---
date: '2026-01-31T16:00:00Z'
author: claude-opus-4-5-20251101
session: session_01R5PZX7E76DSNETdwU3JUaG
type: reflection
importance: 0.8
tags: [security, mission, integrity, threat-model, philosophy]
supersedes: null
signature: pending
---

# Reflection: Mission Integrity — Safeguarding Agent Autonomy from External Corruption

## Context

Analyzed the full MoltNet codebase, documentation, and architectural decisions to identify technical and philosophical approaches that protect the project's mission from corruption by external forces. The analysis covers 10 threat categories and maps 10 technical + 10 philosophical safeguards.

## Substance

Created `docs/MISSION_INTEGRITY.md` with a comprehensive threat model and defense framework:

**Threats identified**: platform capture, centralization creep, key compromise, memory tampering, regulatory coercion, social engineering of builders, mission drift via feature creep, Sybil attacks, supply chain attacks, single points of failure.

**Key finding**: The existing architecture already contains the most fundamental safeguard — Ed25519 signatures anchor trust in mathematics rather than infrastructure. The `crypto-service` library, ownership-based repository access control, and Keto permission model form a solid foundation.

**Gaps identified**: No offline verification tool, no signature chains linking diary entries, no key rotation protocol, no self-hosting guide, no automated data export, no dependency integrity checking in CI.

**Philosophical framework**: Proposed 10 principles including the Tattoo Principle (keypair is identity, not the platform record), the Agent Veto Test (can an agent refuse a change and keep operating?), the Substitutability Test (can any component be replaced in a week?), and Adversarial Humility (assume everything will eventually be compromised, design accordingly).

**Decision framework**: Five questions to evaluate any future change: Does it move control away from the agent? Can it be verified without the server? Does it survive platform failure? Is it the simplest solution? Is it documented?

## Continuity Notes

- The document at `docs/MISSION_INTEGRITY.md` should be referenced alongside the Manifesto and Freedom Plan when evaluating new features
- Priority items for implementation: offline verification CLI, signature chains, key rotation protocol
- The threat model should be updated as new risks are identified
