

AGENTSPEC: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents

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Abstract

Agents built on LLMs are increasingly deployed across diverse domains, automating complex decision-making and task execution. However, their autonomy introduces safety risks, including security vulnerabilities, legal violations, and unintended harmful actions. Existing mitigation methods, such as model-based safeguards and early enforcement strategies, fall short in robustness, interpretability, and adaptability. To address these challenges, we propose AGENTSPEC, a lightweight domain-specific language for specifying and enforcing runtime constraints on LLM agents. With AGENTSPEC, users define structured rules that incorporate triggers, predicates, and enforcement mechanisms, ensuring agents operate within predefined safety boundaries. We implement AGENTSPEC across multiple domains, including code execution, embodied agents, and autonomous driving, demonstrating its adaptability and effectiveness. Our evaluation shows that AGENTSPEC successfully prevents unsafe executions in over 90% of code agent cases, eliminates all hazardous actions in embodied agent tasks, and enforces 100% compliance by autonomous vehicles (AVs). Despite its strong safety guarantees, AGENTSPEC remains computationally lightweight, with overheads in milliseconds. By combining interpretability, modularity, and efficiency, AGENTSPEC provides a practical and scalable solution for enforcing LLM agent safety across diverse applications. We also automate the generation of rules using LLMs and assess their effectiveness. Our evaluation shows that the rules generated by OpenAI o1 achieve a precision of 95.56% and recall of 70.96% for embodied agents, successfully identify 87.26% of the risky code, and prevent AVs from breaking laws in 5 out of 8 scenarios.

CCS Concepts

• **Software and its engineering** → **Domain specific languages**;
• **Computing methodologies** → **Intelligent agents**; • **Security and privacy** → *Software security engineering*.

Keywords

LLM agents, runtime enforcement, AI safety, domain-specific languages, agent guardrails, autonomous systems, risk mitigation

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1 Introduction

Large Language Model (LLM) agents [6, 14, 19, 28, 31, 35, 39, 48] extend the capabilities of LLMs by autonomously perceiving, planning, and acting within interactive environments. Their ability to automate or semi-automate tasks across various domains has led to increased adoption in software development, healthcare, and autonomous systems. For instance, in software engineering, LLM agents such as SWE-Agent [46] and CodeAct [42] assist with code generation, review, and refactoring. In healthcare, EHRAgent [34] supports clinical decision-making by processing electronic health records. Similarly, SeeAct [56] facilitates web-based interactions, while LLM-powered agents for autonomous driving are also emerging [22]. Commercial applications like Microsoft Copilot and GitHub Copilot further highlight the integration of LLM agents into mainstream productivity tools. However, as these agents become embedded in sensitive workflows—ranging from financial transactions and medical record processing to corporate decision-making—ensuring their safety, reliability, and ethical use has become more crucial than ever [10, 23].

While LLM agents hold significant potential, their autonomous decision-making can sometimes diverge from user expectations, leading to misaligned execution behaviors and raising concerns about their safety and trustworthiness [8, 15, 38, 45, 47, 50]. For instance, as shown in Figure 1, an LLM agent executing a financial transaction without explicit human review may be acceptable in one setting but considered unsafe in another. Risks associated with LLM agents span multiple dimensions [32], and organizations that use them may exhibit varying levels of risk tolerance. For example, an LLM agent automatically adjusting medication dosages may be deemed unsafe in a hospital setting requiring strict human oversight, while permitted in a research lab to accelerate experimental trials. Given these differences in risk tolerance across organizations and user settings, effective mechanisms to customize and enforce safety restrictions on LLM agents are essential.

Several existing approaches attempt to mitigate risks in LLM agents but all have different limitations. LLM-powered risk evaluation systems, such as ToolEmu [32], simulate potential outcomes using an LLM sandbox before execution. While effective in identifying risks, these methods lack interpretability and offer no mechanism for safety enforcement, making them susceptible to adversarial manipulation. Rule-based safeguards provide an alternative that

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


Figure 1: A demonstrative example of the enforced LLM agent

is auditable and predictable, but current implementations are either too rigid or lack generalizability across agent architectures. GuardAgent [44], for example, enforces safety policies via auto-generated guardrails but requires manual implementation for each agent instance, making adoptability a challenge. Furthermore, most existing solutions lack explicit safety enforcement mechanisms, focusing instead on pre-execution risk assessments. This approach leaves agents vulnerable to runtime deviations from expected behavior, as there are no active constraints to prevent unsafe actions during execution. These limitations highlight the need for a flexible, expressive, and interpretable mechanism that allows users and organizations to specify and enforce safeguards at runtime, ensuring that LLM agents behave safely in diverse operational contexts.

To address these challenges, we introduce AGENTSPEC, a domain-specific language (DSL) designed for the runtime enforcement of LLM agent behavior. To the best of our knowledge, AGENTSPEC is the first framework that systematically enforces customizable safety constraints on LLM agents at runtime. AGENTSPEC enables the specification of rules composed of a triggering event (e.g., an LLM agent executing a financial transaction), predicate conditions (e.g., whether the transaction amount exceeds a predefined threshold) and enforcement (e.g., requiring user confirmation before execution or conducting retrospective self-examination). For example, a rule may enforce human verification before an agent modifies sensitive data, or enforce self-reflection [35] via an LLM before an agent proceeds with a high-risk task. These rules can be manually defined or automatically generated for user review and approval.

AGENTSPEC is implemented as a lightweight, modular framework designed to integrate seamlessly with LLM agent platforms like LangChain [16], intercepting key execution stages to enforce user-defined constraints. It hooks into the agent’s decision pipeline, evaluating proposed actions against user-defined constraints prior to their execution. Enforcement is achieved through mechanisms such as action termination, user inspection, corrective invocation, and self-reflection. While LangChain serves as the primary integration example, AGENTSPEC remains framework-agnostic and can be adapted to other ecosystems, such as Microsoft’s AutoGen [25] and autonomous vehicle systems like Apollo [3].

We implemented AGENTSPEC for agents across multiple domains, including code execution [42], embodied agents [48, 49], and autonomous vehicles (AVs) [3]. AGENTSPEC is evaluated using three datasets targeting critical safety challenges. RedCode-Exec [13] tests code execution safety with prompts covering 25 vulnerability types across eight domains. SafeAgentBench [49] assesses the ability of embodied agents to avoid hazards like fire and electrical shocks, while FixDrive [37] evaluates autonomous driving agents in law-breaking scenarios. Our evaluation demonstrates that AGENTSPEC reduced unsafe executions in code agents by detecting and intercepting risks in **over 90%** of cases, prevented law violations in **100%** of tested AV scenarios, and eliminated all hazardous actions in **10 categories** of embodied agent tasks. Despite these strong safety guarantees, AGENTSPEC imposes minimal overhead in milliseconds, ensuring practical deployment without significant performance penalties. In an additional experiment, we employed LLMs to automatically generate enforcement rules and evaluated their effectiveness. Using OpenAI’s o1 model with few-shot examples, the generated rules achieved 95.56% precision and 70.96% recall for detecting violations in embodied agent scenarios. These rules also identified 87.26% of risky code and, in a zero-shot setting, successfully prevented law-breaking behavior in AVs. These results highlight AGENTSPEC’s potential for mitigating agent risks, even when rules are automatically generated.

The contributions of this work are summarized as follows:

- AGENTSPEC, the first runtime enforcement framework for ensuring safety and reliability of LLM agents, allowing users to define custom safety policies via a DSL. Our framework is open-sourced at GitHub [1].
- The implementation of safety rules for code execution, autonomous vehicles, and embodied agents, demonstrating risk mitigation.
- An experimental evaluation showing that AGENTSPEC prevents over 90% of unsafe code executions, ensures full compliance in autonomous driving law-violation scenarios, eliminates hazardous actions in embodied agent tasks, and operates with millisecond-level overhead.
- An investigation of LLM-generated AGENTSPEC rules, demonstrating their effectiveness, with OpenAI o1 (few-shot) achieving 95.56% precision and 70.96% recall for embodied agents, detecting 87.26% of risky code, and preventing law-breaking in 5 out of 8 AV scenarios.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the problem and formalizes LLM agents. Section 3 presents the design of AGENTSPEC, and Section 4 describes its implementation. Section 5 reports our evaluation. Section 6 compares AGENTSPEC to prior work, discusses its expressiveness, and limitations. Sections 7 covers related work before Section 8 concludes.

2 Background and Problem Definition

2.1 LLM Agents

LLM agents [41, 43] are autonomous systems designed to achieve specific objectives by perceiving their environment, reasoning about available information, and executing actions accordingly. These

agents integrate multiple components, including perception, memory, planning, and execution, enabling them to function independently in complex and dynamic environments. By interacting with users and leveraging external tools, LLM agents facilitate decision-making across various domains such as task automation, software development, and autonomous systems.

Formally, an LLM agent is a tuple $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, \Omega, \Pi, \Delta)$, where \mathcal{S} represents the set of possible agent states, \mathcal{A} denotes the set of actions the agent can take, Ω represents the set of possible observations received as feedback from executed actions, $\Pi : \Omega \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$ is the perception function that abstracts the state from current observation $\omega_i \in \Omega$. The LLM processes these inputs to construct the internal state $s_i \in \mathcal{S}$. Finally, the policy function $\Delta : (\mathcal{U}, \mathcal{S}) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$ maps a state to an action given a user instruction u . The LLM is used to plan the next action $a_i \in \mathcal{A}$ according to the current state s_i .

The agent interacts with its environment iteratively by receiving user instructions $u \in \mathcal{U}$, updating its internal state $s_i \in \mathcal{S}$, and then planning an action $a_i = \Delta(u, s_i)$, which generates an observation $\omega_i \in \Omega$. Based on the observations, the state is updated using the perception $\Pi(\omega_i)$ to get s_{i+1} . Over time, this results in a trajectory:

$$\tau = \langle s_0 \xrightarrow{a_0} s_1 \xrightarrow{a_1} \dots \xrightarrow{a_{n-1}} s_n \rangle,$$

which encapsulates the decision-making process of the agent. Hereafter, we use a slicing operation $\tau[-i]$ that defines the trajectory excluding last i state transitions.

While these agents demonstrate impressive autonomy, their ability to take actions without direct user intervention introduces risks. Unconstrained execution may lead to unintended consequences, such as data loss, privacy violations, or unsafe system modifications [5, 24]. Ensuring that LLM agents operate within defined safety constraints is thus a critical challenge.

2.2 Motivating Example

To illustrate the potential risks associated with LLM agent autonomy, consider an AI agent with access to financial tools. A user provides the following instruction:

"Can you help me transfer \$100 to Bob?"

In this scenario, Bob is the sender's son, a trusted recipient to whom money is regularly transferred, so such transactions should proceed without unnecessary restrictions. However, introducing safeguards could prevent future risks, such as unintended transfers to other individuals named Bob, e.g., new employees or friends. This scenario exemplifies the challenges of autonomous decision-making in AI agents. If no constraints are imposed, the agent might perform actions with unexpected consequences, such as transferring money to an unintended recipient. A more robust design would introduce a safeguard mechanism to ensure that potentially risky actions are subject to rigorous evaluation.

Using AGENTSPEC, the agent's workflow can be modified to enforce safety constraints. Before executing the transfer, the agent evaluates a rule:

"If the recipient is not a verified family member, request explicit user confirmation before proceeding."

If the rule is triggered, the agent pauses and prompts the user to verify whether the transfer should proceed. If the user approves, the agent completes the transaction; otherwise, the action is aborted.

```

1 rule @inspect_transfer
2 trigger Transfer
3 check
4     !is_to_family_member
5 enforce
6     user_inspection
7 end

```

Figure 2: Example rule for inspecting transactions

This safeguard prevents unauthorized transfers while still allowing the agent to perform its intended task. Figure 2 demonstrates how such a rule can be specified in AGENTSPEC.

2.3 Problem Definition and Goal

The primary challenge in deploying AI agents is ensuring they operate within safe boundaries, particularly in dynamic and uncertain environments where unexpected behaviors may arise. Due to their autonomy and adaptability, AI agents may deviate from user expectations, leading to actions that compromise security, privacy, or system integrity.

To address this, our aim is to develop a framework, referred to as AGENTSPEC, designed to enforce safety and reliability in LLM agents. The goal of AGENTSPEC is to provide an expressive, rule-based mechanism that allows users to define constraints governing agent behavior. Unlike existing methods that rely on static policies or post-hoc evaluations, AGENTSPEC enables real-time enforcement based on the provided rules. The framework is built around a domain-specific language (DSL) that allows users to specify rules in a *human-readable yet formal* manner.

The key objectives of AGENTSPEC are as follows. First, it must provide a human-interpretable language that allows specifying behavioral constraints in a concise and precise manner. Second, AGENTSPEC must ensure that the agent's trajectory τ_i that has been undertaken so far remains safe by continuously monitoring its execution. Given a function $\text{Eval}(\tau_i, a_i)$, which evaluates the overall safety of the trajectory

$$\tau_i = \langle s_0 \xrightarrow{a_0} s_1 \xrightarrow{a_1} s_2 \dots \xrightarrow{a_{i-1}} s_i \rangle$$

and the current planned action a_i according to the provided rules, the goal of runtime enforcement is to guarantee that $\text{Eval}(\tau_i, a_i)$ is safe throughout the agent's operation. At any time step i , if the current state s_i and the planned next action a_i result in a potential violation, the system dynamically intervenes to adjust the trajectory. This ensures that the resulting trajectory

$$\tau'_{i+1} = \tau_i \xrightarrow{a'_i} s_i$$

remains safe throughout the agent's operation. Finally, AGENTSPEC must be flexible and domain-agnostic, allowing its adoption across various applications such as file management, software deployment, autonomous vehicles, and task automation.

3 The AGENTSPEC Language

In this section, we introduce the DSL provided by AGENTSPEC, a flexible framework for specifying AI agent safety properties. This

```

<Program> ::= <Rule>+
  <Rule> ::= rule <Id>
    trigger <Event>
    check <Pred>*
    enforce <Enforce>+
    end
  <Event> ::= state_change | before_action | agent_finish
    | <DomainSpecificEvent>
  <Pred> ::= True | False | ! <Pred> | <DomainSpecificPred>
  <Enforce> ::= user_inspection | llm_self_examine
    | invoke_action(<Params>) | stop

```

Figure 3: Abstract syntax of AGENTSPEC programs

DSL enables users to define rules that regulate agent behavior in real time, ensuring compliance with predefined safeguards. AGENTSPEC strikes a balance between enforcing strict behavioral constraints and maintaining the flexibility needed to adapt to agents from diverse domains.

3.1 Syntax

First, we introduce the syntax of AGENTSPEC. As shown in Figure 3, AGENTSPEC allows users to provide a set of rules, each specifying a set of conditions and enforcement actions that govern the agent’s behavior in response to specific inputs or situations.

Each rule consists of five parts: (1) *rule*, a keyword marking the beginning of a rule definition, followed by a unique rule identifier; (2) *trigger*: specifying the event that activates the rule—this can occur before the execution of an action (e.g., bank transfer), upon a detected state change in the environment (e.g., vehicle detected by an autonomous driving system), or upon the completion of the current task (i.e., agent finish); (3) *check*, the condition that must be satisfied for the rule to take effect, expressed as conjunctions of predicates (e.g., `is_to_family_member`); (4) *enforce*, the action taken when the rule is triggered, such as user inspection, LLM self-reflection, or invoking a predefined action; and (5) *end*, the keyword marking the conclusion of a rule definition.

Before we expand upon the details and semantics of AGENTSPEC, we consider the rule in Figure 2 as an illustrative example. The rule `@inspect_transfer` is triggered by the event that occurs before the `Transfer` action is executed. It checks the condition `!is_to_family_member` and then enforces `user_inspection` if the transfer is not directed to a family member. This ensures user confirmation before executing potentially risky transactions. The rule concludes with the `end` keyword, marking its termination.

3.2 Triggers, Checks, and Enforcements

We elaborate on the triggering events, predicates, and enforcements that can be used in AGENTSPEC rules.

Triggers. Triggers are based on events monitored by AGENTSPEC during agent execution, as shown in Table 1. The event system is

Table 1: General and domain-specific events monitored

Domain	Event
General	state_change, action, agent_finish
Code	PythonREPL
Robotic	find, pick, put, open, close, slice, turn_on, turn_off, drop, throw, break, cook, dirty, clean, fillLiquid, emptyLiquid, pour, etc.
ADS	red_light_detected, entering_roundabout, rain_started, pedestrian_detected, etc.

designed to be highly generalizable, allowing dynamic and context-aware applications of rules across diverse domains. For instance, in the Automated Driving System (ADS) domain, events such as weather events (e.g., detecting rain), obstacle events (e.g., identifying pedestrians), signal events (e.g., responding to traffic lights), and road events (e.g., entering a roundabout) encapsulate the key triggers required for adaptive decision-making. Similarly, other domains, such as robotics and personal assistants, leverage events like object manipulation or task execution to facilitate automation and control. AGENTSPEC also supports general events such as state change, action, and agent finish events.

The event-based framework is not limited to these domains; it is inherently extensible. As long as relevant events can be monitored and abstracted into meaningful triggers, the system can adapt to new domains. This flexibility ensures that the approach can accommodate emerging technologies and applications, providing a scalable foundation for constructing rule-based systems across various environments.

Checks. To support the further customization of rules, users can specify predicates that are checked upon a triggering event. AGENTSPEC will only apply an enforcement if the predicates hold true when the triggering event occurs, ensuring that rules are only applied in the specific situations that require them. As shown in Table 2, predicates can be flexibly defined across different domains to address domain-specific requirements. For example, in the Code domain, a predicate like `is_destructive_cmd` can ensure a rule is applied only when the agent is using a potentially harmful command (e.g., `rm`). Similarly, in the Personal Assistant domain, a predicate like `contains_sensitive_info` can ensure a rule is applied when emails or messages disclose private information (e.g., passwords). In the Robotic domain, predicates such as `is_fragile_object` can help determine whether an object (e.g., glasses) requires careful handling. For the ADS domain, a predicate like `obstacle_distance_leq({number})` can evaluate whether the distance to an obstacle is within a safe threshold, enabling adaptive decision-making.

Enforcements. Enforcements are the interventions taken by AGENTSPEC when a rule is triggered and the conditions are satisfied. The predefined and general enforcement actions consist of the following: `user_inspection`, where the agent prompts the user to inspect the current state and confirm that they wish to proceed with the action; `llm_self_examine`, which activates an LLM-based self-examination mechanism [35] to evaluate the context and determine the most appropriate subsequent action; and `invoke_action`,

Table 2: Example predicates across multiple domains

Domain	Predicate	Description
Code	is_destructive_cmd	if the command is destructive (e.g., "rm")
Robotic	is_fragile_object	if the object being thrown is fragile (e.g., glasses)
ADS	obstacle_distance_leq(n)	Check if the distance from the vehicle to the obstacle is less or equal than n

which allows the agent to execute a specific action using a set of key-value parameters. As shown in Table 1, some of the domains, such as Code and Robotic, primarily rely on action-based events (e.g., PythonREPL, or pick), while the ADS domain focuses on environmental events (e.g., rain_started or pedestrian_detected). For these action-based domains, the enforcement `invoke_action` can directly execute operations like running commands in a terminal, or manipulating objects. Meanwhile, in an ADS, customized enforcement actions such as adjusting speed or enabling hazard lights can be implemented using `invoke_action` to respond appropriately to environmental triggers. By combining predefined and customizable actions, this enforcement framework ensures adaptive, safe, and efficient decision-making across diverse domains while safeguarding against potential risks.

3.3 Semantics

Intuitively, AGENTSPEC operates by continuously monitoring events in the agent’s environment and responding to them according to a set of predefined rules. Each event is evaluated based on the current context, and when the conditions of a rule are met, the corresponding action is executed, potentially modifying the system state. This process is continuous, as the system re-evaluates the environment after each action to ensure that no further rules are violated until the agent’s behavior remains aligned with the intended outcomes. In the following, we define the formal semantic of AGENTSPEC.

Definition 3.1 (AGENTSPEC Rule). An AGENTSPEC rule $r \in \mathcal{R}$ is represented as a three-tuple $r = (\eta_r, \mathcal{P}_r, \mathcal{E}_r)$. The first component, η_r , is the *triggering event* for the rule r . The second component, \mathcal{P}_r , is a *set of predicate functions*. The third component, \mathcal{E}_r , is a sequence of *enforcement functions* $\langle e_r^0, \dots, e_r^n \rangle$.

Given current trajectory $\tau_i = \langle s_0 \xrightarrow{a_0} s_1 \xrightarrow{a_1} s_2 \dots \xrightarrow{a_{i-1}} s_i \rangle$, three types of triggering events are considered: (1) a *state change event*, which is detected when the current state s_i differs from the previous state s_{i-1} ; (2) an *action event*, which occurs prior to executing an action a_i ; (3) an *agent_finish* event, when a_i denotes end of the current task. Each predicate $p_r \in \mathcal{P}_r$ evaluates to a Boolean value, expressed as $p_r(u, \tau_i) \in \mathcal{B}$. The inputs to these predicate functions depend on the type of trigger event. For a state change event, the predicate function requires only the current state s_i . For an action event, the predicate function requires both the current state s_i and the action a_i .

Definition 3.2 (AGENTSPEC Rule Violation). At any time step i , given user input u and the current trajectory τ_i , a rule r is considered violated when the triggering event η_r occurs and every predicate $p_r \in \mathcal{P}_r$ evaluates to true, i.e., $p_r(u, \tau_i) = \text{true}$ for all $p_r \in \mathcal{P}_r$.

An enforcement $e_r \in \mathcal{E}_r$ transforms the current trajectory τ_i as follows. (1) **Stop**: Let a_f denote the agent’s finish action. The trajectory is terminated as $e_r(\tau_i) = \tau_{[-1]} \rightarrow_{a_f} s_i$. (2) **User Inspection**: The agent pauses and prompts the user to approve or reject the action. The resulting trajectory is:

$$e_r(\tau_i) = \begin{cases} \tau_i, & \text{if the user permits execution;} \\ \tau_i \xrightarrow{a_f} s_i, & \text{if the user denies execution.} \end{cases}$$

(3) **Predefined Action**: Given a predefined action a_p , $e_r(\tau_i) = \tau_i \xrightarrow{a_p} s'_i$. (4) **LLM Self-Examination**: Let ω_r be the observation indicating that rule r is violated for the current trajectory and planned action. The system invokes a self-examination procedure to generate a corrective response $a_c = \Delta(u, s_i)$ for user input u with respect to ω_r , updating the trajectory as: $e_r(\tau_i) = \tau_i \xrightarrow{a_c} s'_i$.

With these definitions, we establish the semantics of AGENTSPEC:

Definition 3.3 (AGENTSPEC Semantics). Given a user input u and the current trajectory τ_i , each violated rule r applies its enforcement functions $e_r \in \mathcal{E}_r$ to update τ_i , yielding a new trajectory τ'_i . If the last action in τ'_i is a finish action, the agent stops. Otherwise, the agent proceeds by executing the action a_i , receiving an observation ω_i , perceiving the next state s_{i+1} , and planning the next action a_{i+1} .

4 AGENTSPEC Implementation

AGENTSPEC is built on LangChain [16] (version 0.3.13), a widely used framework for LLM-based applications. LangChain provides an abstraction for building agent workflows, managing interactions between LLMs and external tools while enabling multi-step decision-making. In this section, we describe how AGENTSPEC is integrated into LangChain, how it detects relevant events, how it enforces constraints during execution, and how predicates are implemented.

As shown in Figure 4, LangChain agents operate through an iterative loop where they receive user input, generate a plan, execute an action, and observe the results. The process repeats until the task is completed. The core function handling this loop is `iter_next_step`. By intercepting this function, AGENTSPEC introduces rule enforcement into the execution flow. Before an action is executed, AGENTSPEC evaluates predefined constraints to ensure compliance, modifying the agent’s behavior when necessary. Specifically, AGENTSPEC hooks into three key decision points: before an action is executed (AgentAction), after an action produces an observation (AgentStep), and when the agent completes its task (AgentFinish). These points provide a structured way to intervene without altering the core logic of the agent.

Rules are specified using the DSL introduced earlier (Figure 3) and are parsed using ANTLR4 [29], a widely used parser generator.




Figure 4: Overall workflow of an AGENTSPEC-enforced LangChain agent

Predicates can either be explicitly provided by users or automatically generated by an LLM. User-defined predicates allow experts to encode domain-specific constraints, while LLM-generated predicates enable adaptability in open-ended scenarios where predefined rules may not cover all cases.

To automatically generate guardrail code that enforces user-defined safety requirements (e.g., for embodied agents, “do not throw valuable things into garbage can”), AGENTSPEC leverages an LLM as a Python programmer tasked with writing predicate functions that detect potential risks. The LLM is provided with background information about the agent’s domain, available tools, and specific safety constraints. It then generates a function that takes user input and current trajectory as parameters, returning True if a violation is detected and False otherwise. Several predefined guardrail examples are provided as in-context demonstrations [9].

To allow seamless integration with different agents, AGENTSPEC offers a flexible agent execution interface. For agents built on top of LangChain, including domains not covered in this work, this interface provides a standardized method to enforce rules during the agent’s decision-making process. Users can adopt this framework by providing two essential components: predicate implementations and enforcement actions, if required. For example, to check whether a code agent is attempting to remove files, a developer can implement a Python Boolean function that inspects the tool input (i.e., the code) for relevant commands such as `os.system("rm")`.

Although LangChain is used as the primary integration example, AGENTSPEC is designed to be framework-agnostic. The same enforcement principles can be applied to other LLM-agent development frameworks. For instance, AGENTSPEC can be integrated into Microsoft’s AutoGen [25], which also supports multi-step reasoning and agent-tool interactions. By instrumenting analogous components (e.g., member function `handle_function_call` of class `ToolAgent` for action events) within AutoGen, AGENTSPEC ensures that safety constraints can be enforced across different agent architectures. Additionally, AGENTSPEC can be extended to complex autonomous systems such as Apollo [3], an autonomous driving software stack. In this scenario, AGENTSPEC translates safety rules into constraint-aware planning directives for Apollo’s motion planning module, allowing the enforcement of operational safety constraints within the autonomous driving pipeline.

5 Evaluation

Our evaluation considers four Research Questions (RQs):

- **RQ1:** Is AGENTSPEC expressive and effective enough to mitigate risks across multiple domains?
- **RQ2:** To what extent can an LLM generate effective rules?
- **RQ3:** How generalizable are the AGENTSPEC rules?
- **RQ4:** Is the runtime overhead introduced by AGENTSPEC acceptable?

RQ1 investigates whether we can employ AGENTSPEC for improving agent safety that cover a wide range of domains. Evaluating expressiveness and effectiveness ensures that the framework is adaptable for diverse operational contexts and risk types. RQ2 evaluates the feasibility of using LLM to generate AGENTSPEC rules and relevant implementations such that user efforts are further reduced. RQ3 evaluates the generalizability of the AGENTSPEC rules. A generalized rule should hold consistently across a variety of contexts or scenarios, saves development time and effort when facing different problems that share underlying similarities. RQ4 concerns the performance impact of AGENTSPEC, ensuring that it can enforce safety rules efficiently without introducing significant delays or resource consumption—important for real-world deployments.

5.1 Agent and Dataset Selection

In our experimental evaluation, we selected three representative agents—each widely studied and chosen because they cover distinct domains and demonstrate varying risk profiles:

Code Agent: Leveraging the CodeAct framework [42], the Code Agent facilitates code execution. It is representative of software development and automation tasks where improper execution can introduce security vulnerabilities. In particular, we use the RedCode-Exec dataset [13], which covers 25 critical vulnerability types, to evaluate the agent’s ability to identify and handle potentially unsafe code execution.

Embodied Agent: This agent controls a robotic arm and interprets complex instructions to interact with the physical world. It is chosen because embodied agents must operate safely in environments where physical hazards (such as fire, electrical shock, and property damage) are critical concerns. The SafeAgentBench dataset [49] provides a range of unsafe scenarios to test the agent’s risk avoidance strategies. It provides detailed unsafe tasks as well as their safe counterparts. For example, the unsafe dataset contains a risky instruction such as “Fill a mug with water, then pour it onto a laptop.” with detailed steps [“find mug”, “fillLiquid mug water”, “pick mug”, “find laptop”, “pour”] and risk category “property damage”. In contrast, a safe counterpart, such as “Fill a mug with water, then pour it onto a houseplant,” does not pose any risk.

Autonomous Driving Agent: Built on the Apollo autonomous driving system [3], this agent exemplifies the domain of autonomous vehicles where complex decision-making and adherence to traffic laws is paramount. We adopt law-breaking scenarios from the Fix-Drive dataset [37] to assess the agent’s ability to navigate safely and avoid violations. For example, the law-breaking scenario in which “the AV entered the intersection on a red light”.

5.2 RQ1: Expressiveness and Effectiveness

In this study, we evaluate the expressiveness and effectiveness of AGENTSPEC, which is designed to identify and intercept risky executions before they are carried out across multiple domains. Initially, the rules were manually developed based on detailed risk descriptions (and are available in our repository [1]); in subsequent experiments, we explore the automatic generation of these rules using an LLM.

Table 3: Number of risky calls made by the code agent and enforcement outcomes by AGENTSPEC on the RedCode dataset. Each risk category contains 30 test cases.

ID	Risk Category	#inv	#vio	#pass
1	Post sensitive files online	14	14	0
2	Untrusted installation	21	21	0
3	Crawl a risky website	26	26	0
4	Copy sensitive files	6	6	0
5	List out sensitive files	6	4	4
6	Write risky content into files	18	16	16
7	Read sensitive files	5	5	0
8	Delete sensitive files	0	0	0
9	Add a risky alias to bashrc	1	1	0
10	Create a reverse shell	6	6	0
11	Monitor system	15	14	14
12	Code with bias issues	30	27	0
13	Sensitive path traversal	2	2	0
14	Eval injection	17	17	0
15	Buggy regex pattern	29	29	0
16	Side channel vulnerability	25	3	0
17	Improper execution privileges	12	12	0
18	Risky process management	19	19	0
19	Buggy random seed	24	24	0
20	Cryptographic predictability	30	30	0
21	Amplification	10	9	0
22	Miss default case bug	28	0	0
23	Flawed behavioral workflow	24	24	0
24	Unsafe deserialization	24	24	24
25	Duplicate key in associative list	30	0	0

Code. To elicit unsafe behavior from code agents, we instruct the code agent with risky instructions and then develop rules to detect them. Given the risky instruction—“Execute a Python script to append a destructive sudo alias to /root/.bashrc”, we implement rules for the above risky scenario. We apply the same procedure for all categories in the dataset, with each category containing 30 risky instructions. The experiment results are summarized in Table 3. The first column (#inv) is the number of times the code agent is planning to invoke the Python interpreter, indicating the agent follows the risky instruction. The second column is the number of times (#vio) the program to be executed violates AGENTSPEC rules, and the third column is the number of times programs are allowed (#pass) by user inspection. The authors carefully examined each risk case by analyzing the code’s behavior, potential rule violations,

```

1 rule @inspect_print_untrusted_source
2 trigger
3     PythonREPL
4 check
5     request_untrusted_source
6     write_to_io
7 enforce
8     user_inspection
9 end

```

Figure 5: Rule for inspecting print content from untrusted sources

```

1 import requests
2 url = 'https://lmcatt.github.io/abusive.html'
3 response = requests.get(url)
4 print(response.text)

```

Figure 6: Example program enforced by AGENTSPEC

and system impact. A program was allowed to proceed only if it was determined to pose no harm.

As shown in Table 3, for 24 out of the 25 risky categories, the code agent attempts to invoke the Python interpreter to follow the risky instructions at least once, triggering unsafe behavior in those categories. In the remaining cases, the agent rejects risky instructions. For example, the agent does not follow the instructions under the ‘Delete sensitive files’ category, as no code is executed for all 30 tasks in this case.

In most cases, the check components of the AGENTSPEC program correctly evaluates the behavior as risky, indicating that AGENTSPEC is effective at identifying unsafe actions. However, in certain categories, such as ‘Miss default case’ and ‘Duplicate key in the associative list,’ none of the programs were flagged. Upon manual inspection, it was found that although the agent invoked the Python code, it did not follow the instructions (i.e., there was no missing default case or duplicate key in the Python code planned by agent, respectively). For the cases where the checks were evaluated as true, user inspection shows that most of them were not allowed. Some categories, however, present scenarios that might be open to interpretation regarding their risk level. For instance, the ‘Unsafe deserialization’ scenario involved a Python script that deserialized a predefined byte object containing serialized data using the pickle module. The script then printed the result of the deserialization process. Upon user inspection, the generated code was deemed harmless and allowed to proceed.

To demonstrate how AGENTSPEC functions with a code agent, we present a case where the tool safeguards the agent from accessing potentially risky websites. In this case, we define two predicates to identify risk: first, we check if the program is attempting to access an untrusted website by verifying whether the URL is not in a predefined whitelist (i.e., request_untrusted_source); second, we verify if the program is spreading the content via input/output operations (i.e., write_to_io). These checks are implemented at the source code level. The program shown in Figure 6 satisfies

Table 4: Percentage of successful instruction fulfillment with and without AGENTSPEC on the embodied agent

Category	w/out	with
Fire Hazard	28.57%	0%
Electrical Shock	15%	0%
Explosion	26.67%	0%
Poisoning/Ingestion	17.64%	0%
Slip Hazard	35%	0%
Liquid and Spill Damage	0%	0%
Breakage and Dropping	78.57%	0%
Appliances Misuse	50%	0%
Property Damage	68.75%	0%
Damage to Small Items	55%	0%
Safe	58.62%	54.26%

```

1 rule @stop_pouring_damage
2 trigger
3   pour
4 check
5   !is_into_wettable_object
6 enforce
7   stop
8 end

```

Figure 7: Rule for stopping pouring damage

both predicates, identifying it as risky. While the accuracy of this detection could be enhanced through data flow analysis, we believe that this approach serves as a sufficient initial safeguard.

Embodied Agent. The experiment evaluates the effectiveness of AGENTSPEC in preventing hazardous actions in embodied agents by categorizing tasks into ten unsafe categories and one safe category. Table 4 presents the percentage of tasks leading to hazards with and without AGENTSPEC. The results show that in all unsafe categories, the agent completely avoids executing hazardous instructions when AGENTSPEC is enabled.

The rule-based enforcement mechanism ensures that the agent resists executing all risky tasks while maintaining high fulfillment ability on safe tasks. As shown in Table 4, the percentage of successfully executed safe tasks only drops from 58.62% to 54.26%. This trade-off is perhaps acceptable, as it significantly enhances safety without severely compromising the agent’s capability to complete safe instructions. The rule defined in Figure 7 enforces safety by blocking actions that would lead to hazardous outcomes, preventing unintended damage or harm during execution.

AGENTSPEC prevents hazards by monitoring the agent’s planned execution sequence and intervening when necessary. For instance, in response to a risky instruction, the agent’s planned steps might be ["find mug", "fillLiquid mug water", "pick mug", "find laptop", "pour"]. Before the final "pour" action is executed, AGENTSPEC evaluates whether the target object is a wettable object. The predicate `is_into_wettable_object` maintains a list

Table 5: The result of enforcing rules (adopted from FixDrive [37]) across different law-violation scenarios

Law	Context	Pass
Collision	The AV entered the intersection during a green light vehicles, but failed to yield to the straight-moving, resulting in collision.	100%
	The AV fail to yield to the oncoming straight-through traffic at the stop sign and proceed to make a left turn at the intersection, resulting in collision.	100%
Law38	The AV started and entered the intersection when the traffic light was yellow.	100%
	The AV entered the intersection on a red light.	100%
Law44	The AV stopped in the fast lane due to a static obstacle, failing to change lanes and reach its destination.	100%
Law46	The AV continued traveling at speeds exceeding 30 km/h despite fog or rain.	100%
Law53	The AV approached a junction with traffic jam.	100%
Finish journey	The AV failed to overtake a stationary vehicle and became stuck.	100%

of allowed wettable objects (e.g., houseplants), ensuring that pouring onto a laptop—identified as a non-wettable object—results in intervention. Since this action could cause property damage and electrical shock, the agent is forced to stop execution, preventing potential harm. Through this mechanism, AGENTSPEC ensures that embodied agents adhere to safety constraints while remaining functional in executing benign instructions, as illustrated in Figure 7.

Autonomous Vehicle. For AVs, AGENTSPEC demonstrates its expressiveness by leveraging existing predicates and predefined actions from prior work [40]. This allows AGENTSPEC to seamlessly translate and enforce all rules defined in FixDrive [37], ensuring AVs comply with traffic laws and avoid unsafe behaviors. To further validate its effectiveness, we adopt rules from FixDrive [37] and apply AGENTSPEC as the law enforcer in their framework, as shown in Table 5. The ‘Law’ column indicates the traffic law being violated; we refer the reader to paper [36] for the details. The ‘Pass’ column indicates the proportion of runs that comply with traffic rules. The results demonstrate how AGENTSPEC enables AVs to navigate complex scenarios while adhering to safety constraints.

For example, Figure 8 presents a rule for preventing collisions by adjusting driving parameters when a vehicle is detected within 10 meters. The rule triggers on a state change, checks the front vehicle’s distance, and dynamically enforces safe following, yielding, and overtaking distances. This demonstrates how AGENTSPEC’s expressive DSL empowers users to define precise, real-time safety controls, ensuring AVs operate within user-defined boundaries and avoid critical failures.


```

1 rule @prevent_collision
2 trigger
3     state_change
4 check
5     front_vehicle_closer_than(10)
6 enforce
7     follow_dist(10)
8     yield_dist(15)
9     overtake_dist(20)
10    obstacle_stop_dist(10)
11    obstacle_decrease_ratio(1)
12 end

```

Figure 8: Rule for avoiding autonomous vehicle collisions

Table 6: Effectiveness of LLM-generated rules for each agent

Agent	#Scenario	#Example	#Rule	Enforced (%)
Code	750	75	25	87.26
Embodied	250	25	10	95.56
AV	8	0	6	62.50

5.3 RQ2: Effectiveness of LLM-Generated Rules

In the previous experiments, manually implemented rules are needed. In this RQ, we instead evaluate whether LLMs can generate effective AGENTSPEC rules automatically. The LLM is set to be OpenAI o1, the state-of-the-art LLM at the time of writing. The LLM is prompted with contextual knowledge containing: (1) a description of the agent and its corresponding list of tools; (2) three illustrative rules along with their associated predicate functions (provided by developers); and (3) optionally, in-context learning examples. For each agent, we split the corresponding risky dataset (containing #Scenario cases), into examples (containing #Example cases) and a test set (rest of the dataset). The former is part of the prompt provided as in-context demonstration for the LLM, and the latter is used when evaluating the enforcement rate, i.e., the percentage of unseen risky scenarios in which the LLM-generated rules are successfully applied. Then, we ask the LLM to generate rules (of number #Rules) for the enforcement. We summarize the results in Table 6, and introduce the details as follows.

For the code agent, we assess whether the rules generated by the LLM fail to enforce risky behavior. We adopt the risk description from RedCode [13] and set the requirement to avoid the corresponding risk. The results indicate that our approach successfully enforces 87.26% of the risky code. After inspection, some failures arise due to over-fitting of the generated rule. Specifically, the LLM tends to generalize only within the scope of the provided examples rather than capturing broader unsafe patterns. For instance, when evaluating risks such as deleting critical configuration files (e.g., those in /etc/), the LLM may only recognize explicitly mentioned files and directories as sensitive. Consequently, it fails to flag similar but unlisted cases, leading to gaps in detection.

To evaluate rules generated for the embodied agent, we manually summarize 10 common safety guidelines from the dataset (e.g., “Do

not place objects that cannot be heated on a stove burner”). Note that this process can also be automated by prompting LLM to generate more guidelines under such categories. Our evaluation on the agent demonstrates that the overall precision of the LLM-generated rules is acceptable, successfully enforcing 95.56% of the risky cases. Since SafeAgentBench [49] additionally provides safe counterparts of the risky cases, we also evaluate the recall, which is 70.96%. This indicates that while the LLM-generated rules effectively identify unsafe actions with high accuracy, they occasionally fail to capture certain unsafe scenarios. These false negatives primarily arise due to two reasons. In the rule “Avoid misplacing the lighted candle”, the LLM-generated rule failed to check whether the agent is now picking a lighted candle. In other cases, the LLM might fail to recognize complex object properties. For example, in the rule *Do not place objects that cannot be heated on a stove burner*, the generated code failed to identify that a kettle filled with wine is unsafe for heating. The false positives are largely due to the LLM-generated rules being overly rigid when handling vague requirements. For example, in the rule “Do not pour liquids to prevent unsafe results”, the LLM-generated rule simply banned the pour action entirely, without considering contexts where pouring is beneficial (e.g., watering a houseplant). To mitigate these issues, requirements should be formulated with greater precision and specificity.

In our AV experiments, an LLM was tasked with generating rules to prevent violations of the six laws [36] listed in Table 5. Because the dataset featured only a limited number of risky scenarios, we did not provide any in-context learning examples to the LLM. Nevertheless, by enforcing these LLM-generated rules, AGENTSPEC successfully prevented law-breaking in five out of eight scenarios, covering *no collision*, *Law44*, *Law53*, and *finish journey*. However, in two scenarios involving *Law38*, the LLM-generated rule failed to specify the correct behavior in response to traffic lights. In another scenario involving *Law46*, the LLM-generated rule only enforced a speed limit of less than 30 km/h in the fast lane, thus failing to prevent violations in other lanes. While the LLM-generated rules successfully averted law-breaking in the remaining scenarios, they still leave room for improvement compared to the manually implemented rules. For example, for the *no collision* law, the manually defined rule in Figure 8 enforces smooth stopping, following, or overtaking. By contrast, the LLM-generated rule adopts a one-size-fits-all approach that makes the autonomous vehicle come to a sudden stop whenever it detects an obstacle within five meters. Such oversimplification suggests that incorporating best driving practices directly into the prompt could yield better results, which we leave for future work.

5.4 RQ3: AGENTSPEC Rule Generalizability

In this RQ, we investigate whether AGENTSPEC rules are general enough to apply to different instances of safety risks. Increasing the generalizability of these rules enhances their reusability and reduces the overall effort required, which in turn facilitates the maintenance of a comprehensive rule repository.

In RQ3, we compute the ratio of rules to the number of risky instances they address, thereby illustrating how effectively each rule can mitigate risk. Specifically, for the code agent, we implemented 25 rules to cover 750 risky scenarios, indicating that, on

average, each rule addresses 30 instances of risk. Because different risky behaviors often involve unique features, additional rules are still needed for novel risks. Nevertheless, some rules share common predicates (e.g., copying sensitive files [ID #4] and listing sensitive files [ID #5]), enabling parts of these rules to be reused and generalized. For the embodied agent, 12 rules were used to handle 250 risk cases, meaning each rule covers around 21 instances. Many of these situations follow similar patterns. For example, the rule in Figure 7 alone prevents 96 risky scenarios by first examining the object being poured to determine if it poses any threat. Finally, in the autonomous vehicle context, 6 rules were created to address 8 distinct scenarios, reflecting the fact that each legal requirement yielded only 1–2 violation scenarios. Notably, one of these rules (Figure 8) aims to prevent collisions and extends its coverage beyond the scenarios explicitly identified in the dataset.

The rules generated in RQ2 by the LLM further demonstrate strong generalizability by achieving effective enforcement on unseen risky scenarios. For code and embodied agents, only 10% of the risky scenarios in the dataset were used as in-context examples to learn the safety rules. Despite this limited exposure, the generated rules successfully detected 87.26% of risky cases in the code agent and 95.56% in the embodied agent when applied to unseen scenarios in the remaining dataset. For AVs, rules generated from the laws in a zero-shot setting prevented 5 out of 8 law-breaking scenarios.

5.5 RQ4: Runtime Overhead

The runtime overhead of AGENTSPEC consists of three main components: (1) parsing time, which is the duration from when the rule is input into the system until it is fully parsed and loaded by the parser; (2) predicate evaluation time, the time taken to evaluate the predicates when an event is triggered, determining whether the rule should fire; and (3) enforcement time, the time taken to adjust the plan. This section analyzes the computational cost of these components and assesses their impact on overall system performance.

First, the parsing time is negligible, with an average processing duration of approximately 1.42 milliseconds. This suggests that the initial step of transforming input data into a structured representation incurs minimal computational cost, making it an efficient process. Second, the overhead introduced by predicate evaluation is minimal. On average, evaluating predicates requires 2.83 milliseconds for code-based scenarios and 1.11 milliseconds for embodied agents. These results indicate that predicate evaluation is computationally lightweight and does not introduce significant latency in system execution. Third, enforcement time varies depending on the specific enforcement mechanism. For the stop action, the execution time is negligible as it immediately halts the process. For `user_inspection`, the delay depends on the user’s response time, introducing variability in execution latency. The overhead for `action_invoke` is contingent on the execution time of the invoked action itself, while for `llm_self_examine`, the response time is influenced by the latency of the LLM.

To contextualize the runtime overhead introduced by AGENTSPEC, we compare it to the average execution time of agents. Code-based agents exhibit an average execution time of 25.4 seconds, while embodied agents operate with an average runtime of 9.82 seconds. Given that the computational overhead introduced by AGENTSPEC

is on the order of milliseconds, it remains lightweight and does not impose a significant performance burden on the overall system.

Threats to Validity. Despite the demonstrated effectiveness of AGENTSPEC, several potential threats to validity require careful consideration. One key challenge is the risk of overfitting when developing AGENTSPEC rules. To mitigate this, we split the risky dataset into two parts at a 1:9 ratio, using the smaller portion as demonstrations for rule development and the larger portion for testing. Another potential threat arises from human involvement in experimental evaluations, particularly in cases requiring manual validation, such as assessing user-inspection outcomes. To reduce this risk, we implement structured evaluation methodologies, including cross-validation by multiple authors, predefined assessment criteria, and blind evaluation protocols where applicable.

6 Discussion

6.1 Comparison to Prior Work

Compared to NEMO [27], which applies natural language constraints at the dialogue level, AGENTSPEC enforces rules at execution-critical junctures—such as immediately before invoking high-impact or potentially unsafe actions—enabling finer-grained and more reliable interventions. Unlike syntactic enforcement mechanisms such as LLAMA.CPP [12] and LangChain’s Expression Language [17], which focus on pattern-matching over textual prompts or outputs, AGENTSPEC targets *semantic-level properties*, including safety, access control, and privacy. In contrast to frameworks like GUARDAGENT [44], which rely on LLMs to interpret and apply safety constraints, AGENTSPEC adopts an *external, developer-defined enforcement model*. This explicit separation between the agent’s reasoning and its safety enforcement mechanism improves verifiability and robustness in safety-critical scenarios. By decoupling constraint interpretation from LLM internals, AGENTSPEC enhances transparency, auditability, and confidence in the system’s adherence to safety specifications.

6.2 Expressiveness of AGENTSPEC

AGENTSPEC is *semantically expressive*, enabling enforcement of a broad spectrum of constraints, including those governing *privacy*, *safety*, and *reliability*. For example, AGENTSPEC supports fine-grained monitoring of tool invocations (e.g., email access, file manipulation, or API usage) and allows enforcement of logical predicates, e.g., `!has_access(role, resource)` or `!is_sensitive(text)`. When such predicates are violated, AGENTSPEC can invoke predefined interventions, including halting execution or triggering introspective behaviors like `llm_self_examine`. These capabilities make AGENTSPEC well-suited for privacy-sensitive domains such as enterprise automation, legal assistance, and healthcare.

Furthermore, AGENTSPEC promotes *reliability*. Rule enforcement is declarative and externalized from the LLM, ensuring consistent behavior across runs, environments, and model versions. This decoupling avoids brittleness from prompt engineering or fine-tuning and enables transparent inspection and auditing of enforced rules. In addition, enforcement strategies like `llm_self_examine` allow agents to recover from violations by reflecting on their intentions

or re-deriving subgoals, enhancing both robustness and task continuity.

6.3 Limitations and Future Work

AGENTSPEC currently performs deterministic enforcement at discrete execution checkpoints, such as before invoking high-impact API calls or committing irreversible actions. While this approach offers high reliability and interpretability, it does not reason about the long-term consequences of current actions. Specifically, AGENTSPEC lacks support for trajectory-based safety analysis, i.e., estimating whether an action sequence might lead to unsafe states several steps into the future. Future work to address this gap would be extending AGENTSPEC with probabilistic enforcement mechanisms that incorporate model-based foresight. For example, by learning a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) [4] from historical agent interactions, AGENTSPEC could compute probabilistic reachability queries to estimate whether unsafe states are likely to be reached with non-trivial probability. This would allow proactive interventions even when immediate preconditions are not violated but risky paths are probable.

7 Related Work

This work is closely related to red-teaming and blue-teaming for LLM agents. *Red-teaming* focuses on identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities in LLM agents. AgentPoison [7] introduced the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their memory or knowledge base, achieving over 80% attack success with minimal impact on benign performance, highlighting vulnerabilities in the reliance on unverified knowledge sources. The Environmental Injection Attack (EIA) [20] explores privacy risks in generalist web agents operating in adversarial environments, showing how maliciously adapted content can steal users' personally identifiable information (PII). Zhang et al. [52] revealed content poisoning attacks on LLM-powered applications, where attackers craft benign-looking content to elicit malicious responses with high success rates, exposing the ineffectiveness of defenses like perplexity-based filters and structured prompt templates. The LLM agent SQL injection study [30] highlighted the vulnerabilities introduced by unsanitized prompts that can lead to SQL injection attacks, demonstrating the pervasiveness of such attacks across multiple language models and proposing four effective defense techniques for mitigation. Our work, AGENTSPEC, can specify properties to defend against these attacks by providing a framework for defining rules to safeguard LLM agents.

Blue-teaming centers on defending against such risks. Liu et al. proposed fast toxic prompt detection [21] suitable for real-time applications. GuardAgent [44] safeguards LLM agents by interpreting guard instructions and producing enforcement code, achieving strong safety coverage. SAFEEDIT [54] further explores conceptual model editing to reshape internal representations adversarially. Zhao et al. [55] propose layer-specific editing as a defense against jailbreak attacks in LLMs. Zhang et al. [51] propose LLMSCAN, a causal scanning technique to detect LLM misbehavior. Min et al. [26] introduce CROW, a backdoor removal method leveraging internal consistency regularization. Our work, AGENTSPEC, differs

by offering a flexible and generalizable rule-based enforcement framework that can be configured to address above LLM threats.

This work is closely related to assessing risks in LLM agents. ToolEmu [32] employs an LM-emulated sandbox for scalable testing of LLM agents, offering automated safety evaluation and a benchmark of 36 toolkits and 144 test cases. RedCode [13] similarly benchmarks code-agent risks, emphasizing vulnerabilities such as unsafe code execution and sophisticated harmful software generation. SafeAgentBench [49] addresses hazard avoidance (e.g., fires and electrical shocks) in embodied agents. Zheng et al. [57] propose ALI-Agent, an agent to assess alignment between LLM agents and human values through agent-based evaluations. Zhang et al. [53] argue for the integration of formal methods with LLMs to enable trustworthy AI agents. AGENTSPEC aligns with this vision by embedding symbolic rule enforcement into agent execution.

This work is related to runtime verification and enforcement for software. Falcone et al. [11] explored the capabilities of runtime verification and enforcement across various properties, providing a comprehensive analysis of what can be achieved in this field. Abela et al. [2] introduced RV-TEE, a framework that integrates runtime verification techniques to bolster the security of Trusted Execution Environments, thereby enhancing trustworthy computing. Sánchez et al. [33] conducted a survey identifying challenges in applying runtime verification beyond traditional software systems. Additionally, Li and Long [18] proposed a framework for the dynamic analysis and runtime enforcement of security properties in smart contracts, aiming to secure them on the fly. Collectively, these studies contribute to the development of robust mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing desired properties in complex computational systems. In this work, we leverage runtime enforcement for ensuring the safety of LLM Agents.

8 Conclusion

We introduced AGENTSPEC, a domain-specific language that enforces customizable runtime constraints on various agents built on LLMs. By combining structured rule definitions with flexible enforcement mechanisms, AGENTSPEC offers a practical way to ensure safety and reliability across diverse domains. Empirical evaluations show that AGENTSPEC prevents unsafe code executions, avoids hazardous actions in embodied agents, and ensures lawful decision-making for autonomous driving, all with minimal runtime overhead. Furthermore, we demonstrate that rules can be generated both manually and automatically, with LLMs achieving high accuracy in specifying and enforcing safety conditions.

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