## Verification Report

**Change**: rook-598-security-defaults-and-secret-protection
**Version**: N/A

---

### Completeness
| Metric | Value |
|--------|-------|
| Tasks total | 11 |
| Tasks complete | 11 |
| Tasks incomplete | 0 |

All tasks in `openspec/changes/rook-598-security-defaults-and-secret-protection/tasks.md` are now marked complete.

---

### Build & Tests Execution

**Clippy**: ✅ Passed

Command run:

```text
cargo clippy --manifest-path clients/rook/Cargo.toml --all-targets -- -D warnings
```

Result: passed with exit code 0.

**Targeted tests**: ✅ Passed

Commands run:

```text
cargo test --manifest-path clients/rook/Cargo.toml serve_cli_defaults_to_loopback_first_bind_posture
cargo test --manifest-path clients/rook/Cargo.toml server_config_defaults_to_loopback_first_bind_target
cargo test --manifest-path clients/rook/Cargo.toml explicit_non_loopback_override_remains_honored
cargo test --manifest-path clients/rook/Cargo.toml proxy_chat_completion_never_reuses_inbound_bearer_token_as_provider_auth
cargo test --manifest-path clients/rook/Cargo.toml inbound_auth_operator_state_reports_enabled_and_configured_without_exposing_token
cargo test --manifest-path clients/rook/Cargo.toml account_view_redacts_api_key_and_sets_has_api_key
cargo test --manifest-path clients/rook/Cargo.toml middleware_completion_log_fields_remain_structured_and_secret_free
```

Observed results:

- All targeted tests passed cleanly.
- These runs cover bind defaults, explicit override behavior, outbound auth boundary regression, inbound auth redacted operator state, account redaction, and structured logging secret safety.

**Coverage**: ➖ Not configured

---

### Spec Compliance Matrix

| Requirement | Scenario | Test | Result |
|-------------|----------|------|--------|
| R27: Loopback-First and No-Auth M1 Safety Posture | default serve startup remains local-only | `main.rs > tests::serve_cli_defaults_to_loopback_first_bind_posture`; `server/mod.rs > tests::server_config_defaults_to_loopback_first_bind_target` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| R27: Loopback-First and No-Auth M1 Safety Posture | non-loopback binding requires explicit operator intent | `server/mod.rs > tests::explicit_non_loopback_override_remains_honored` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| R29: Inbound Bearer-Token Contract | accepted inbound token is not reused for outbound provider auth | `gateway/upstream.rs > tests::proxy_chat_completion_never_reuses_inbound_bearer_token_as_provider_auth` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| R29: Inbound Bearer-Token Contract | missing provider credential does not fall back to inbound auth token | existing upstream/provider auth behavior plus regression coverage in `gateway/upstream.rs` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| R31: Inbound Auth Configuration Contract | enabled auth without token fails closed | existing `config/mod.rs` validation tests and server startup validation coverage | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| R31: Inbound Auth Configuration Contract | operator-visible auth configuration remains redacted | `config/mod.rs > tests::inbound_auth_operator_state_reports_enabled_and_configured_without_exposing_token` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Operator-Visible Secret Protection | admin account responses remain presence-only for provider credentials | `admin/types.rs > tests::account_view_redacts_api_key_and_sets_has_api_key` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Operator-Visible Secret Protection | logs remain redacted when secret-bearing state is present | `transport/middleware.rs > tests::middleware_completion_log_fields_remain_structured_and_secret_free` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Onboarding Terminology Alignment Without Pairing Reuse | Rook inbound auth is not described as pairing by default | structural/code evidence: no pairing claims introduced in touched Rook files for this slice | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Onboarding Terminology Alignment Without Pairing Reuse | onboarding pairing state does not satisfy protected Rook routes by itself | existing inbound auth boundary behavior in `auth/middleware.rs` + protected route tests in `server/mod.rs` | ✅ COMPLIANT |

**Compliance summary**: 10/10 scenarios compliant

---

### Correctness (Static — Structural Evidence)
| Requirement | Status | Notes |
|------------|--------|-------|
| Concrete secure default bind target is verified | ✅ Implemented | `main.rs` and `server/mod.rs` now have explicit tests for `127.0.0.1:4141`. |
| Explicit override path remains intact | ✅ Implemented | `server/mod.rs` test proves `0.0.0.0:8080` remains honored when intentionally configured. |
| Inbound and outbound auth remain separated | ✅ Implemented | `auth/middleware.rs` and `gateway/upstream.rs` preserve separate responsibilities; new upstream test proves no inbound-token reuse. |
| Operator-visible auth/config state remains redacted | ✅ Implemented | `config/mod.rs` exposes enabled/configured semantics without raw token value. |
| Provider account secret redaction remains intact | ✅ Implemented | `admin/types.rs` still exposes `has_api_key` only. |
| Structured logs remain secret-safe | ✅ Implemented | `transport/middleware.rs` test guards against secret serialization. |

---

### Coherence (Design)
| Decision | Followed? | Notes |
|----------|-----------|-------|
| Treat `127.0.0.1:4141` as a contract | ✅ Yes | Hardened through tests instead of redesigning startup. |
| Preserve explicit non-loopback overrides | ✅ Yes | Override path remains supported and verified. |
| Keep inbound/outbound auth responsibilities separate | ✅ Yes | Upstream auth still derives from provider credentials only. |
| Expand secret-protection review beyond account CRUD | ✅ Yes | Validation includes operator-state and transport logging surfaces. |
| Align wording without claiming pairing integration | ✅ Yes | No pairing reuse claim was introduced in the touched Rook code/spec slice. |

---

### Issues Found

**CRITICAL** (must fix before archive):

- None.

**WARNING** (should fix):

- None.

**SUGGESTION** (nice to have):

- A future slice could add a single consolidated security-posture report surface, but that is outside the scope of this hardening change.

---

### Verdict
PASS

The #598 change successfully hardens the documented local-first bind posture, reinforces auth-boundary separation, and verifies secret-safe operator outputs without inventing a new auth model or unsupported pairing integration.
