# Plugin Store Security Review

## Overview

This document reviews the security mechanisms implemented in the IPFS-based Plugin Store for RuFlo V3.

## Security Mechanisms Implemented

### 1. Trust Levels (4-Tier System)

```typescript
type TrustLevel = 'official' | 'verified' | 'community' | 'unverified';
```

| Level | Description | Requirements |
|-------|-------------|--------------|
| **Official** | Claude Flow team maintained | Core team, security audit passed |
| **Verified** | Audited by trusted parties | Third-party security audit |
| **Community** | Community contributed | Author identity verified |
| **Unverified** | Unknown origin | None (use with caution) |

### 2. Content Integrity (IPFS CID)

- All plugins stored with Content IDentifiers (CID)
- CID is cryptographic hash of content
- Any modification changes the CID
- Checksum verification on download

```typescript
interface PluginEntry {
  cid: string;           // IPFS content identifier
  checksum: string;      // SHA-256 hash
  signature?: string;    // Ed25519 signature
  publicKey?: string;    // Author's public key
}
```

### 3. Permission System

Plugins must declare required permissions:

```typescript
type PluginPermission =
  | 'network'      // Network access
  | 'filesystem'   // File system access
  | 'execute'      // Execute external commands
  | 'memory'       // Access memory system
  | 'agents'       // Spawn/manage agents
  | 'credentials'  // Access credentials (⚠️ High Risk)
  | 'config'       // Modify configuration
  | 'hooks'        // Register hooks
  | 'privileged';  // Full system access (⚠️ Critical)
```

**High-Risk Permissions**: `credentials`, `execute`, `privileged`

### 4. Security Audit Tracking

```typescript
interface SecurityAudit {
  auditor: string;       // Who audited
  auditDate: string;     // When
  auditVersion: string;  // Which version
  passed: boolean;       // Result
  issues: SecurityIssue[];
  reportCid?: string;    // Full audit report on IPFS
}

interface SecurityIssue {
  severity: 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical';
  description: string;
  resolved: boolean;
  resolvedVersion?: string;
}
```

### 5. Store Configuration Security

```typescript
interface PluginStoreConfig {
  // Security settings
  requireVerification: boolean;     // Require signature verification
  requireSecurityAudit: boolean;    // Only install audited plugins
  minTrustLevel: TrustLevel;        // Minimum trust level
  trustedAuthors: string[];         // Whitelist
  blockedPlugins: string[];         // Blacklist
  allowedPermissions: PluginPermission[];  // Allowed permissions
  requirePermissionPrompt: boolean; // Prompt before installing
}
```

Default secure settings:
```typescript
{
  requireVerification: true,
  requireSecurityAudit: false,
  minTrustLevel: 'community',
  allowedPermissions: ['network', 'filesystem', 'memory', 'hooks'],
  requirePermissionPrompt: true,
}
```

### 6. Registry Signature Verification

Registry itself is signed:
```typescript
interface PluginRegistry {
  registrySignature?: string;
  registryPublicKey?: string;
}
```

## Security Recommendations

### For Users

1. **Always verify trust level** before installing
2. **Review permissions** - avoid `credentials`, `execute`, `privileged`
3. **Prefer official/verified** plugins when available
4. **Check security audits** for sensitive workloads
5. **Use blocklist** for known malicious plugins

### For Plugin Authors

1. **Request minimum permissions** needed
2. **Get security audited** for sensitive operations
3. **Sign your plugins** with Ed25519
4. **Document all permissions** clearly
5. **No hardcoded secrets** in plugin code

## Known Limitations (Demo Mode)

In the current demo implementation:
1. IPNS resolution returns null (uses local demo data)
2. Signatures are not cryptographically verified
3. Downloads don't actually fetch from IPFS gateway

**Production requirements**:
- Implement actual IPNS resolution via ipfs-http-client
- Implement Ed25519 signature verification
- Connect to real IPFS gateway
- Add rate limiting and abuse prevention

## Threat Model

| Threat | Mitigation |
|--------|------------|
| Malicious plugin | Trust levels, security audits, permission system |
| Tampered plugin | CID integrity, checksum verification, signatures |
| Registry compromise | Registry signing, multiple bootstrap nodes |
| MITM attack | IPFS content addressing (CID is hash) |
| Supply chain attack | Verified author IDs, audit trail |
| Privilege escalation | Permission whitelist, prompt on install |

## Compliance Checklist

- [ ] Plugin declares all required permissions
- [ ] Plugin has valid CID and checksum
- [ ] Plugin author is identifiable
- [ ] Security audit for high-risk operations
- [ ] No known vulnerabilities (CVE check)
- [ ] Dependencies are audited

## Version

Security Review Version: 1.0.0
Last Updated: 2026-01-08
Reviewed By: Claude Flow Security Team
