## Verification Report

**Change**: rook-591-transport-middleware-baseline  
**Date**: 2026-04-22

---

### Completeness

| Metric | Value |
|--------|-------|
| Tasks total | 11 |
| Tasks complete | 10 |
| Tasks incomplete | 1 |

Remaining unchecked task:

- [ ] 4.3 Refactor narrow duplicates only if needed in `clients/rook/src/gateway/handlers.rs` or `clients/rook/src/admin/handlers.rs`, without changing business contracts or widening scope.

Assessment: the remaining unchecked item is optional cleanup. Core implementation tasks for this slice are complete.

---

### Test Evidence

Build was intentionally not run because the user explicitly required: **Do not build the project.**

#### Targeted verification commands executed

1. `cargo test --manifest-path "clients/rook/Cargo.toml" transport::`
   - Result: **16 passed / 0 failed**

2. `cargo test --manifest-path "clients/rook/Cargo.toml" server::tests::covered_routes_include_effective_request_id_and_dashboard_root_stays_out_of_scope`
   - Result: **1 passed / 0 failed**

3. `cargo test --manifest-path "clients/rook/Cargo.toml" server::tests::auth_failures_still_include_effective_request_id_on_covered_routes`
   - Result: **1 passed / 0 failed**

#### Broader suite signal collected

4. `cargo test --manifest-path "clients/rook/Cargo.toml"`
   - Result: **199 passed / 2 failed / 0 skipped**
   - Remaining unrelated failing tests:
     - `db::account::tests::vendor_other_with_quotes_round_trips`
     - `routing::tests::cycle_detection_returns_routing_error`

Interpretation: the transport middleware slice is clean in targeted evidence and no longer contributes a failing full-suite test. The crate-wide suite remains red due to unrelated existing failures.

---

### Spec Compliance Matrix

| Requirement | Scenario | Evidence | Result |
|-------------|----------|----------|--------|
| Transport Middleware Covered Surfaces | middleware baseline applies to protected gateway route | `server::tests::covered_routes_include_effective_request_id_and_dashboard_root_stays_out_of_scope` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Transport Middleware Covered Surfaces | middleware baseline applies to protected admin route | `server::tests::covered_routes_include_effective_request_id_and_dashboard_root_stays_out_of_scope` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Transport Middleware Covered Surfaces | dashboard routes remain out of scope | `server::tests::covered_routes_include_effective_request_id_and_dashboard_root_stays_out_of_scope` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Request ID Generation and Propagation Contract | server generates request ID when absent | `transport::request_id::tests::resolves_generated_request_id_when_header_absent`; covered-route response header test | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| Request ID Generation and Propagation Contract | server propagates valid inbound request ID | `transport::request_id::tests::resolves_adopted_request_id_for_valid_inbound_value`; covered-route response header test | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Request ID Generation and Propagation Contract | invalid inbound request ID is replaced deterministically | `transport::request_id::*generated*` malformed/empty/whitespace/multi/oversized tests | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| Transport Tracing and Logging Hooks | successful request emits correlated transport fields | `transport::middleware::tests::middleware_completion_log_fields_remain_structured_and_secret_free` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Transport Tracing and Logging Hooks | error response still emits transport correlation data | `server::tests::auth_failures_still_include_effective_request_id_on_covered_routes` | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| Transport Tracing and Logging Hooks | secret-bearing headers are redacted from observability output | `transport::middleware::tests::middleware_completion_log_fields_remain_structured_and_secret_free` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Inbound Header Sanitation Rules | empty forwarded header value is sanitized out of trusted view | `transport::forwarded::tests::malformed_values_are_ignored_and_tracked`; `...enabled_policy_without_peer_address_falls_back_to_strict_default` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Inbound Header Sanitation Rules | malformed request ID header does not survive as effective correlation ID | `transport::request_id::tests::resolves_generated_request_id_for_malformed_inbound_value` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Inbound Header Sanitation Rules | unrelated application headers remain outside this sanitation contract | Structural evidence: transport context derives only from configured request ID / `X-Forwarded-*` / `X-Real-IP` / `Via` and does not rewrite unrelated headers | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| Strict-by-Default Forwarded Header Trust Policy | default policy ignores untrusted forwarded host and proto | `transport::forwarded::tests::disabled_trust_policy_ignores_forwarded_metadata`; `...untrusted_source_ignores_forwarded_headers`; `...enabled_policy_without_peer_address_falls_back_to_strict_default` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Strict-by-Default Forwarded Header Trust Policy | default policy ignores untrusted client IP metadata | `transport::forwarded::tests::disabled_trust_policy_ignores_forwarded_metadata`; `...untrusted_source_ignores_forwarded_headers` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Explicit Trusted-Proxy Opt-In Behavior | trusted proxy policy allows configured forwarded metadata | `transport::forwarded::tests::trusted_source_adopts_allowed_forwarded_headers` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Explicit Trusted-Proxy Opt-In Behavior | opt-in policy does not trust headers from non-trusted source | `transport::forwarded::tests::untrusted_source_ignores_forwarded_headers` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Explicit Trusted-Proxy Opt-In Behavior | trusted-proxy opt-in does not widen unrelated security behavior | Structural evidence: no auth/rate-limit/TLS/provider-auth branching in transport module | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| Transport Middleware Configuration Contract | strict default requires no proxy trust configuration | `config::tests::transport_config_defaults_to_strict_request_id_and_disabled_proxy_trust` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Transport Middleware Configuration Contract | malformed trusted-proxy configuration cannot enable partial trust | `config::tests::transport_config_validate_rejects_enabled_proxy_without_cidrs`; `...rejects_invalid_trusted_proxy_cidr` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Transport Middleware Configuration Contract | transport configuration is separate from auth and provider credentials | `main.rs::tests::build_server_config_keeps_inbound_auth_separate`; `server::tests::valid_inbound_auth_does_not_replace_outbound_provider_auth` | ✅ COMPLIANT |
| Non-Goals and Deferred Concerns | baseline acceptance does not require rate limiting or TLS work | Structural evidence: no rate limiting/idempotency/streaming/TLS/RBAC/outbound provider auth changes in transport implementation | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
| Non-Goals and Deferred Concerns | baseline acceptance remains separate from archived inbound auth work | `server::tests::auth_failures_still_include_effective_request_id_on_covered_routes`; separate `transport/` module | ✅ COMPLIANT |

Summary: compliant on core scope; remaining partial items are evidence-depth warnings, not functional blockers.

---

### Correctness (Structural Evidence)

| Requirement | Status | Notes |
|------------|--------|-------|
| Covered surfaces only `/api/*` and `/v1/*` | ✅ Implemented | `server/mod.rs` layers transport middleware only on nested `/api` and `/v1`, dashboard merged separately. |
| Request ID generation/propagation | ✅ Implemented | `transport/request_id.rs` plus response header propagation in `transport/middleware.rs`. |
| Tracing/logging hooks | ✅ Implemented | Transport middleware emits structured completion fields for request ID, surface, method, route, status, duration, trust state, ignored headers. |
| Secret redaction/omission | ✅ Implemented | Completion logging uses derived/sanitized fields only. |
| Header sanitation scope | ✅ Implemented | Current slice explicitly covers `X-Forwarded-*`, `X-Real-IP`, and `Via` diagnostics; `Forwarded` is out of scope by updated spec/design. |
| Strict-by-default trust | ✅ Implemented | Untrusted/missing peer/default-disabled proxy trust falls back to ignored forwarded metadata. |
| Trusted-proxy opt-in | ✅ Implemented | CIDR allowlist plus allowed header families; fail-closed validation. |
| Separation from auth boundary | ✅ Implemented | `transport/` module remains separate from archived auth slice. |
| Non-goals preserved | ✅ Implemented | No rate limiting, idempotency, streaming, TLS, RBAC, or outbound provider auth changes in this slice. |

---

### Issues Found

**CRITICAL**

- None for the transport middleware slice itself.

**WARNING**

- Full `clients/rook` suite is still not clean due to two unrelated existing failures:
  - `db::account::tests::vendor_other_with_quotes_round_trips`
  - `routing::tests::cycle_detection_returns_routing_error`
- One optional cleanup task remains unchecked (`tasks.md` item 4.3), but it is explicitly non-blocking.
- Some scenarios rely on strong structural/helper evidence rather than dedicated covered-route integration tests.

---

### Verdict

**PASS WITH WARNINGS**

The `rook-591-transport-middleware-baseline` slice is implemented and behaviorally supported by passing targeted evidence. The only remaining issues are unrelated crate-wide test failures and a small amount of evidence-depth debt, so this slice can proceed under PASS WITH WARNINGS if the team accepts that repository-level noise remains outside the slice.
