\"'`<>=])(javascript:|vbscript:|data:\s*[^,]*[;\s]*(javascript|vbscript)|" r"\bon[a-z]+\s*=|<\s*script\b)"

    # Allowed URL schemes for security
    validation_allowed_url_schemes = ["http://", "https://", "ws://", "wss://"]

    # Character validation patterns
    validation_name_pattern = r"^[a-zA-Z0-9_.\- ]+$"  # Names can have spaces (literal space, not \s to reject control chars)
    validation_identifier_pattern = r"^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]+$"  # IDs cannot have spaces
    validation_safe_uri_pattern = r"^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-.:/?=&%{}]+$"
    validation_unsafe_uri_pattern = r'[<>"\'\\]'
    validation_tool_name_pattern = r"^[a-zA-Z0-9_][a-zA-Z0-9._/-]*$"  # SEP-986 pattern

    # Size limits for various fields
    validation_max_name_length = 100  # Realistic name length
    validation_max_description_length = 1000
    validation_max_template_length = 10000
    validation_max_content_length = 100000
    validation_max_json_depth = 5
    validation_max_url_length = 2048  # Standard URL length limit

    # Allowed MIME types
    validation_allowed_mime_types = ["application/json", "text/plain", "text/html"]


@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def patch_logger(monkeypatch):
    """Mock logger to capture log messages during tests."""
    logs = []

    class DummyLogger:
        def __getattr__(self, name):
            def logfn(*args, **kwargs):
                logs.append((name, args, kwargs))

            return logfn

    monkeypatch.setattr("mcpgateway.common.validators.logger", DummyLogger())
    yield logs


@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def patch_settings_and_classvars(monkeypatch):
    """Patch settings and SecurityValidator class variables for testing."""
    with patch("mcpgateway.config.settings", new=DummySettings):
        # Update all class variables to use test settings
        SecurityValidator.MAX_NAME_LENGTH = DummySettings.validation_max_name_length
        SecurityValidator.MAX_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH = DummySettings.validation_max_description_length
        SecurityValidator.MAX_TEMPLATE_LENGTH = DummySettings.validation_max_template_length
        SecurityValidator.MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH = DummySettings.validation_max_content_length
        SecurityValidator.MAX_JSON_DEPTH = DummySettings.validation_max_json_depth
        SecurityValidator.MAX_URL_LENGTH = DummySettings.validation_max_url_length
        SecurityValidator.DANGEROUS_HTML_PATTERN = DummySettings.validation_dangerous_html_pattern
        SecurityValidator.DANGEROUS_JS_PATTERN = DummySettings.validation_dangerous_js_pattern
        SecurityValidator.ALLOWED_URL_SCHEMES = DummySettings.validation_allowed_url_schemes
        SecurityValidator.NAME_PATTERN = DummySettings.validation_name_pattern
        SecurityValidator.IDENTIFIER_PATTERN = DummySettings.validation_identifier_pattern
        SecurityValidator.VALIDATION_SAFE_URI_PATTERN = DummySettings.validation_safe_uri_pattern
        SecurityValidator.VALIDATION_UNSAFE_URI_PATTERN = DummySettings.validation_unsafe_uri_pattern
        SecurityValidator.TOOL_NAME_PATTERN = DummySettings.validation_tool_name_pattern
        yield


# =============================================================================
# SANITIZE DISPLAY TEXT TESTS
# =============================================================================


def test_sanitize_display_text_valid():
    """Test that valid text passes through with HTML escaping."""
    # Normal text should be escaped but not raise errors
    result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text("Hello World", "desc")
    assert result == "Hello World"

    # Text with special characters should be escaped
    result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text("Hello & Goodbye", "desc")
    assert result == "Hello & Goodbye"

    # Quotes should be escaped
    result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text('Hello "World"', "desc")
    assert result == 'Hello "World"'


def test_sanitize_display_text_empty():
    """Test that empty strings are handled correctly."""
    assert SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text("", "desc") == ""
    assert SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(None, "desc") == None


def test_sanitize_display_text_html_tags():
    """Test detection of dangerous HTML tags."""
    dangerous_html = [
        "<script>alert(1)</script>",
        '<iframe src="malicious.com"></iframe>',
        "<object data='bad.swf'></object>",
        "<embed src='bad.swf'>",
        "<link rel='stylesheet' href='bad.css'>",
        "<meta http-equiv='refresh' content='0;url=bad.com'>",
        "<base href='http://evil.com/'>",
        "<form action='steal.php'>",
        "</script>",  # Closing tags also caught
        "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>",
        "<svg onload=alert(1)>",
        "<style>@import 'bad.css';</style>",
    ]

    for html in dangerous_html:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="contains HTML tags"):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(html, "desc")


def test_sanitize_display_text_js_patterns_basic():
    """Test detection of basic JavaScript patterns."""
    # Only test patterns that won't be caught by HTML filter first
    dangerous_js = [
        " javascript:alert(1)",  # Space before to trigger boundary
        " vbscript:msgbox(1)",  # Space before to trigger boundary
        " data:text/html;javascript",  # Space before to trigger boundary
    ]

    for js in dangerous_js:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="contains script patterns"):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(js, "desc")

    # These contain both HTML and JS patterns - JS pattern might be checked first
    mixed_patterns = [
        "<img src=x onload=alert(1)>",
        "<div onclick=alert(1)>",
    ]

    for pattern in mixed_patterns:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="contains (HTML tags|script patterns)"):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(pattern, "desc")


def test_sanitize_display_text_js_case_insensitive():
    """Test that JavaScript patterns are caught regardless of case."""
    # Pure JS patterns (no HTML tags)
    case_variations = [
        "JavaScript:alert(1)",
        "JAVASCRIPT:alert(1)",
        "JaVaScRiPt:alert(1)",
        "VBScript:msgbox(1)",
        "vBsCrIpT:msgbox(1)",
        "VBSCRIPT:msgbox(1)",
    ]

    for js in case_variations:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="contains script patterns"):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(js, "desc")

    # These contain HTML tags so will be caught by HTML filter
    html_case_variations = [
        "<img src=x OnLoad=alert(1)>",
        "<img src=x ONLOAD=alert(1)>",
        "<img src=x oNcLiCk=alert(1)>",
    ]

    for html in html_case_variations:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="contains HTML tags"):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(html, "desc")


def test_sanitize_display_text_js_boundaries():
    """Test boundary detection for JavaScript patterns."""
    # Should catch with various delimiters
    boundary_cases = [
        '"javascript:alert(1)"',  # Double quotes
        "'javascript:alert(1)'",  # Single quotes
        "`javascript:alert(1)`",  # Backticks
        "<javascript:alert(1)>",  # Angle brackets
        "=javascript:alert(1)",  # Equals sign
        " javascript:alert(1)",  # Space before
    ]

    for js in boundary_cases:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="contains script patterns"):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(js, "desc")

    # Should NOT catch when part of a word (no boundary)
    valid_cases = [
        "myjavascript:function",  # Part of larger word
        "nojavascript:here",  # Part of larger word
    ]

    for valid in valid_cases:
        # These should pass through (though will be HTML escaped)
        result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(valid, "desc")
        assert "javascript:" in result.lower()  # Verify it wasn't blocked


@pytest.mark.skip(reason="test_sanitize_display_text_data_uri_enhanced not implemented")
def test_sanitize_display_text_data_uri_enhanced():
    """Test enhanced data URI detection."""
    # Should catch data URIs with script execution
    dangerous_data_uris = [
        " data:text/html;javascript",  # Space before to trigger boundary
        " data:text/html;base64,javascript",  # Space before
        " data:;javascript",  # Space before
        " data: text/html ; javascript",  # With spaces and boundary
        " data:text/html;vbscript",  # Space before
        " data: ; vbscript",  # Space before
    ]

    for uri in dangerous_data_uris:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="contains script patterns"):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(uri, "desc")

    # Should NOT catch legitimate data URIs without script execution
    valid_data_uris = [
        "",
        "data:text/plain;charset=utf-8,Hello%20World",
        "",
        "data:application/x-javascript",  # Without actual javascript/vbscript after semicolon
    ]

    for uri in valid_data_uris:
        result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(uri, "desc")
        assert "data:" in result  # Verify it wasn't blocked


def test_sanitize_display_text_event_handlers_precise():
    """Test precise event handler detection with word boundaries."""
    # Should catch actual event handlers (pure, without HTML tags)
    event_handlers = [
        " onclick=alert(1)",  # Space before to trigger boundary
        " onmouseover=alert(1)",
        " onload=doEvil()",
        " onerror=hack()",
    ]

    for handler in event_handlers:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="contains script patterns"):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(handler, "desc")

    # HTML-containing event handlers might be caught by either filter
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="contains (HTML tags|script patterns)"):
        SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text('<div onkeydown="steal()">', "desc")

    # Should NOT catch words that happen to start with 'on' when not preceded by boundary
    # Note: Some patterns like "once=", "only=", "online=" will be caught because they match \bon[a-z]+\s*=
    false_positive_cases = [
        "conditional=true",  # Should pass - doesn't start with 'on'
        "donation=100",  # Should pass - doesn't start with 'on'
        "honor=high",  # Should pass - doesn't start with 'on'
    ]

    for valid in false_positive_cases:
        result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(valid, "desc")
        assert valid.split("=")[0] in result  # Verify the word wasn't blocked


def test_sanitize_display_text_script_tag_variations():
    """Test script tag detection with whitespace variations."""
    # These will be caught by HTML pattern, not JS pattern
    script_variations = [
        "< script>alert(1)</script>",  # Space after <
        "<  script>alert(1)</script>",  # Multiple spaces
        "<\tscript>alert(1)</script>",  # Tab
        "<\nscript>alert(1)</script>",  # Newline
        "< \tscript>alert(1)</script>",  # Mixed whitespace
    ]

    for script in script_variations:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="contains HTML tags"):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(script, "desc")


@pytest.mark.skip(reason="test_sanitize_display_text_false_positives not implemented")
def test_sanitize_display_text_false_positives():
    """Test that legitimate content is not incorrectly blocked."""
    # The new pattern will catch some of these, so we need to adjust expectations
    legitimate_content = [
        # These should actually pass
        "Learn about JavaScript programming at our school",  # JavaScript (capital S) without colon
        "The conditional=false setting disables checks",
        "The function uses data: {name: 'value'} format",  # data: without javascript/vbscript
        "We accept donations online",
        "Check your internet connection if you're not online",
        "This is done only once per session",
    ]

    for content in legitimate_content:
        try:
            result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(content, "desc")
            # Should succeed and return escaped content
            assert result is not None
        except ValueError as e:
            pytest.fail(f"False positive - legitimate content blocked: '{content}' - Error: {e}")

    # These are expected to be caught due to the new pattern's boundary detection
    expected_catches = [
        " javascript: protocol is dangerous",  # Space before javascript:
        " online=true to enable",  # Space before online= matches pattern
        " data: text/html ; javascript",  # data: followed by javascript
        " onclick handlers can be risky",  # Space before onclick
        " once=true for single",  # Space before once=
        " only=false to disable",  # Space before only=
    ]

    for content in expected_catches:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="contains script patterns"):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(content, "desc")


# =============================================================================
# NAME VALIDATION TESTS
# =============================================================================


def test_validate_name_valid():
    """Test valid name patterns."""
    valid_names = [
        "ValidName",
        "Valid Name",  # Spaces allowed
        "Valid.Name",  # Dots allowed
        "Valid-Name",  # Hyphens allowed
        "Valid_Name",  # Underscores allowed
        "Name123",  # Numbers allowed
        "A",  # Single character
    ]

    for name in valid_names:
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_name(name, "Name") == name


def test_validate_name_invalid():
    """Test invalid name patterns."""
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="cannot be empty"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_name("", "Name")

    # Special characters not allowed - check for actual error message
    invalid_chars = ["Name!", "Name@", "Name#", "Name$", "Name%", "Name<>", "Name&"]
    for name in invalid_chars:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="can only contain letters, numbers"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_name(name, "Name")


def test_validate_name_rejects_control_characters():
    """EDGE-03: Control characters (\\n, \\t, \\r) must be rejected, not treated as whitespace."""
    control_char_names = [
        "test\nname",  # newline
        "test\tname",  # tab
        "test\rname",  # carriage return
        "test\x0bname",  # vertical tab
        "test\x0cname",  # form feed
    ]
    for name in control_char_names:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="can only contain letters, numbers"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_name(name, "Name")


def test_validate_name_length():
    """Test name length validation."""
    # At limit (100 chars)
    valid_name = "a" * 100
    assert SecurityValidator.validate_name(valid_name, "Name") == valid_name

    # Over limit (101 chars)
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="exceeds maximum length"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_name("a" * 101, "Name")


# =============================================================================
# IDENTIFIER VALIDATION TESTS
# =============================================================================


def test_validate_identifier_valid():
    """Test valid identifier patterns."""
    valid_ids = [
        "id123",
        "user_id",
        "user-id",
        "user.id",
        "UUID.123.456",
        "a",  # Single character
    ]

    for id_val in valid_ids:
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_identifier(id_val, "ID") == id_val


def test_validate_identifier_invalid():
    """Test invalid identifier patterns."""
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="cannot be empty"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_identifier("", "ID")

    # No spaces allowed in identifiers - check for actual error message
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="can only contain letters, numbers"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_identifier("id with space", "ID")

    # No special characters
    invalid_ids = ["id!", "id@", "id#", "id<>", "id&"]
    for id_val in invalid_ids:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="can only contain letters, numbers"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_identifier(id_val, "ID")


def test_validate_identifier_length():
    """Test identifier length validation."""
    # At limit
    valid_id = "a" * 100
    assert SecurityValidator.validate_identifier(valid_id, "ID") == valid_id

    # Over limit
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="exceeds maximum length"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_identifier("a" * 101, "ID")


# =============================================================================
# URI VALIDATION TESTS
# =============================================================================


def test_validate_uri_patterns():
    """Test URI validation patterns."""
    # URIs must match safe pattern
    valid_uri = "http://example.com/path"
    result = SecurityValidator.validate_uri(valid_uri, "URI")
    assert result == valid_uri

    # Empty URI
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="cannot be empty"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_uri("", "URI")

    # Path traversal - check for actual error message
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="cannot contain directory traversal"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_uri("../../../etc/passwd", "URI")

    # HTML in URI
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="cannot contain HTML"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_uri("path/<script>", "URI")

    # Invalid characters
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="contains invalid characters"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_uri("path|with|pipes", "URI")


# =============================================================================
# TOOL NAME VALIDATION TESTS
# =============================================================================


def test_validate_tool_name_valid():
    """Test valid tool name patterns."""
    valid_names = [
        "tool",
        "Tool",
        "tool_name",
        "tool-name",
        "tool.name",
        "toolName123",
        "t",  # Single character
    ]

    for name in valid_names:
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_tool_name(name) == name


def test_validate_tool_name_invalid():
    """Test invalid tool name patterns."""
    # Empty name
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="cannot be empty"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_tool_name("")

    # Names starting with hyphen are invalid (not in [a-zA-Z0-9_])
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="must start with a letter, number, or underscore"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_tool_name("-tool")

    # Tool name pattern doesn't match - contains invalid characters
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="must start with a letter, number, or underscore"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_tool_name("tool<name>")
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="must start with a letter, number, or underscore"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_tool_name('tool"name')


def test_validate_tool_name_valid_with_leading_underscore_or_number():
    """Test valid tool names starting with underscore or number (per MCP spec)."""
    # Names starting with underscore are valid (per MCP spec)
    assert SecurityValidator.validate_tool_name("_tool") == "_tool"
    assert SecurityValidator.validate_tool_name("_5gpt_query_by_market_id") == "_5gpt_query_by_market_id"

    # Names starting with number are valid (per MCP spec)
    assert SecurityValidator.validate_tool_name("1tool") == "1tool"
    assert SecurityValidator.validate_tool_name("5gpt_query") == "5gpt_query"


def test_validate_tool_name_length():
    """Test tool name length validation."""
    # At limit
    valid_name = "t" + "o" * 127  # 128 chars total, starts with letter
    assert SecurityValidator.validate_tool_name(valid_name) == valid_name

    # Over limit
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="exceeds MCP spec limit"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_tool_name("t" + "o" * 128)  # 129 chars


# =============================================================================
# TEMPLATE VALIDATION TESTS
# =============================================================================


def test_validate_template_valid():
    """Test valid template patterns."""
    valid_templates = [
        "Hello {{ name }}",  # Jinja2 variable
        "{% if condition %}Show this{% endif %}",  # Jinja2 control
        "Plain text template",
        "<div>{{ content }}</div>",  # HTML with Jinja2
        "",  # Empty template
    ]

    for template in valid_templates:
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_template(template) == template


def test_validate_template_dangerous():
    """Test detection of dangerous content in templates."""
    # Dangerous HTML tags
    dangerous_templates = [
        "<script>alert(1)</script>",
        "<iframe src='bad.com'></iframe>",
        "<form action='steal.php'>",
        "<embed src='bad.swf'>",
    ]

    for template in dangerous_templates:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="contains HTML tags"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_template(template)

    # Event handlers
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="contains event handlers"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_template("<div onclick='alert(1)'>")


def test_validate_template_length():
    """Test template length passes schema validation (size enforced at service layer)."""
    # At limit (10000 chars)
    valid_template = "a" * 10000
    assert SecurityValidator.validate_template(valid_template) == valid_template

    # Over limit - schema no longer rejects; size enforcement is at service layer
    over_limit = "a" * 10001
    assert SecurityValidator.validate_template(over_limit) == over_limit


# =============================================================================
# URL VALIDATION TESTS
# =============================================================================


def test_validate_url_valid():
    """Test valid URL patterns."""
    valid_urls = [
        "http://example.com",
        "https://example.com",
        "https://example.com/path",
        "https://example.com:8080/path?query=value",
        "ws://example.com/ws",
        "wss://example.com/ws",
    ]

    for url in valid_urls:
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL") == url


def test_validate_url_invalid_schemes():
    """Test URL validation with disallowed schemes."""
    invalid_schemes = [
        "ftp://example.com",  # FTP not allowed
        "file:///etc/passwd",  # File protocol dangerous
        "javascript:alert(1)",  # JavaScript protocol
        "vbscript:msgbox(1)",  # VBScript protocol
        "data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>",  # Data URI
        "about:blank",  # About protocol
        "chrome://settings",  # Chrome protocol
        "mailto:user@example.com",  # Mailto protocol
    ]

    for url in invalid_schemes:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="dangerous protocol|must start with"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL")


def test_validate_url_case_insensitive():
    """Test that dangerous protocols are caught regardless of case."""
    case_variations = [
        "JavaScript:alert(1)",
        "JAVASCRIPT:alert(1)",
        "JaVaScRiPt:alert(1)",
        "VBScript:msgbox(1)",
        "VBSCRIPT:msgbox(1)",
        "DATA:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>",
        "FiLe:///etc/passwd",
    ]

    for url in case_variations:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="dangerous protocol|must start with"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL")


def test_validate_url_structure():
    """Test URL structure validation."""
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="cannot be empty"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_url("", "URL")

    # Invalid URL structures
    invalid_urls = [
        "not-a-url",
        "http://",  # No host
        "://example.com",  # No scheme
        "http:/example.com",  # Missing slash
    ]

    for url in invalid_urls:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL")


def test_validate_url_length():
    """Test URL length validation."""
    # Create a URL at the limit (2048 chars)
    long_path = "a" * (2048 - len("https://example.com/"))
    valid_url = f"https://example.com/{long_path}"
    assert SecurityValidator.validate_url(valid_url, "URL") == valid_url

    # Over limit
    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="exceeds maximum length"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_url(valid_url + "a", "URL")


# =============================================================================
# JSON DEPTH VALIDATION TESTS
# =============================================================================


def test_validate_json_depth_valid():
    """Test JSON depth validation with valid objects."""
    # Depth 1
    obj1 = {"key": "value"}
    SecurityValidator.validate_json_depth(obj1)  # Should not raise

    # Depth 3 (at limit with default settings)
    obj3 = {"level1": {"level2": {"level3": "value"}}}
    SecurityValidator.validate_json_depth(obj3)  # Should not raise

    # Arrays count toward depth
    arr = [[[["deep"]]]]  # Depth 4 in arrays
    SecurityValidator.validate_json_depth(arr, max_depth=4)  # Should not raise


def test_validate_json_depth_exceeded():
    """Test JSON depth validation with objects exceeding max depth."""
    # Depth 6 (exceeds default limit of 5)
    deep_obj = {"l1": {"l2": {"l3": {"l4": {"l5": {"l6": "too deep"}}}}}}

    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="exceeds maximum depth"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_json_depth(deep_obj)

    # Should work with higher limit
    SecurityValidator.validate_json_depth(deep_obj, max_depth=6)


def test_validate_json_depth_mixed():
    """Test JSON depth with mixed arrays and objects."""
    mixed = {"array": [{"nested": [{"deep": "value"}]}]}
    # Depth is 4: dict -> array -> dict -> array -> dict
    SecurityValidator.validate_json_depth(mixed, max_depth=5)  # Should not raise

    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="exceeds maximum depth"):
        SecurityValidator.validate_json_depth(mixed, max_depth=3)


# =============================================================================
# PERFORMANCE AND EDGE CASE TESTS
# =============================================================================


@pytest.mark.parametrize(
    "test_input,should_fail",
    [
        # Legitimate content that should pass
        ("Learn JavaScript programming", False),
        ("The conditional=false setting", False),
        # TODO: Skip Use once=true for now
        # ("Use once=true", False),
        ("We accept donations online", False),
        # Dangerous content that should fail
        ("javascript:alert(1)", True),
        ("JAVASCRIPT:void(0)", True),
        ("<script>alert(1)</script>", True),
        (" onclick=hack()", True),  # Space before onclick
        # Edge cases that WILL be caught by new pattern
        ("The javascript: protocol is dangerous", True),  # Space before javascript:
        ("Set online=true", True),  # online= matches pattern
    ],
)
def test_sanitize_parametrized(test_input, should_fail):
    """Parametrized tests for various input patterns."""
    if should_fail:
        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(test_input, "test")
    else:
        result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(test_input, "test")
        assert result is not None


def test_pattern_performance():
    """Ensure regex patterns don't cause catastrophic backtracking."""
    # Standard
    import time

    # Create potentially problematic inputs
    test_cases = [
        "a" * 10000 + "javascript:" + "b" * 10000,  # Long string with pattern in middle
        "<" * 1000 + "script" + ">" * 1000,  # Repeated characters
        "on" * 5000 + "load=alert(1)",  # Repeated pattern prefix
    ]

    for test_input in test_cases:
        start = time.time()
        try:
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(test_input, "perf_test")
        except ValueError:
            pass  # Expected for dangerous content
        elapsed = time.time() - start

        # Should complete quickly (under 1 second even for pathological cases)
        assert elapsed < 1.0, f"Pattern took too long: {elapsed:.2f}s for input length {len(test_input)}"


def test_unicode_handling():
    """Test handling of unicode characters in validation."""
    unicode_tests = [
        "Hello 世界",  # Chinese characters
        "Привет мир",  # Cyrillic
        "مرحبا بالعالم",  # Arabic
        "🚀 Emoji test 🎉",  # Emojis
    ]

    for text in unicode_tests:
        # Should handle unicode gracefully
        result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(text, "unicode_test")
        assert result is not None

        # Name validation might be more restrictive
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="can only contain"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_name(text, "Name")


@pytest.mark.skip(reason="test_null_byte_injection not implemented")
def test_null_byte_injection():
    """Test handling of null byte injection attempts."""
    null_tests = [
        "javascript:\x00alert(1)",  # Null byte in middle
        "java\x00script:alert(1)",  # Null byte breaking keyword
        "<scr\x00ipt>alert(1)</script>",  # Null in tag
    ]

    for test in null_tests:
        # Should still catch these as dangerous
        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(test, "null_test")


# =============================================================================
# SPECIAL CASES FOR NEW PATTERN
# =============================================================================


def test_new_pattern_special_cases():
    """Test special cases specific to the new enhanced pattern."""
    # Test that the pattern requires boundaries
    assert SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text("myjavascript:test", "desc")  # Should pass
    assert SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text("conditional=true", "desc")  # Should pass

    # Test case insensitivity
    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
        SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text("JAVASCRIPT:test", "desc")

    # Test data URI specifics
    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
        SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text("data:;javascript", "desc")

    # Test that legitimate data URIs pass
    assert SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text("", "desc")


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: validate_no_xss                                                    #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestValidateNoXss:
    """Tests for validate_no_xss (lines 1266-1270)."""

    def test_empty_string(self):
        SecurityValidator.validate_no_xss("", "test")  # Should not raise

    def test_none_value(self):
        SecurityValidator.validate_no_xss(None, "test")  # Should not raise

    def test_safe_text(self):
        SecurityValidator.validate_no_xss("Hello World", "test")  # Should not raise

    def test_html_script_tag(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="HTML tags"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_no_xss("<script>alert(1)</script>", "test")

    def test_html_iframe_tag(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="HTML tags"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_no_xss("<iframe src='evil'></iframe>", "test")


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: validate_mime_type                                                 #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestValidateMimeType:
    """Tests for validate_mime_type (lines 1454-1469)."""

    def test_empty_string(self):
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_mime_type("") == ""

    def test_valid_standard_types(self):
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_mime_type("text/plain") == "text/plain"
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_mime_type("application/json") == "application/json"
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_mime_type("image/jpeg") == "image/jpeg"

    def test_invalid_format(self):
        allowed_mime_types = DummySettings.validation_allowed_mime_types
        invalid_mime_types = [
            "invalid",
            *(f"{mime_type};param" for mime_type in allowed_mime_types),
            *(f"{mime_type}; charset" for mime_type in allowed_mime_types),
            *(f"{mime_type.split('/', 1)[0]}/" for mime_type in allowed_mime_types if "/" in mime_type),
        ]
        for mime_type in invalid_mime_types:
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid MIME type"):
                SecurityValidator.validate_mime_type(mime_type)

    def test_vendor_types_allowed(self):
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_mime_type("application/x-custom") == "application/x-custom"
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_mime_type("text/x-log") == "text/x-log"

    def test_plus_suffix_allowed(self):
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_mime_type("application/vnd.api+json") == "application/vnd.api+json"
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_mime_type("image/svg+xml") == "image/svg+xml"

    def test_parameterized_types_allowed(self):
        allowed_parameterized_types = [
            "text/plain; charset=utf-8",
            "application/json; charset=utf-8",
            "text/html; profile=interactive-app",
        ]
        for mime_type in allowed_parameterized_types:
            assert SecurityValidator.validate_mime_type(mime_type) == mime_type

    def test_not_in_whitelist(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not in the allowed list"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_mime_type("application/evil")
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not in the allowed list"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_mime_type("application/evil; charset=utf-8")


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: validate_shell_parameter                                           #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestValidateShellParameter:
    """Tests for validate_shell_parameter (lines 1490-1502)."""

    def test_non_string(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="must be string"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_shell_parameter(123)

    def test_safe_value(self):
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_shell_parameter("safe_param") == "safe_param"

    def test_dangerous_strict(self):
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings") as mock_s:
            mock_s.validation_strict = True
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="shell metacharacters"):
                SecurityValidator.validate_shell_parameter("test; rm -rf /")

    def test_dangerous_non_strict(self):
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings") as mock_s:
            mock_s.validation_strict = False
            result = SecurityValidator.validate_shell_parameter("test; rm")
            # shlex.quote wraps in single quotes
            assert result.startswith("'")


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: validate_path                                                      #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestValidatePath:
    """Tests for validate_path (lines 1524-1547)."""

    def test_non_string(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="must be string"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_path(123)

    def test_uri_scheme_passthrough(self):
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_path("http://example.com/file") == "http://example.com/file"
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_path("plugin://some/path") == "plugin://some/path"

    def test_traversal_detected(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Path traversal"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_path("../../../etc/passwd")

    def test_allowed_roots_denied(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="outside allowed roots"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_path("/tmp/file", allowed_roots=["/nonexistent/root"])

    def test_valid_path(self):
        result = SecurityValidator.validate_path("/tmp")
        assert result  # Returns resolved path


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: validate_sql_parameter                                             #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestValidateSqlParameter:
    """Tests for validate_sql_parameter (lines 1568-1579)."""

    def test_non_string_passthrough(self):
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_sql_parameter(123) == 123

    def test_safe_value(self):
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_sql_parameter("safe_value") == "safe_value"

    def test_injection_strict(self):
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings") as mock_s:
            mock_s.validation_strict = True
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="SQL injection"):
                SecurityValidator.validate_sql_parameter("'; DROP TABLE users--")

    def test_injection_non_strict(self):
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings") as mock_s:
            mock_s.validation_strict = False
            result = SecurityValidator.validate_sql_parameter("test' OR '1'='1")
            assert "''" in result  # Single quotes escaped


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: validate_parameter_length                                          #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestValidateParameterLength:
    """Tests for validate_parameter_length (lines 1599-1602)."""

    def test_within_limit(self):
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_parameter_length("short", 10) == "short"

    def test_exceeds_limit(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="exceeds maximum length"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_parameter_length("a" * 100, max_length=10)

    def test_default_limit(self):
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_parameter_length("test") == "test"


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: sanitize_text                                                      #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestSanitizeText:
    """Tests for sanitize_text (lines 1620-1627)."""

    def test_non_string_passthrough(self):
        assert SecurityValidator.sanitize_text(123) == 123

    def test_ansi_removal(self):
        result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_text("\x1b[31mRed\x1b[0m Text")
        assert "\x1b" not in result
        assert "Red" in result

    def test_control_char_removal(self):
        result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_text("Text\x00with\x01control")
        assert "\x00" not in result
        assert "\x01" not in result

    def test_clean_text(self):
        assert SecurityValidator.sanitize_text("Clean text") == "Clean text"


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: sanitize_json_response                                             #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestSanitizeJsonResponse:
    """Tests for sanitize_json_response (lines 1647-1653)."""

    def test_string(self):
        result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_json_response("text\x1b[31m")
        assert "\x1b" not in result

    def test_dict(self):
        data = {"key": "val\x00ue", "nested": {"k": "v\x01"}}
        result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_json_response(data)
        assert "\x00" not in result["key"]
        assert "\x01" not in result["nested"]["k"]

    def test_list(self):
        data = ["item\x00", "item\x1b[31m"]
        result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_json_response(data)
        assert "\x00" not in result[0]
        assert "\x1b" not in result[1]

    def test_primitives(self):
        assert SecurityValidator.sanitize_json_response(123) == 123
        assert SecurityValidator.sanitize_json_response(None) is None
        assert SecurityValidator.sanitize_json_response(True) is True


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: _iter_template_expressions edge cases                              #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestIterTemplateExpressions:
    """Tests for _iter_template_expressions backslash/quote/unterminated paths."""

    def test_unterminated_expression(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="potentially dangerous"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_template("{{ unclosed")

    def test_escaped_chars_in_expression(self):
        """Template with escaped backslash inside expression."""
        result = SecurityValidator.validate_template("{{ 'test' }}")
        assert result == "{{ 'test' }}"

    def test_double_quoted_expression(self):
        result = SecurityValidator.validate_template('{{ "hello" }}')
        assert result == '{{ "hello" }}'


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: validate_template SSTI branches                                    #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestValidateTemplateSsti:
    """Tests for SSTI detection in validate_template (lines 802-818)."""

    def test_ssti_dangerous_substring_in_expression(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="potentially dangerous"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_template("{{ config }}")

    def test_ssti_dangerous_substring_import(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="potentially dangerous"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_template("{{ __import__('os') }}")

    def test_ssti_dangerous_operator_bracket(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="potentially dangerous"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_template("{{ foo[bar] }}")

    def test_ssti_in_block_tag(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="potentially dangerous"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_template("{% set x = __class__ %}")

    def test_ssti_dangerous_operator_in_block_tag(self):
        """Operators like '+' in {% %} blocks should be rejected (line 815)."""
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="potentially dangerous"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_template("{% set x = 1 + 1 %}")

    def test_ssti_simple_template_dollar(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="potentially dangerous"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_template("${evil}")

    def test_ssti_simple_template_hash(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="potentially dangerous"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_template("#{expression}")


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: validate_url additional security branches                          #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestValidateUrlSecurity:
    """Tests for uncovered URL validation branches (lines 1011-1070)."""

    def test_ipv6_blocked(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="IPv6"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url("https://[::1]/path")

    def test_crlf_injection(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="control characters"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url("https://example.com/\r\nHost: evil.com")

    def test_space_in_domain(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="spaces"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url("https://exam ple.com/")

    def test_zero_address(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="0.0.0.0"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url("https://0.0.0.0/")

    def test_credentials_in_url(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="credentials"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url("https://user:pass@example.com/")

    def test_html_in_url(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="HTML tags"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url("https://example.com/<script>")

    def test_js_in_url_query(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url("https://example.com?x=javascript:alert(1)")

    def test_dangerous_data_protocol_in_url(self):
        """data: protocol patterns in URL (line 1011)."""
        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url("https://example.com?r=data:text/html,<script>")

    def test_protocol_relative_url_blocked_even_if_allowed_schemes_misconfigured(self, monkeypatch):
        """Protocol-relative URLs must be blocked even if // is (incorrectly) whitelisted (line 1019)."""
        monkeypatch.setattr(SecurityValidator, "ALLOWED_URL_SCHEMES", ["//", "http://", "https://", "ws://", "wss://"])
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="protocol-relative"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url("//example.com", "URL")

    def test_ipv6_double_check_netloc_brackets(self):
        """Defensive netloc bracket check after urlparse (line 1037)."""
        from types import SimpleNamespace

        stub = SimpleNamespace(scheme="https", netloc="[::1]", path="", hostname=None, port=None, username=None, password=None)
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.urlparse", return_value=stub):
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="IPv6"):
                SecurityValidator.validate_url("https://example.com", "URL")

    def test_ssrf_skipped_when_disabled(self, monkeypatch):
        """SSRF protection can be disabled via settings (branch 1047->1051)."""
        import mcpgateway.common.validators as validators

        monkeypatch.setattr(validators.settings, "ssrf_protection_enabled", False)
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_url("https://example.com", "URL") == "https://example.com"

    def test_script_patterns_in_url(self, monkeypatch):
        """Script patterns (non-protocol) should be blocked (line 1064)."""
        import mcpgateway.common.validators as validators

        monkeypatch.setattr(validators.settings, "ssrf_protection_enabled", False)
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="script patterns"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url("https://example.com/?q=onload=alert(1)", "URL")

    def test_urlparse_exception_raises_valueerror(self, monkeypatch):
        """Non-ValueError exceptions are converted to a generic validation error (lines 1069-1070)."""
        import mcpgateway.common.validators as validators

        monkeypatch.setattr(validators.settings, "ssrf_protection_enabled", False)
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.urlparse", side_effect=RuntimeError("boom")):
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not a valid URL"):
                SecurityValidator.validate_url("https://example.com", "URL")

    def test_hostname_missing_still_runs_port_validation(self, monkeypatch):
        """Cover hostname=None branch (1041->1051) without accepting an invalid port."""
        import mcpgateway.common.validators as validators

        monkeypatch.setattr(validators.settings, "ssrf_protection_enabled", False)
        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url("http://:99999", "URL")


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: percent-encoded injection vectors for validate_url (PR #4335)      #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestValidateUrlPercentEncoding:
    """Regression tests that encoded injection payloads cannot bypass validate_url."""

    @pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
    def _disable_ssrf(self, monkeypatch):
        """SSRF tests live in TestValidateSsrf; here we focus on pattern bypass."""
        import mcpgateway.common.validators as validators

        monkeypatch.setattr(validators.settings, "ssrf_protection_enabled", False)

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "url,match",
        [
            ("https://example.com/%0d%0aHost:evil.com", "control characters"),
            ("https://example.com/%0D%0AHost:evil.com", "control characters"),
            ("https://example.com/%0a", "control characters"),
            ("https://example.com/%0d", "control characters"),
        ],
    )
    def test_encoded_crlf_blocked(self, url, match):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match=match):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "url",
        [
            "https://example.com/%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E",
            "https://example.com/%3cscript%3ealert(1)%3c/script%3e",
            "https://example.com/%3Ciframe%20src=x%3E",
        ],
    )
    def test_encoded_html_tags_blocked(self, url):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="HTML tags"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "url",
        [
            "https://example.com/?x=javascript%3Aalert(1)",
            "https://example.com/?x=JAVASCRIPT%3Aalert(1)",
            "https://example.com/?x=vbscript%3Amsgbox(1)",
            "https://example.com/?x=data%3Atext/html,<script>",
        ],
    )
    def test_encoded_dangerous_protocols_blocked(self, url):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="unsupported or potentially dangerous protocol"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "url",
        [
            "https://%5B%3A%3A1%5D:8080/",
            "https://%5B::1%5D:8080/",
        ],
    )
    def test_encoded_ipv6_brackets_blocked(self, url):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="IPv6"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL")

    def test_encoded_space_in_authority_blocked(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="spaces"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url("https://exam%20ple.com/", "URL")

    def test_encoded_tab_in_authority_blocked(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="control characters"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url("https://example%09.com/", "URL")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "url",
        [
            "https://example.com/%253Cscript%253E",
            "https://example.com/%250d%250aHost:evil.com",
            "https://example.com/%2520",
        ],
    )
    def test_double_encoded_payloads_blocked(self, url):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="double-encoded"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "url",
        [
            "https://example.com/%u003cscript%u003e",
            "https://example.com/%U003C",
        ],
    )
    def test_iis_unicode_escapes_blocked(self, url):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="%u-style escapes"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "url",
        [
            "https://example.com/%5Cu003cscript%5Cu003e",
            "https://example.com/%5Cx3c",
            "https://example.com/path\\u003cscript",
        ],
    )
    def test_js_unicode_escape_blocked(self, url):
        """JS-style `\\uXXXX` / `\\xXX` escapes must be rejected."""
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="JavaScript-style escape sequences"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "url",
        [
            "https://example.com/%C0%BC",
            "https://example.com/%c0%bcscript",
            "https://example.com/%ED%A0%80",
        ],
    )
    def test_utf8_overlong_or_invalid_rejected(self, url):
        """Invalid UTF-8 / overlong sequences produce U+FFFD and are rejected."""
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="invalid UTF-8"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "url",
        [
            "https://example.com/hello%20world",
            "https://example.com/?q=hello%20world",
            "https://example.com/foo%2Fbar",
            "https://example.com/caf%C3%A9",
            "https://example.com/%2B",
        ],
    )
    def test_legitimate_encoded_characters_accepted(self, url):
        """Regression: `%20` and other legitimate encodings in path/query must pass."""
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL") == url

    def test_encoded_loopback_blocked_with_ssrf(self):
        """Encoded `127.0.0.1` in hostname must be caught by SSRF once enabled."""
        ssrf_settings = MagicMock()
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_protection_enabled = True
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_blocked_networks = []
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_blocked_hosts = []
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_allow_localhost = False
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_allow_private_networks = False
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_allowed_networks = []
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_dns_fail_closed = True
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings", ssrf_settings):
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="localhost|SSRF"):
                SecurityValidator.validate_url("http://%31%32%37%2E%30%2E%30%2E%31/", "URL")


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: percent-encoded bypass prevention on adjacent validators           #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestAdjacentValidatorPercentEncoding:
    """Ensure percent-encoded payloads cannot bypass validate_no_xss / validate_uri / sanitize_display_text."""

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "payload",
        [
            "%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E",
            "%3Ciframe%20src=x%3E",
            "%3Cimg%20onerror=x%3E",
        ],
    )
    def test_validate_no_xss_blocks_encoded_html(self, payload):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="HTML tags"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_no_xss(payload, "field")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "payload",
        [
            "foo/%2E%2E/bar",
            "foo/%2e%2e/bar",
            "/%2E%2E/etc/passwd",
        ],
    )
    def test_validate_uri_blocks_encoded_traversal(self, payload):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="directory traversal"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_uri(payload, "URI")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "payload",
        [
            "%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E",
            "%3Ciframe%20src=evil%3E",
        ],
    )
    def test_sanitize_display_text_blocks_encoded_html(self, payload):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="HTML tags"):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(payload, "field")

    def test_sanitize_display_text_blocks_encoded_js_protocol(self):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="script patterns"):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text("javascript%3Aalert(1)", "field")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "payload",
        [
            "foo/%252E%252E/bar",
            "%252E%252E%252Fetc%252Fpasswd",
        ],
    )
    def test_validate_uri_blocks_double_encoded_traversal(self, payload):
        """Double-encoded `%2E%2E` must not slip past validate_uri."""
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="double-encoded"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_uri(payload, "URI")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "payload",
        [
            "%253Cscript%253Ealert(1)%253C/script%253E",
            "%253Cimg%2520onerror%253Dx%253E",
        ],
    )
    def test_validate_no_xss_blocks_double_encoded_html(self, payload):
        """Double-encoded `%3Cscript%3E` must not slip past validate_no_xss."""
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="double-encoded"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_no_xss(payload, "field")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "payload",
        [
            "%253Cscript%253Ealert(1)%253C/script%253E",
            "javascript%253Aalert(1)",
        ],
    )
    def test_sanitize_display_text_blocks_double_encoded(self, payload):
        """Double-encoded HTML/script must not slip past sanitize_display_text."""
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="double-encoded"):
            SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(payload, "field")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "payload",
        [
            "%2527 OR 1=1",
            "admin%253B DROP TABLE users",
            "1%252D%252D",
        ],
    )
    def test_validate_sql_parameter_blocks_double_encoded(self, payload):
        """Double-encoded SQL metacharacters must not slip past validate_sql_parameter."""
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="double-encoded"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_sql_parameter(payload)

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "payload",
        [
            "javascript%3Aalert(1)",
            "vbscript%3Amsgbox(1)",
            "click%20onload%3Dalert(1)",
        ],
    )
    def test_validate_no_xss_blocks_encoded_js_protocol(self, payload):
        """validate_no_xss now also rejects encoded JavaScript protocol patterns."""
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="script patterns|HTML tags"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_no_xss(payload, "field")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "payload",
        [
            "%27 OR 1=1",
            "%27%3B DROP TABLE users",
            "1%2D%2D",
            "admin%3B",
            "%2F%2A evil %2A%2F",
        ],
    )
    def test_validate_sql_parameter_blocks_encoded(self, payload):
        """Percent-encoded SQL injection tokens must not bypass validate_sql_parameter."""
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="SQL injection"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_sql_parameter(payload)

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "safe",
        [
            "plain_param",
            "user@example.com",
            "12345",
        ],
    )
    def test_validate_sql_parameter_accepts_safe_values(self, safe):
        """Regression: safe parameters still pass."""
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_sql_parameter(safe) == safe


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: _validate_ssrf branches                                            #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestValidateSsrf:
    """Tests for _validate_ssrf (lines 1130-1189)."""

    @pytest.fixture
    def ssrf_settings(self):
        s = MagicMock()
        s.ssrf_protection_enabled = True
        s.ssrf_blocked_networks = ["169.254.169.254/32"]
        s.ssrf_blocked_hosts = ["metadata.google.internal"]
        s.ssrf_allow_localhost = False
        s.ssrf_allow_private_networks = False
        s.ssrf_allowed_networks = []
        s.ssrf_dns_fail_closed = True
        return s

    def test_blocked_hostname(self, ssrf_settings):
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings", ssrf_settings):
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="blocked hostname"):
                SecurityValidator._validate_ssrf("metadata.google.internal", "URL")

    def test_blocked_network(self, ssrf_settings):
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings", ssrf_settings):
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="blocked by SSRF"):
                SecurityValidator._validate_ssrf("169.254.169.254", "URL")

    def test_localhost_blocked(self, ssrf_settings):
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings", ssrf_settings):
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="localhost"):
                SecurityValidator._validate_ssrf("127.0.0.1", "URL")

    def test_private_network_blocked(self, ssrf_settings):
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings", ssrf_settings):
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private network"):
                SecurityValidator._validate_ssrf("10.1.2.3", "URL")

    def test_private_network_allowed_when_in_allowlist(self, ssrf_settings):
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_allowed_networks = ["10.1.0.0/16"]
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings", ssrf_settings):
            SecurityValidator._validate_ssrf("10.1.2.3", "URL")  # Should not raise

    def test_dns_fail_closed(self, ssrf_settings):
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings", ssrf_settings):
            with patch("socket.getaddrinfo", side_effect=socket.gaierror):
                with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="DNS resolution failed"):
                    SecurityValidator._validate_ssrf("nonexistent.example.invalid", "URL")

    def test_public_ip_allowed(self, ssrf_settings):
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_allow_localhost = True
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_allow_private_networks = True
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings", ssrf_settings):
            SecurityValidator._validate_ssrf("8.8.8.8", "URL")  # Should not raise

    def test_invalid_cidr_logged(self, ssrf_settings):
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_blocked_networks = ["invalid-cidr"]
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_allow_localhost = True
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_allow_private_networks = True
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings", ssrf_settings):
            SecurityValidator._validate_ssrf("8.8.8.8", "URL")  # Should not raise

    def test_invalid_allowlist_cidr_logged(self, ssrf_settings):
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_allowed_networks = ["invalid-cidr"]
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings", ssrf_settings):
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private network"):
                SecurityValidator._validate_ssrf("10.1.2.3", "URL")

    def test_no_resolved_addresses_fail_closed(self, ssrf_settings):
        """DNS resolves but returns no valid addresses."""
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings", ssrf_settings):
            with patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=[]):
                with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="no addresses"):
                    SecurityValidator._validate_ssrf("weird.host.example", "URL")

    def test_invalid_dns_address_fail_open(self, ssrf_settings):
        """DNS returns unparseable addresses: skip invalid entries and fail-open if configured (lines 1153-1165)."""
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_dns_fail_closed = False
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_allow_localhost = True
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_allow_private_networks = True

        bad_addrinfo = [
            (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("not-an-ip", 0)),
        ]
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings", ssrf_settings):
            with patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=bad_addrinfo):
                SecurityValidator._validate_ssrf("weird.host.example", "URL")  # Should not raise

    def test_private_network_check_skips_loopback(self, ssrf_settings):
        """When localhost allowed but private networks blocked, loopback should not trip the private-range check (branch 1188->1168)."""
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_allow_localhost = True
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_allow_private_networks = False
        ssrf_settings.ssrf_dns_fail_closed = True
        with patch("mcpgateway.common.validators.settings", ssrf_settings):
            SecurityValidator._validate_ssrf("127.0.0.1", "URL")  # Should not raise


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: A-G helpers (_unquote_if_needed, _parse_ip_network_cached)        #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestUrlHardeningHelpers:
    """Verify the module-level helpers added by the A-G hardening refactor."""

    def test_unquote_if_needed_returns_identity_for_no_percent(self):
        """No `%` → helper returns the same object (enables `is not` short-circuit)."""
        from mcpgateway.common.validators import _unquote_if_needed

        s = "https://example.com/path/no/percent"
        result = _unquote_if_needed(s)
        assert result is s, "no-% path must return same object identity"

    def test_unquote_if_needed_decodes_when_percent_present(self):
        """With `%` → helper returns a new decoded string."""
        from mcpgateway.common.validators import _unquote_if_needed

        s = "https://example.com/hello%20world"
        result = _unquote_if_needed(s)
        assert result is not s
        assert result == "https://example.com/hello world"

    def test_parse_ip_network_cached_reuses_cache(self):
        """Second call with the same CIDR must be a cache hit."""
        from mcpgateway.common.validators import _parse_ip_network_cached

        _parse_ip_network_cached.cache_clear()
        first = _parse_ip_network_cached("10.0.0.0/8")
        info_after_first = _parse_ip_network_cached.cache_info()
        second = _parse_ip_network_cached("10.0.0.0/8")
        info_after_second = _parse_ip_network_cached.cache_info()

        assert first is second, "same CIDR must return same cached network object"
        assert info_after_first.misses == 1
        assert info_after_second.hits == info_after_first.hits + 1

    def test_parse_ip_network_cached_raises_for_invalid_cidr_every_call(self):
        """Invalid CIDRs re-raise on every call (lru_cache does not cache exceptions)."""
        import pytest as _pytest

        from mcpgateway.common.validators import _parse_ip_network_cached

        _parse_ip_network_cached.cache_clear()
        for _ in range(3):
            with _pytest.raises(ValueError):
                _parse_ip_network_cached("not-a-cidr")

    def test_decode_strict_rejects_double_encoded(self):
        """_decode_strict must raise on double-encoded payloads."""
        import pytest as _pytest

        from mcpgateway.common.validators import _decode_strict

        with _pytest.raises(ValueError, match="double-encoded"):
            _decode_strict("%253Cscript%253E", "field")

    def test_decode_strict_passes_through_clean_input(self):
        """_decode_strict returns same-identity object for no-% input."""
        from mcpgateway.common.validators import _decode_strict

        s = "https://example.com/clean"
        assert _decode_strict(s, "field") is s


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: C0 control character rejection in validate_url                     #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestValidateUrlControlCharacters:
    """Verify that C0 controls and DEL are rejected in decoded URLs."""

    @pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
    def _disable_ssrf(self, monkeypatch):
        import mcpgateway.common.validators as validators

        monkeypatch.setattr(validators.settings, "ssrf_protection_enabled", False)

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "url",
        [
            "https://example.com/%00",
            "https://example.com/%09path",
            "https://example.com/%0b",
            "https://example.com/%0c",
            "https://example.com/%7f",
            "https://example.com/%01%02%03",
        ],
    )
    def test_encoded_c0_controls_blocked(self, url):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="control characters"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "url",
        [
            "https://example.com/%20path",
            "https://example.com/caf%C3%A9",
            "https://example.com/%2B",
        ],
    )
    def test_legitimate_encodings_still_accepted(self, url):
        assert SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL") == url


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: C0 control character rejection in validate_uri                     #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestValidateUriControlCharacters:
    """Verify that C0 controls are rejected in decoded URIs."""

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "uri",
        [
            "resource/%00name",
            "resource/%09tab",
            "resource/%0bvtab",
            "resource/%7fdelchar",
        ],
    )
    def test_encoded_c0_controls_blocked_in_uri(self, uri):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="control characters"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_uri(uri, "URI")


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: %25uXXXX bypass regression (double-encoded IIS escapes)           #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestDoubleEncodedIisEscapes:
    """Verify %25uXXXX decodes to %uXXXX and is still rejected."""

    @pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
    def _disable_ssrf(self, monkeypatch):
        import mcpgateway.common.validators as validators

        monkeypatch.setattr(validators.settings, "ssrf_protection_enabled", False)

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "url",
        [
            "https://example.com/%25u003cscript%25u003e",
            "https://example.com/%25U003C",
            "https://example.com/%25u0022",
        ],
    )
    def test_double_encoded_iis_escapes_blocked(self, url):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="%u-style escapes"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_url(url, "URL")


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Coverage: JS-pattern false-positive awareness on free text                   #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class TestJsPatternFalsePositiveAwareness:
    """Document expected behavior of DANGEROUS_JS_PATTERN on free text.

    These tests make the strictness policy explicit: event-handler-like patterns
    in display text ARE rejected by validate_no_xss / sanitize_display_text.
    If this policy changes, update these expectations.
    """

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "safe_text",
        [
            "Meeting is oncall rotation",
            "Turn on the lights",
            "Python onclick handler docs",
            "condition: true",
            "user@example.com",
        ],
    )
    def test_freetext_without_equals_accepted_by_validate_no_xss(self, safe_text):
        SecurityValidator.validate_no_xss(safe_text, "field")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "text",
        [
            "oncall=1",
            "onclick=alert(1)",
            "onload=evil()",
        ],
    )
    def test_event_handler_like_patterns_rejected_by_validate_no_xss(self, text):
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="script patterns"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_no_xss(text, "field")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "safe_text",
        [
            "plain text",
            "user@example.com",
            "12345",
            "hello world with spaces",
        ],
    )
    def test_freetext_accepted_by_sanitize_display_text(self, safe_text):
        result = SecurityValidator.sanitize_display_text(safe_text, "field")
        assert result == safe_text


class TestGatewayTestUrlValidation:
    """Test suite for gateway test endpoint URL validation (security issue ICA_ContextForgeICACF-14).

    This test class validates the security fixes for the /admin/gateways/test endpoint,
    which previously allowed arbitrary URLs and could be used as an open proxy.

    The tests verify:
    - Allowlist enforcement for approved hosts
    - FQDN normalization (trailing dot bypass prevention)
    - Private IP blocking (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local)
    - DNS rebinding protection
    - Generic error messages (no internal detail leakage)
    """

    @pytest.fixture
    def mock_dns_public(self):
        """Mock DNS resolution to return a public IP address."""
        with patch("socket.getaddrinfo") as mock_getaddrinfo:
            # Simulate DNS returning a public IP (8.8.8.8)
            mock_getaddrinfo.return_value = [
                (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("8.8.8.8", 443))
            ]
            yield mock_getaddrinfo

    @pytest.fixture
    def mock_dns_private(self):
        """Mock DNS resolution to return a private IP address."""
        with patch("socket.getaddrinfo") as mock_getaddrinfo:
            # Simulate DNS returning a private IP (192.168.1.1)
            mock_getaddrinfo.return_value = [
                (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", ("192.168.1.1", 443))
            ]
            yield mock_getaddrinfo

    def test_trailing_dot_fqdn_bypass_rejected(self, mock_dns_public):
        """Test that trailing dot FQDN bypass is rejected (AC #5).

        A trailing dot (evil.com.) is valid DNS FQDN notation but can bypass
        naive allowlist checks. The validator must normalize before checking.
        """
        allowed_hosts = ["trusted.com"]
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
                "https://evil.com./bypass",
                allowed_hosts,
                "Gateway URL"
            )

    def test_trailing_dot_fqdn_normalized_and_allowed(self, mock_dns_public):
        """Test that trailing dots are normalized for legitimate hosts."""
        allowed_hosts = ["trusted.com"]
        # trusted.com. should be normalized to trusted.com and allowed
        result = SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
            "https://trusted.com./path",
            allowed_hosts,
            "Gateway URL"
        )
        assert result == "https://trusted.com./path"

    def test_private_ip_blocked_unconditionally(self):
        """Test that private IPs are blocked even if in allowlist (AC #3)."""
        # RFC 1918 private ranges
        private_ips = [
            "https://192.168.1.1/",
            "https://10.0.0.1/",
            "https://172.16.0.1/",
        ]
        # Even if we explicitly allow them, they should be blocked
        allowed_hosts = ["192.168.1.1", "10.0.0.1", "172.16.0.1"]

        for url in private_ips:
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
                SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(url, allowed_hosts, "Gateway URL")

    def test_loopback_blocked_unconditionally(self):
        """Test that loopback addresses are blocked unconditionally (AC #3)."""
        loopback_urls = [
            "https://127.0.0.1/",
            "https://127.0.0.2/",
            "https://localhost/",
        ]
        # Even if we explicitly allow them, they should be blocked
        allowed_hosts = ["127.0.0.1", "localhost"]

        for url in loopback_urls:
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
                SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(url, allowed_hosts, "Gateway URL")

    def test_link_local_blocked_unconditionally(self):
        """Test that link-local addresses are blocked unconditionally (AC #3)."""
        # Link-local range (169.254.0.0/16) - commonly used for cloud metadata
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
                "https://169.254.169.254/",
                ["169.254.169.254"],
                "Gateway URL"
            )

    def test_dns_rebinding_attack_blocked(self, mock_dns_private):
        """Test that DNS rebinding attacks are blocked.

        An attacker might register a domain that resolves to a public IP initially
        but later resolves to a private IP. The validator must check resolved IPs.
        """
        allowed_hosts = ["evil-rebinding.com"]
        # evil-rebinding.com is in allowlist, but DNS returns private IP
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
                "https://evil-rebinding.com/",
                allowed_hosts,
                "Gateway URL"
            )

    def test_exact_hostname_match_allowed(self, mock_dns_public):
        """Test that exact hostname matches are allowed."""
        allowed_hosts = ["api.example.com"]
        result = SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
            "https://api.example.com/test",
            allowed_hosts,
            "Gateway URL"
        )
        assert result == "https://api.example.com/test"

    def test_wildcard_subdomain_match_allowed(self, mock_dns_public):
        """Test that wildcard subdomain patterns work correctly."""
        allowed_hosts = ["*.example.com"]

        # Should match subdomains
        result = SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
            "https://api.example.com/test",
            allowed_hosts,
            "Gateway URL"
        )
        assert result == "https://api.example.com/test"

        result = SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
            "https://api.v2.example.com/test",
            allowed_hosts,
            "Gateway URL"
        )
        assert result == "https://api.v2.example.com/test"

        # Should NOT match the base domain itself (only subdomains)
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
                "https://example.com/test",
                allowed_hosts,
                "Gateway URL"
            )

    def test_wildcard_does_not_match_different_domain(self, mock_dns_public):
        """Test that wildcard patterns don't match unrelated domains."""
        allowed_hosts = ["*.example.com"]
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
                "https://evil.com/test",
                allowed_hosts,
                "Gateway URL"
            )

    def test_empty_allowlist_rejects_all(self, mock_dns_public):
        """Test that empty allowlist rejects all URLs (AC #1)."""
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
                "https://example.com/",
                [],
                "Gateway URL"
            )

    def test_generic_error_message_no_detail_leakage(self):
        """Test that error messages don't expose internal validation details (AC #4)."""
        allowed_hosts = ["trusted.com"]

        # Test various rejection scenarios - all should return generic messages
        test_cases = [
            "https://evil.com/",  # Not in allowlist
            "https://192.168.1.1/",  # Private IP
            "https://127.0.0.1/",  # Loopback
        ]

        for url in test_cases:
            try:
                SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(url, allowed_hosts, "Gateway URL")
                pytest.fail(f"Expected ValueError for {url}")
            except ValueError as e:
                error_msg = str(e)
                # Error message should be generic
                assert "Gateway URL" in error_msg
                # Should NOT contain internal details
                assert "not allowed" in error_msg.lower()
                # Should NOT expose specific validation failure reasons in detail
                assert "private" not in error_msg.lower()
                assert "loopback" not in error_msg.lower()

    def test_case_insensitive_hostname_matching(self, mock_dns_public):
        """Test that hostname matching is case-insensitive."""
        allowed_hosts = ["Example.COM"]
        result = SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
            "https://example.com/test",
            allowed_hosts,
            "Gateway URL"
        )
        assert result == "https://example.com/test"

    def test_prevents_oob_callback_to_external_collaborator(self, mock_dns_public):
        """Test that out-of-band callbacks to external collaborators are blocked (AC #6).

        This simulates a penetration test scenario where an attacker tries to use
        the gateway test endpoint to trigger a callback to their external server
        (e.g., burpcollaborator.net, interact.sh, etc.) to prove the vulnerability.
        """
        allowed_hosts = ["trusted.com"]

        # Common external collaborator services used in pentesting
        collaborator_domains = [
            "https://attacker.burpcollaborator.net/callback",
            "https://test.interact.sh/oob",
            "https://evil.oastify.com/exfiltrate",
            "https://attacker-controlled.com/collect-data",
        ]

        for url in collaborator_domains:
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
                SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(url, allowed_hosts, "Gateway URL")

    def test_multiple_allowlist_patterns(self, mock_dns_public):
        """Test that multiple allowlist patterns work correctly."""
        allowed_hosts = ["api.example.com", "*.partner.com", "legacy.system.net"]

        # All of these should be allowed
        valid_urls = [
            "https://api.example.com/test",
            "https://v1.partner.com/api",
            "https://v2.partner.com/api",
            "https://legacy.system.net/old",
        ]

        for url in valid_urls:
            result = SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(url, allowed_hosts, "Gateway URL")
            assert result == url

        # These should be rejected
        rejected_urls = [
            "https://evil.com/",
            "https://partner.com/api",  # *.partner.com does not match base domain
        ]
        for url in rejected_urls:
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
                SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(url, allowed_hosts, "Gateway URL")

    def test_empty_url_rejected(self):
        """Test that empty URLs are rejected."""
        allowed_hosts = ["example.com"]

        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="cannot be empty"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url("", allowed_hosts, "Gateway URL")

        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="cannot be empty"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(None, allowed_hosts, "Gateway URL")

    def test_url_without_hostname_rejected(self, mock_dns_public):
        """Test that URLs without hostnames are rejected."""
        allowed_hosts = ["example.com"]

        # URL with no hostname
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url("https:///path", allowed_hosts, "Gateway URL")

    def test_ipv4_mapped_ipv6_loopback_blocked(self):
        """Test that IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback addresses are blocked."""
        allowed_hosts = ["::ffff:127.0.0.1"]

        # IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback should be blocked
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
                "http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/test",
                allowed_hosts,
                "Gateway URL"
            )

    def test_ipv4_mapped_ipv6_in_resolved_address_blocked(self, monkeypatch):
        """Test that IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses in DNS resolution are unwrapped and checked."""
        import socket

        # Mock DNS to return IPv4-mapped IPv6 private address
        def mock_getaddrinfo(host, port, family=0, type=0, proto=0, flags=0):
            # Return IPv4-mapped IPv6 address for private IP
            return [(socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, '', ('::ffff:192.168.1.1', port or 443))]

        monkeypatch.setattr("mcpgateway.common.validators.socket.getaddrinfo", mock_getaddrinfo)

        allowed_hosts = ["mapped.example.com"]

        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
                "https://mapped.example.com/test",
                allowed_hosts,
                "Gateway URL"
            )

    def test_dns_resolution_failure_rejected(self, monkeypatch):
        """Test that DNS resolution failures are rejected."""
        import socket

        def mock_getaddrinfo(host, port, family=0, type=0, proto=0, flags=0):
            raise socket.gaierror("Name or service not known")

        monkeypatch.setattr("mcpgateway.common.validators.socket.getaddrinfo", mock_getaddrinfo)

        allowed_hosts = ["nonexistent.example.com"]

        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
                "https://nonexistent.example.com/test",
                allowed_hosts,
                "Gateway URL"
            )

    def test_cgnat_address_blocked(self, monkeypatch):
        """Test that carrier-grade NAT (CGNAT) addresses are blocked."""
        import socket

        # Mock DNS to return CGNAT IP (100.64.0.0/10)
        def mock_getaddrinfo(host, port, family=0, type=0, proto=0, flags=0):
            return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, '', ('100.64.1.1', port or 443))]

        monkeypatch.setattr("mcpgateway.common.validators.socket.getaddrinfo", mock_getaddrinfo)

        allowed_hosts = ["cgnat.example.com"]

        # Should be blocked even if in allowlist
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
                "https://cgnat.example.com/test",
                allowed_hosts,
                "Gateway URL"
            )

    def test_cgnat_direct_ip_blocked(self):
        """Test that direct CGNAT IP addresses are blocked."""
        allowed_hosts = ["100.64.0.1"]

        # CGNAT addresses (100.64.0.0/10) should be blocked
        cgnat_ips = [
            "http://100.64.0.1/test",
            "http://100.64.255.254/test",
            "http://100.127.255.255/test",
        ]

        for url in cgnat_ips:
            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
                SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(url, allowed_hosts, "Gateway URL")

    def test_resolved_ip_exception_continues_checking(self, monkeypatch):
        """Test that exceptions during resolved IP checking don't stop validation."""
        import socket

        # Mock DNS to return mix of valid and invalid entries
        def mock_getaddrinfo(host, port, family=0, type=0, proto=0, flags=0):
            return [
                (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, '', ('not-an-ip', port or 443)),  # Invalid
                (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, '', ('8.8.8.8', port or 443)),  # Valid public IP
            ]

        monkeypatch.setattr("mcpgateway.common.validators.socket.getaddrinfo", mock_getaddrinfo)

        allowed_hosts = ["mixed.example.com"]

        # Should succeed because one address is valid
        result = SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
            "https://mixed.example.com/test",
            allowed_hosts,
            "Gateway URL"
        )
        assert result == "https://mixed.example.com/test"

    def test_url_parse_exception_rejected(self):
        """Test that URLs that raise exceptions during parsing are rejected."""
        allowed_hosts = ["example.com"]

        # URL that might cause parsing issues - test the exception handling path
        # Using a malformed URL structure
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            # Create a URL object that will fail hostname extraction
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url("http://", allowed_hosts, "Gateway URL")

    def test_wildcard_subdomain_match(self, monkeypatch):
        """Test wildcard subdomain pattern matching."""
        import socket

        def mock_getaddrinfo(host, port, family=0, type=0, proto=0, flags=0):
            return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, '', ('8.8.8.8', port or 443))]
        monkeypatch.setattr("mcpgateway.common.validators.socket.getaddrinfo", mock_getaddrinfo)

        allowed_hosts = ["*.example.com"]

        # Test wildcard match for subdomain
        result = SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
            "https://sub.example.com/test",
            allowed_hosts,
            "Gateway URL"
        )
        assert result == "https://sub.example.com/test"

        # Test that base domain does NOT match wildcard pattern (only subdomains)
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
                "https://example.com/test",
                allowed_hosts,
                "Gateway URL"
            )

    def test_hostname_not_in_allowlist_rejected(self, monkeypatch):
        """Test that hostnames not in allowlist are rejected with generic message."""
        import socket

        def mock_getaddrinfo(host, port, family=0, type=0, proto=0, flags=0):
            return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, '', ('8.8.8.8', port or 443))]
        monkeypatch.setattr("mcpgateway.common.validators.socket.getaddrinfo", mock_getaddrinfo)

        allowed_hosts = ["allowed.example.com"]

        # Test that non-matching hostname is rejected
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
                "https://notallowed.example.com/test",
                allowed_hosts,
                "Gateway URL"
            )

    def test_ipv4_mapped_ipv6_public_unwrapping(self):
        """Test that IPv4-mapped IPv6 public addresses are unwrapped and checked."""
        # Use IPv4-mapped public IP - this hits the unwrapping logic on line 1560
        # Even though it's a public IP, it should fail allowlist check
        allowed_hosts = ["8.8.8.8"]

        # IPv4-mapped public IP should be unwrapped and pass through to allowlist check
        # It will fail because the IP itself is not in the allowlist (need hostname match)
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
                "http://[::ffff:8.8.8.8]/test",
                allowed_hosts,
                "Gateway URL"
            )

    def test_url_with_missing_hostname_rejected(self):
        """Test that URLs without a hostname are rejected (covers lines 1545-1547)."""
        allowed_hosts = ["example.com"]

        # URL with no hostname (http:///test has hostname=None)
        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="is not allowed"):
            SecurityValidator.validate_gateway_test_url(
                "http:///test",
                allowed_hosts,
                "Gateway URL"
            )
