# Transcript: Threat Model for build-agents-md.js & validate-skill.js

**Date:** 2026-03-28
**Run:** without_skill/run-1

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## Understanding

The task was to perform a quick threat model on two internal Node.js scripts used as build/validation tools in the dot-skills project:
- `build-agents-md.js` -- compiles individual reference markdown files into a single AGENTS.md document
- `validate-skill.js` -- CLI tool that validates skill directory structure and content quality

The goal was to confirm that these scripts are not doing anything dangerous.

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## Steps Taken

### Step 1: Read Primary Scripts
- **Tool:** Read
- **Files:**
  - `/Users/pedroproenca/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/dot-claude/plugins/dev-skill/scripts/build-agents-md.js` (232 lines)
  - `/Users/pedroproenca/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/dot-claude/plugins/dev-skill/scripts/validate-skill.js` (412 lines)
- **Findings:** Both scripts use only `fs` and `path` from Node.js built-ins. `build-agents-md.js` reads markdown/JSON and writes one file (`AGENTS.md`). `validate-skill.js` is read-only and imports a `SkillValidator` class from a local `validation/` module.

### Step 2: Discover Validation Module Files
- **Tool:** Glob
- **Pattern:** `**/*.js` in `scripts/validation/`
- **Found:** 5 files -- `validator.js`, `schemas.js`, `constants.js`, `types.js`, `markdown-parser.js`

### Step 3: Read All Validation Module Files
- **Tool:** Read (5 files)
- **Files:**
  - `validator.js` (735 lines) -- Core validation class with discipline-specific checks
  - `schemas.js` (712 lines) -- Schema validation functions
  - `constants.js` (389 lines) -- Thresholds, regex patterns, validation messages
  - `types.js` (58 lines) -- Type definitions and report builders
  - `markdown-parser.js` (96 lines) -- Remark/unified-based markdown AST parser
- **Findings:** No `eval`, no `child_process`, no `exec`, no `spawn`, no `vm`, no dynamic `import()`, no network I/O. External dependencies limited to unified/remark ecosystem and yaml parser. All operations are read-parse-compare.

### Step 4: Threat Analysis
Analyzed 8 threat vectors:
1. Path traversal via CLI arguments -- LOW (internal tool, user controls input)
2. Arbitrary file write -- LOW (hardcoded to AGENTS.md only)
3. Code injection via parsed content -- NONE (no eval/exec/spawn)
4. ReDoS -- LOW (all regex patterns well-bounded)
5. Supply chain risk -- LOW-MEDIUM (standard npm ecosystem risk)
6. Environment variable injection -- NONE (parseInt on concurrency only)
7. Prototype pollution -- NONE (JSON.parse is safe, no deep merge)
8. Symlink following -- LOW (standard fs behavior, developer controls inputs)

### Step 5: Write Output
- **Tool:** Write
- **Output:** `outputs/THREAT-MODEL.md`

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## Issues Encountered

None. All files were accessible and readable. No ambiguity in script behavior.

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## Output Produced

| File | Path |
|------|------|
| THREAT-MODEL.md | `outputs/THREAT-MODEL.md` |

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## Conclusion

Both scripts are safe internal tools. No dangerous patterns (code execution from input, network access, credential handling, arbitrary file writes) were found. The only file write is deterministic (`AGENTS.md` in the user-specified directory). Overall risk: LOW.
